(1) Whatever is corporeal is discerptible. § 29.

(2) Whatever is animated is capable of feeling, and whatever is capable of feeling is liable to impressions from without, and therefore to destruction. § 29.

(3) Whatever is composed of changing elements is itself liable to change and therefore perishable; but the four elements, of which all animals are composed, are changeable and perishable; therefore all animals are mortal. $$ 30, 31.

(4) Every animal is susceptible of pleasure and pain, but that which is susceptible of pain is susceptible of death. §§ 32, 33.

(5) Every animal has instinctive likes and dislikes for that which is in accordance with, and that which is contrary to its nature; but that which is contrary to nature is destructive to life; therefore every animal is liable to destruction. § 33.

(6) Sensation, whether pleasurable or painful, when it reaches a certain point is destructive to life. § 34.

(7) All things must be either simple, or compounded of different elements. A simple animal is inconceivable: in a compound each element has a tendency to fly apart to its proper sphere, so that decomposition is inevitable. § 34.

Bc. There is no reason to suppose that fire is more akin to Divinity than the other elements. $$ 35-37.

(1) It is not more essential to life than they are. $$ 35, 36.

(2) If it is the cause of feeling in man, it must itself be endued with feeling and therefore (by Bb. 4) liable to destruction. $36.

(3) Moreover fire is not self-existent, but needs fuel for its support. § 37.

Bd. Virtue, as we understand it, is incompatible with our idea of the divine nature. Yet it is impossible to believe in a Deity without virtue. The incompatibility of virtue with our idea of God is shown in the case of each particular virtue, prudence (1), justice (2), temperance (3), fortitude (4). § 38.

Be. Even if we grant the divinity of the universe, what ground is there for admitting a host of other gods? ch. xv § 39-ch. xxv $ 64.

M. C. III.

(1) The vulgar mythology is not more irrational than that of the Stoics, who make gods of the stars, and of food, and of dead men. S$ 39-41.

(2) Admitting the principle of apotheosis, how are we to pick out the true claimant from among the many pretenders to each divine name? (For details see the Appendix on the mythological section.) $42, 53-60.

(3) The sorites of Carneades shows that it is impossible to draw the line between what is divine and what is human or natural. $43-52.

(4) No less absurd are the deified abstractions of the Stoics, and their whole system of allegorization with its strained etymologies. $61-64.

C. Providential Government of the Universe. § 65. [This section is almost entirely lost.]

D. Providential Care for Man, ch. xxvi § 66-ch. XXXIX § 93. [A considerable portion of this section is lost, comprising probably (1) the argument founded on the endowments of man exclusive of his reason, which latter is considered below under Da; (2) that founded on the subordination of the animate and inanimate creation to man's good. Compare II §§ 133-146, 148-153, 154-162.]

Da. The gift of reason is an injury rather than a benefit. $$ 66-78.

(1) This shown by examples from tragedy, $$ 66-68;

(2) by examples from comedy, §§ 72, 73;

(3) by examples from the law-courts, § 74.

(4) It is only right reason which is beneficial, and this is so rare that it cannot be derived from God, as he would never have been guilty of partiality in his dealings with men. $$ 69, 70.

(5) The objection is not met by the rejoinder that these evils are owing to man's abuse of reason; for the Deity must have foreseen that these evils would flow from the bare gift of reason, and was therefore bound to prevent them by guarding it from error. S$ 70, 71, 76-78.

Db. If it be true that lack of wisdom is the greatest of evils, and that all men lack wisdom, how can it be said that man is the special favorite of Heaven? § 79.

Dc. If God really cared for men, he ought to have made all men good, or at least to have rewarded the good and punished the bad. $$79-93.

(1) Instances of suffering virtue. § 80.

(2) Instances of triumphant vice. 81-84.

(3) Such a state of things is inconsistent with any moral government. § 85.

(4) It is no answer to say that de minimis non curat lex. Life and liberty cannot be called minima. § 86.

(5) [If it be alleged that all external goods are minima in comparison with virtue], it is just these external goods which are at the disposal of Heaven. Virtue is what each man must win for himself, and is therefore never made the subject of prayer. Men have deified Virtue in the abstract, but in reality it is only a quality of their own nature. 86-88.

(6) It is only by shutting our eyes to the negative instances, that we can maintain that piety is regularly rewarded and impiety punished. § 89.

(7) Intentional neglect is a great fault in a ruler, and in a Divine Ruler there can be no such thing as unintentional neglect. § 90.

(8) It is argued that vice is punished in the descendants of the guilty person: what should we say to such justice in a human ruler? $ 90.

(9) We need not have recourse to the Deity to explain such moral government as actually exists in the world. It is the natural result of human agency. § 91.

(10) Moreover how can God punish, if, as the Stoics assert, he is incapable of anger? He might however exert the power, of which you have given such elaborate proof, in helping the good. If he does not do this, it must be because either the will or the knowledge is wanting. § 92.

(11) You allow that his care does not extend to individuals : why should it extend to nations, or even to humanity at large? $93.

(12) Yet you are inconsistent enough to believe in divination and to encourage the offering of vows. § 93.

(13) With so many unemployed deities as you acknowledge, there seems no reason why supervision might not have been extended to the minutest detail of individual life. § 93.

Conclusion. Cicero avows his personal preference for the Stoic, as opposed to the Academic view of theology. SS 94, 95.

ON THE SOURCES OF THE THIRD BOOK OF THE
DE NATURA DEORUM.

There can be no doubt that for the materials of this book Cicero was mainly indebted to the Carthaginian Hasdrubal, better known by his Greek name Clitomachus, who was born about 180 B.C. and went to reside at Athens about 155. He was for many years a disciple of Carneades and eventually became the head of the New Academy. Carneades himself having left no written remains (Diog. Iv 65, Plut. Mor. p. 328), it was through the voluminous writings of his scholar, extending to more than 400 volumes, that his teaching was perpetuated, cf. Diog. IV 67 SuedégαTо Tov Kapveádny kai Tà αὐτοῦ μάλιστα διὰ τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐφώτισεν, Cic. Acad. u 104 explicavi paulo ante Clitomacho auctore quo modo ista Carneades diceret, ib. II 98 a Clitomacho sumam (totam Carneadi sententiam) qui usque ad senectutem cum Carneade fuit, Sext. Emp. 1x 182 ἠρώτηνται δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Καρνεάδου καὶ σωρειτικῶς τινες (λόγοι), οὓς ὁ γνώριμος αὐτοῦ Κλειτόμαχος ὡς σπουδαιοτάτους καὶ ἀνυτικωτάτους ἀνέ ypayer (referring to the arguments which Cicero has inserted below $$ 43-52). We are told (Ac. 11 102) that Clitomachus addressed two of his philosophical treatises to Romans, one to the satirist Lucilius, the other to Censorinus, consul in 149 B.C.; and that he was lecturing at Athens during the quaestorship of the orator Crassus 110 B.C. (Orat. 1 45). Cicero mentions a treatise πepì èπoxys in four books (Ac. 11 98) and a consolatio written to his countrymen after the fall of Carthage (Tusc. III 54). Schwencke (Jahrb. f. class. Philol. 1879, 2 p. 141) conjectures that the title of the treatise employed here by Cicero was περὶ προνοίας.

That Carneades was the great source of all criticism of Stoic doctrines and especially of Stoic theology is evident from Cicero's own words N. D. 11 162 Carneades libenter in Stoicos invehebatur, Tusc. v 83 contra Stoicos, quos studiosissime semper refellebat et contra quorum disciplinam ingenium ejus exarserat, N. D. 1 4 sunt autem alii philosophi qui deorum mente omnem mundum administrari censeant...contra quos Carneades ita multa disseruit, ut excitaret homines non socordes ad veri investigandi cupiditatem. We might therefore assume a priori that the argument of the Third Book was taken from him, even if it were not distinctly stated in regard to the proof that no animal can be eternal (III 29), and in regard to the sorites showing the impossibility of drawing any line between the divine and human in the traditional mythology (1144). The same thing appears from the 9th book of Sextus Empiricus Adv. Math. where we meet with many of the arguments used by Cicero. Thus, at the commencement of the discussion on natural causes, Sextus declares his intention not to dwell too much on points of detail or run to the immoderate length of Clitomachus in refuting the dogmatists, but to sum up the most important arguments on both sides and allow them to balance one another (Ix 1). As the whole discussion is of interest for this as well as for the earlier books of our treatise, it may be worth while to give a short analysis, referring to the parallel passages in the N. D. The positive argument is probably taken in part at least from Posidonius, see Introduction on the Sources of the First Book, vol. I p. lii foll., and Schwencke Jahrb. f. cl. Philol. 1879, 1 p. 57 foll.

The discussion in Sextus may be divided as follows: (A) The origin of religious belief, (1) positive argument §§ 13-28, (2) negative argument 29-47. (B) The fact of the divine existence, (1) positive argument § 48-136, (2) negative argument §§ 137-194. give them in order below.

(A) The origin of religion has been ascribed to the earliest legislators who desired to establish a check upon unrighteousness of thought as well as of deed §§ 14—16 (N. D. 1 118). Euhemerus thought that the first rulers of mankind declared themselves divine in order to increase their own power § 17 (N. D. 1 119); Prodicus that the ancients deified all that was useful to life, as the Sun, the rivers § 18 (V. D. 1 118); Democritus that images of vast size appeared to men and forewarned them of the future § 19 (N. D. 120); Aristotle derived the belief from the soul's prophetic faculty and