26 sed post axiaximenes. ac ratione ac vi. sensu. deus sine ulla forma (superscr. fortuna). (animal aliquod voluit esse erit aliquid) an. esse vol. aliquod erit. (habere quod liqueat) qu. liq. scire. nonne aer qui. (careat etiam) c. (dicens tollit) dicens qua omnia regantur t. (from below). (dicit) dixit. designaret. (fabulis) famulis. tamen modo. 36 (vi divina esse affectam) ut divinam esse ac perfectam. 37 (censeat) deceat. dum. voluntatem. 38 (volumus) voluminis. 39 veterrimus. esse demum. vult corr. from tulit. appellatur. (tum totius) cum t. (quidvis) quid jus. (venerari) vulnerare (so M and vul(habere debeat) haberi debeatur. enim est. credam. nausi fane. 70 (hoc dicere turpius est) hoc diceretur pius esse. utrum esset ejus modi (omitting esse verum-concessit). negavit. (Arcesilas) Artophilas. 71 mirabilius quam vos. 72 (equidem) quidam. 73 (metuit) metivit. eorumque. 74 quasi corpus-intellego om. 75 (in Venere) invenere. nisi valde. corpus aut quasi om. devinctionibus. (aut etiam 2nd) aut (sanguis est) s. non est. (liberet) juberet. 92 decreverunt. supervacaneum. loqueretur. quam interiora om. 93 hermacus. superscr. sit. (etiam Leontium) om. etiam (so HN). sillum. crisippam. 94 ne ulla. impetraretis. (curatio) oratio. ausa fuit concideret. ANALYSIS OF BOOK III. ACADEMIC CRITICISM OF THE STOIC THEOLOGY. Introduction. Cotta regards the Stoic doctrine as deserving of more serious attention than the Epicurean; but is himself content to believe as his fathers did. If the Stoics profess to base their religion on grounds of reason, they must be prepared for criticism, ch. 1 § 1— ch. II § 6. Criticism distributed under four heads. A. The Divine Existence, ch. III § 7-ch. VIII § 19. B. The Divine Nature, ch. vIII § 20-ch. xxv § 64. C. Providential Government of the Universe, § 65. (All but a few lines lost.) D. Providential Care for Man (beginning lost), ch. xxvi § 66— ch. XXXIX § 93. Conclusion. Cicero gives his vote in favour of the Stoic, as opposed to the Academic view. A. The Divine Existence, ch. III § 7-ch. vIII § 19. Aa. If the belief in the Divine Existence is necessary and universal, as the Stoics allege, it is worse than useless to attempt to rest it on argument, which simply raises doubts as to the validity of the belief. 7-10. Ab. It is not true that the sight of the heavens leads to a belief in the Stoic God of Nature. § 10, 11. Ac. General belief is a strange ground to allege for a philosophical conviction, especially on the part of those who hold the vox populi to be the vox stultorum. § 11. Ad. The epiphanies' to which the Stoics appeal are mere rumour unconfirmed by evidence. $ 11-13. Ae. Divination is utterly fallacious, and would be of no benefit, if true. It cannot therefore prove the Divine Existence. SS 14, 15. Af. Of the other arguments adduced by Cleanthes, the two which deal with the blessings of life and the order of the heavenly bodies will be treated of under C: the awe-inspiring phenomena of nature, though they helped to produce the belief in God, yet are far from proving the validity of that belief. $ 16, 17. Ag. The arguments of Chrysippus as to the power, beauty and harmony exhibited in the universe, the syllogisms of Zeno, and the physical proof of the divinity of the universe are reserved for the same section (C). $$ 18, 19. (They are really treated of in section B.) B. The Divine Nature, ch. vIII § 20-ch. xxv § 64. Ba. Criticism of particular arguments of Zeno, Chrysippus and Xenophon. § 20-28. (1) When it is said 'the universe is best and therefore divine', there is an ambiguity in 'best'. Granted that it is most beautiful and admirably adapted to our wants, but how is it most wise? If, as Zeno says, because what is wise is better than what is not wise, why not, on the same principle, make the universe to be a mathematician or musician? S$ 20-23. (2) Again, as to the argument that the regular movements of the stars prove them to be divine, this is simply the regularity of nature on the same principle we should call the tides divine. $23, 24. (3) Chrysippus uses 'better' in the same vague way as Zeno, and does not distinguish between nature and reason. It is no presumption in man to believe that he is himself rational and that the stars are made of brute matter. The comparison of the universe to a house begs the question. $$ 25, 26. (4) Nor is there more weight in the assumption of the Xenophontic Socrates, that the rational soul of man must have proceeded from a rational soul in the universe; or in that (of Chrysippus) that the harmony of nature can only be explained on the supposition of one divine Governour. Both the harmony of nature and the soul of man are spontaneous products of nature acting according to her own laws. § 27, 28. Bb. The argument of Carneades showing that no animal can be eternal (and therefore that the God of the Stoics is a figment). S$ 29-34. |