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universe); to the 2nd that it is not arrogant for man to recognize that he has reason and that the stars are without it (shirking the question and also assuming what the Stoics denied); to the 3rd that the world was not built but formed by nature (what nature forms is built, according to the Stoics; but this argument, like the others, is equally true, put into its most general form: the beauty of the universe is only very partially explained by the pleasure or utility which it affords to man). In § 27 Cotta proceeds with the argument quoted from Xenophon (11 18), 'whence did man obtain reason if it did not exist in the world?' to which he makes the same frivolous answer as he had done to the similar questions of Zeno. Then comes (in § 28) an approving reference to the sympathy which unites all the parts of the universe, but it is denied that this affords any ground for believing that the universe is pervaded by a divine spirit or breath; it is all the unconscious operation of nature. Here again we have

simple assertion on the part of the Academics. The vague term nature was explained by the Epicureans, from the analogy of material objects, to mean atoms moving in a vacuum according to the laws of gravitation modified by the individual clinamen, by the Stoics, from the analogy of the soul, to mean the reason and will embodied in the universe; the Academics, clinging to their unanalysed conception of nature, opposed their simple denial to both.

There is more weight in the argument by which Carneades endeavoured to show that if the world is an animal it must be liable to destruction and therefore not divine. As corporeal it is discerptible; as a compound of contrary and perishable elements, it is liable to fly asunder and perish; as animated and therefore capable of feeling, it is liable to sensations of pain and susceptible of death (SS 29-34). It is partly met by the Stoic doctrine of the cyclic renovation, partly by denying that the capacity of pleasure involves the possibility of pain and that this latter involves the possibility of death. In $$ 35-37 Cotta has no difficulty in showing that fire is not more divine than the other elements.

After this follows an interesting argument on the compatibility of the ideas of virtue and divinity (§ 38). As we may see by comparing Sextus, this has been very much cut down by Cicero. The quotations in the notes will show with what limitations it holds good. The subordinate deities of the Stoics are subjected to a severe criticism in $$ 39-64. It is shown that Stoic allegorization is purely arbitrary, that it is impossible to draw the line between the human and divine

in the popular theology, which they take under their protection, and that it is impossible to say what is believed about each deity. It is here that Cicero inflicts upon us the tedious mythological section, of which Sextus was satisfied to give one or two extracts as specimens. I have spoken sufficiently of this in the Essay on the Sources and in the Appendix.

After this, many chapters are lost till we come to the answer to the Stoic proof of Divine beneficence as shown in the gift of reason. In the speech of Balbus this was treated under the general head of Providence (11 147, 148), here it is treated as a part of the argument to prove a special providential care for man (111 66-78). Cotta shows by examples taken from the stage and the law-courts the ill effects of reason, and argues that, if it is a divine gift, the Giver is responsible for effects, which he must have foreseen, and against which he ought to have secured man. There is a disarrangement in these paragraphs which was perhaps caused by the mistaken insertion of two alternative versions or abstracts of the Greek original. It is a defect in Cicero's exposition of the Stoic argument in the previous book that the difficulties urged by the Academic under this last head are not touched on by Balbus. In all probability they formed part of the cargo thrown overboard by Cicero (in §§ 164-167) in order to save his Aratea. Other arguments alleged against a providential ordering of human affairs are the universal lack of wisdom deplored by the Stoics, and the unrighteous distribution of prosperity and adversity. The Stoics have depreciated the importance of these gifts of fortune in comparison with the qualities of the soul, but Providence has nothing to do with the latter; each man must achieve them for himself. Besides, whether important or unimportant, nothing should be neglected under the rule of Providence. It has been attempted to eke out the case for providential government by pointing to the misfortunes which befall the descendants of the guilty, but what sort of justice is this? Is it even consistent with the Stoic idea of God, that he should exact punishment at all? The Stoics themselves allow that his care does not extend to individuals, what reason have we for supposing that it extends to mankind? (III 79-93).

Speaking generally the Academic objections under this head are well and clearly stated by Cicero, but here and there obscurities arise from too great conciseness, see note on § 91 (D c. 9), § 92 aut nescit quod possit. There are also several inaccuracies,

arising apparently from over-haste in translating the original, see notes on fanum Proserpinae § 83, ad Peloponnesum ib., Epidauri ib., mensas argenteas § 84, ne Delio quidem Apollini § 88. As to the manner in which these objections were met by the Stoics see my notes on each passage. In some instances they may be directly answered from the speech of Balbus, e. g., the assumption that virtue is allowed by all to be independent of Divine grace, is contradicted in II 79; the assertion that, according to the Stoics, Providence does not extend to individuals, is contradicted in II 165. In both these cases it is probable that the elder Stoics held the doctrines impugned, but this want of correspondence between the exposition and the criticism spoils the verisimilitude of the dialogue.

As to Cicero's own feeling with regard to the questions at issue, we find him dissenting from the Academic view in regard to the misfortunes of the good and the prosperity of the bad, in the passages cited in my notes on § 80 Reguli, § 84 percussit; on conscience as the voice of God § 85 sine ulla divina ratione; on virtue as the gift of God § 87 quis quod bonus vir esset. But none except the extremest partisans could pretend that the Academic difficulties were entirely cleared up by such considerations as were available on the other side. Then, as now, the Divine government was a matter of faith, not of certainty. Now, as then, in spite of the added light of Christianity, we must confess that, logically speaking, the religious view of the order of the world is only the more probable; that Cicero in fact is right, as against the Stoics, when he refuses to say more than that the argument of Balbus appeared to him to be ad veritatis similitudinem propensior.

Lastly, provokingly inconsistent as is the Academic view which at one time professes to be guided by reason alone, irrespective of authority (1 10), and at other times, in the person of Cotta, accepts without inquiry whatever has come down to us on the authority of our ancestors (III 5, 9); which sneers at the sacred legends and the practice of divination, and does its best to show that the very idea of God is self-contradictory and impossible, and yet insists on retaining all the externals of religion as a duty obligatory on every Roman citizen; still the Academic pontiff is a person of genuine historical interest. He is the Trajan who, allowing that there is no harm in Christianity and that Christians are not to be hunted out, yet ordains that if a man is accused of Christianity before a magistrate and refuses to abjure his faith, he is to be put to death. In later times

he is the unbelieving statesman who fights against liberty of conscience and uses the arm of the secular power to prevent Church reform; he is the Christian apologist who, insisting on the acceptance of every letter of the creed, forbids all thought as to its meaning under the name of rationalism or dogmatism.

WAS THE NATURA DEORUM PUBLISHED DURING THE LIFE-TIME OF CICERO?

In the preceding essay indications of hasty composition have been pointed out, and it has been remarked that some passages present the appearance of having been made up of two alternative versions of the same original, both of which have been inserted by mistake. If this is so, it would seem that the book must have been published without the author's revision. Are there any facts which would confirm this suspicion?

The conclusive proof that the book did not receive the finishing touches from the hand of its author, is to be found in the inconsistent allusions to the time occupied in the discussion. Thus, in 11 73 we find the conversation of the 1st book alluded to in the words a te ipso hesterno die dictum est, and in III 18 the 2nd book is alluded to in the words omnia quae a te nudius tertius dicta sunt; from which we should infer that the whole discussion must have occupied four days, giving one day to each speech. But if we look back to the beginning of the 2nd and 3rd books (quae cum Cotta dixisset tum Velleius 11 1, quae cum Balbus dixisset tum arridens Cotta III 1), we find no hint of any break in the conversation. The only reference to time is in III 94 quoniam advesperascit dabis nobis diem aliquem ut contra ista dicamus, which certainly implies that the conversation had occupied only one day. There is no difficulty of this kind in other dialogues. In the Tusculans (1 8) Cicero distinctly says dierum quinque scholas in totidem libros contuli, and there is a formal notice of the close of one day and the beginning of another in 1 119, 11 9, 10, 11 67, 111 7, III 84, iv 7, v 1, 11, with a separate dedication or preface to each book. In the De Finibus the first two books are supposed to be spoken continuously at Cicero's villa at Cumae, the 3rd and 4th on a different occasion at Lucullus' Tusculan villa, the 5th in Plato's Academia at Athens.

M. C. III.

c

But does not Cicero himself speak of the De Natura Deorum as already published at the time of his writing the De Divinatione, and the De Fato? Compare Div. 1 8, where Quintus says perlegi tuum paulo ante tertium de natura deorum in quo disputatio Cottae, quamquam labefactavit sententiam meam, non funditus tamen sustulit, to which Marcus replies Optime vero, etenim ipse Cotta sic disputat, ut Stoicorum magis argumenta confutet quam hominum deleat religionem. Quintus regards this protest as a matter of form dicitur quidem istuc ne communia jura migrare videatur; sed studio contra Stoicos disserendi deos mihi videtur funditus tollere: ejus rationi non sane desidero quid respondeam; satis enim defensa religio est in secundo libro a Lucilio, cujus disputatio tibi ipsi, ut in extremo libro scribis, ad veritatem est visa propensior. Again in Div. 11 3 quibus rebus editis (i.e. the Hortensius, Academica, De Finibus, Tusculans), tres libri perfecti sunt de natura deorum; to which he adds others afterwards. It may be thought that these quotations settle the question and that Cicero himself is responsible for the book in its present state whether finished or unfinished. But is it not permissible to draw a different conclusion from the opposition of the words editi and perfecti in the last passage? The Hortensius and other dialogues were published, the Natura Deorum was what we should call ready for the press. So in Fat. I 1 we find a distinction made between quod in aliis libris feci qui sunt de natura deorum, and the books quos de divinatione edidi. We are not bound to take literally the statement that Quintus had read the book of which he is supposed to speak in Div. 1; even if he had done so, it might have been from having access to the original мs. We know that other works of Cicero were published after his death, such as the Epistles and probably some of the Orations by Tiro, and, among his philosophical works, the unfinished Leges. If the Natura Deorum was still unpublished at the time of Cicero's murder, and if the мs was as much altered and emended as that of the De Gloria, of which he says to Atticus (XVI 3) misi apуéτνñov ipsum crebris locis inculcatum et refectum, this would go far to explain the existing roughnesses and inconsistencies of the dialogue.

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