from the order of the heavenly bodies §§ 20—22 (N. D. 11 95); others by a process of amplification rose from the finite intelligence in man to the conception of a divine intelligence in nature § 23 (N. D. II 33—38); others, among whom is also Democritus, from the terrible phenomena of nature § 24 (N. D. п 14); Epicurus from visions of anthropomorphic deities § 25 (N. D. 1 46); others from the orderly movements of the heavenly bodies, which suggest a creative and guiding intelligence no less than the movements of an army or a ship to the distant spectator §§ 26, 27 (N. D. II 85, 87); some of the younger Stoics say that it is a tradition handed down from the sages of the golden age § 28 (N. D. II 148, 159). On the negative side it is maintained that these opposing views are mutually destructive § 29 (N. D. 1 1, 5); but dealing with them separately we may ask, where did these early legislators get their own idea of deity? §§ 30, 31. How did the differences of religious belief arise? How were the various nations brought together to be instructed in religion? If it be said 'each nation was independently taught', how did all agree in the same general idea of God? §§ 32, 33. Religion cannot have been an invention for the purpose of giving additional authority to living or dead rulers, for where did the idea itself come from? and how could a mere imposture have taken such firm root? §§ 34-38 (N. D. II 5). The deification of utility is even more absurd. How can it be supposed that men would make gods of what they ate and drank? There might be some reason for ascribing divinity to the power which holds together the earth and makes it fruitful, but, sooner than call rivers divine, we should deify philosophers, or even all animals that are of use to man §§ 39-41 (N. D. II 60, III 41). Democritus and Epicurus explain the easier by the more difficult §§ 42, 43 (N. D. 1 121); they utterly fail to account for the attributes of immortality and perfection § 44. Those who fill up the conception of divinity obtained from visions and the celestial movements by amplifying their experience of human blessedness, are really guilty of arguing in a circle. They base their conception of divinity on blessedness (evdapovía), but this in its turn involves the conception of deity (daiμwr) §§ 45-47.

(B) The fact of the existence of the Gods is accepted as a matter of belief and of practice, not of science, by the Sceptics §§ 48, 49 (N. D. 1 62, III 5, 43). It is denied virtually or in terms by the so-called atheists, Euhemerus, Diagoras, Prodicus, Critias, Theodorus, and, as some hold, by Epicurus §§ 50—58 (N. D. 1 2, 63, 117-119, III 89). The Sceptics on the contrary hold that the opposing arguments balance each other § 59. Thus, on the positive side, four methods of proof are employed, (a) the general voice of mankind, (b) the order of the universe, (c) the absurdities which follow from the opposite view, (d) the refutation of objections § 60. As to (a) it is affirmed that religious belief and worship are common to all, both Greeks and barbarians; that, if this belief were false, it must have died out like other unfounded beliefs, whereas it has existed and will exist

for ever; that it is not confined to the vulgar, but accepted by the greatest poets and philosophers, and distinctly asserted even by Epicurus himself §§ 61–65 (N. D. 1 43, п1 5, 12, III 7, 11, 1. 85, 86). If it be said that there is a similar consensus on the part of poets and the vulgar in regard to the belief in Tartarus, yet that belief is self-contradictory, as may be seen in the case of Tityus and Tantalus; for agony and immortality are contradictory ideas. But there is no such inconsistency in the belief in spiritual powers. We recognize that the spirit of man, which holds together the body during life, is not dissipated at death, but ascends upwards owing to its ethereal nature, and dwells in the lunar region, nourished by vapours from the earth; if our spirit thus passes into the condition of a daiμov, why should we doubt the existence of those spiritual powers whom we know under the name of gods? §§ 66-74 (N. D. II 5 on Tartarus). (b) The material universe is evidently a work of art modelled and set in motion by a power which pervades it, as the soul pervades the body. Is this power self-moving? If not, we go back ad infinitum. It is therefore self-moving and has been so from eternity, therefore it is God §§ 75, 76. That which produces what is rational must itself be rational; man is a product of the power which pervades the universe, therefore that power is rational §§ 77 (N. D. 11 22). The world is one, either in virtue of its original unity or from being composed of distinct parts, which may either have been compacted together as a ship, or remain separate, as an army. It cannot be the latter, for whatever happens in one part is felt in another part, e.g. the moon's influence in growth and in the tides (N. D. II 19, 50, 119), and sympathy of this kind belongs only to bodies originally united. Such an original union may be either that of cohesion, as in wood or stone, or of growth (puois, nature), as in a plant, passing in its highest stage into a unity of life, as in animals. Things united by cohesion are scarcely liable to change, but the universe undergoes constant and violent changes, as from cold and heat. It has therefore a unity of nature, and that of the best nature, since it includes all natures in it. Hence, since the whole cannot be inferior to its part, it must be rational as including what is rational, and being best of all things it must be immortal, and therefore divine §§ 78–85 (N. D. 11 32, 33, 82). If even the gross earth can foster animals capable of perception, how much more should the finer elements of air and ether, from which we men derive our thinking power, be inhabited by a divine order of beings? §§ 86, 87 (N. D. II 17, 18, 42). Argument of Cleanthes: if one animal is better than another, there must be some one which is best of all; man is best of all animals on earth, but, as we see, he is full of defects; the true best is an animal with none of these defects and unapproachable by evil; and such is God §§ 88-91 (N. D. II 16, 33-37). Argument of Socrates in Xenophon man is a work of art testifying to the existence of an artist; his nature is derived from elements without, flesh from earth, breath from

air, and therefore reason from the great source of reason, i.e. from God (N. D. II 18). It is objected that we might similarly argue 'man has bile, therefore the universe must be bilious', but the argument applies only to pure elements, not to secondary compounds such as bile. Putting it in another way we might say 'if there were nothing earthy in the universe, there could have been nothing earthy in man; so, if there were nothing rational in the universe, there could have been no reason in man' §§ 92-98 (N. D. III 27). On seeing a statue we admire the skill of the sculptor, shall we not do the same when we think of the mind of man, which is so far more marvellous than any statue? §§ 99, 100 (N. D. 11 87). Argument of Zeno: that from which the seeds of reason proceed must itself be rational, for all subordinate faculties testify to the character of the yeμovikóv from which they are derived; since then the universe contains the seeds of all rational creatures, the yeμovikov of the universe must be rational, and therefore divine §§ 101-103 (N. D. II 22, 29, 30). Argument of Zeno after Plato: since that which is animate and rational is superior to that which is inanimate and irrational, the universe, being supreme, must be a rational animal. The objection of Alexinus, that on the same ground the universe might be proved to be a poet and grammarian, confounds the absolute and the relative best; Archilochus was a poet, but he was not therefore superior to Socrates who was no poet §§ 104–110 (N. D. II 18, 21). The Stoics prove the divinity of the world from its motion, which must proceed from nature or volition or necessity. It is certainly not the last, in the sense of an irrational vortex, such as Democritus held, for it is orderly, unchanging and harmonious. It is not caused by an unconscious nature, since this would be inferior to the rational natures included in the universe. It must therefore be caused by a rational nature. Further, voluntary movements are always more admirable than those which are involuntary. When we admire the sphere of Archimedes, it is not the moving frame we wonder at, but the rational volition of the astronomer. Again, the more wonderful the thing moved, by so much more wonderful is the moving force. Hence the force which moves the entire universe is the most admirable of all things, and being such it must be a rational and voluntary agent, i.e. God §§ 111–118 (N. D. II 43, 44, 88). In every organism there is a centre of motion, the heart or the brain or, in plants, the root; the yeμovikóv or centre of motion of the universe is in God §§ 119–122 (N. D. II 29, 30). Absurdities arising from atheism (c). If there are no gods, there is no such thing as piety, which is defined as ἐπιστήμη θεῶν θεραπείας, for there can be no science of the non-existent § 123; nor as holiness, for this is defined as diκαιοσúvη прòs deoús § 124 (N. D. 1 3, 4, 11 153); nor as wisdom, defined Ως ἐπιστήμη θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπείων § 125 ; nor as justice, which springs from the fellowship existing between men and God § 126 (N. D. 1 4). Pythagoras and others erroneously extended this fellowship to irrational creatures, with which it is true we are connected by common participation

in the all-pervading spirit of the universe, but so we are with plants and stones, yet no one has ever imagined that there could be any tie of justice between us and them §§ 127-130; the reason why there is justice between men and gods is because both participate in reason § 131. Again, there can be no divination if there are no gods, since it is the science of signs given by the gods to man § 132 (N. D. II 12).

Sextus, having discussed objections as they occurred, has not reserved a separate section for their refutation (d), but goes on, after another insignificant verbal quibble by Zeno, to state the negative argument in § 137. It is from this point that the comparison with N. D. III becomes important. If there are gods, they are animals, since animal nature is superior to all other nature; but animals are defined by the property of sensation, and the gods, as the most perfect animals, will experience the greatest variety of sensations (as Carneades says); they will therefore have sensations of taste, such as bitter and sweet, pleasant and unpleasant; but an unpleasant sensation implies possibility of change for the worse, i.e. implies mortality, and mortal gods are no gods §§ 137-141 (cited as from Carneades in N. D. III 32). So, in regard to every sense, animals are liable to be affected in a manner which is either according to their nature or contrary to their nature; but that which is contrary to nature is destructive to life, therefore again all animals are mortal. This shown in regard to eye-sight in particular §§ 142-145 (N. D. III 33). Every sensation is an alteration; a deity who undergoes alteration is liable to change, therefore to death §§ 146, 147. The deity must be either finite or infinite; if infinite, it would be lifeless and motionless, for motion must be from place to place, which is impossible for that which fills all space; again if held together by soul, this must be by means of centripetal and centrifugal movements, but the infinite has no centre §§ 148, 149 (N. D. II 115 n.). Nor on the other hand can the deity be finite, for the finite is contained in the infinite, as the part within the whole, so that there would be something greater and better than the deity § 150. The deity is either bodied or bodiless; if the latter, it can neither feel nor act; if the former, it is liable to corruption § 151. If there be a God, he must have all happiness and all virtue, but he is without éykpáreia and KaρTEρía, for there is nothing which he finds it hard to bear or to abstain from §§ 152-155 (N. D. III 38). Further, if he has not got these virtues, he must have the opposite vices, since there is nothing intermediate § 156. If there were anything hard for him to bear, it is evident that he would be liable to distress and therefore to destruction § 157. In like manner he is devoid of fortitude, which is defined as the knowledge of what is, and what is not, dangerous. For if there is something dangerous to him, he is liable to destruction §§ 158-160 (N. D. III 38). Similarly for magnanimity, which consists in rising above the accidents of life, for, if he is exposed to such accidents, he is liable to destruction § 161. So for prudence, the knowledge of good and evil and

of things indifferent, among which things trouble is included. But the knowledge of trouble can only be gained by experience of trouble itself, not, as some say, from the experience of pleasure by imagination of the opposite. For pleasure, being only the removal of pain, is unknown to one who is ignorant of pain; not to mention that being itself (as the Stoics say) a kind of dissolution it implies mortality §§ 162–166 (N. D. III 38). So for evßouxía, since all deliberation is of the uncertain, and if there are things uncertain to the deity, why may it not be uncertain to him whether the infinite may not conceal some power capable of destroying him? Such uncertainty would naturally give rise to fear, which implies mortality. §§ 167-170. On the other hand, if nothing is uncertain to him, he must know everything by instinct without art; therefore he must be without the art of life, which is virtue, and being without virtue he must have its opposite, vice §§ 171-173. As to temperance (owppoσivn), this cannot exist without prudence (Opóvnoɩs), as is shown by its name, and it has been proved that this virtue is inconsistent with deity. Again, temperance involves the existence of appetites to be resisted, which is contrary to our idea of deity §§ 174, 175 (N. D. 111 38). If God is without virtue he is miserable, if he has virtue there is something superior to him (the perfection or virtue of a thing being superior to the thing itself); if neither of these contradictories is true, he must be non-existent §§ 176, 177. Once more, God has either the faculty of speech or he has not; the latter is absurd and contrary to universal belief; but if he has speech, he must also possess all those parts of the body which conduce to speech, which is an idea only worthy of the Epicureans; he must also speak in some particular dialect, and if so how will he express himself to those who use another tongue? Therefore, as before, he must be non-existent §§ 178, 179. So, if God has a body, it must be either simple or compound: the compound is liable to dissolution, the simple is inanimate and irrational §§ 180, 181 (N. D. III 34).

We have also on this point the following sorites of Carneades preserved by Clitomachus. If Zeus is a god, so is his brother Poseidon; if Poseidon, then Achelous and Nilus, and every river and torrent. But these are not gods, therefore neither is Zeus §§ 182, 183 (N. D. III 43, 44). If the sun is a god, so is the day (which is only a name for the sun above the horizon); if the day, then the month, the year, the morning and evening § 184 (N. D. 111 51). If Artemis, so is Enodia, &c.; if Aphrodite, so Eros and other feelings of the mind, such as Pity and Fear §§ 185-188 (cf. N. D. III 47). If Demeter (= yn μýrŋp), then the earth, the hills, the promontories, every stone § 189 (N. D. III 52). Carneades adds many other examples, but the above will suffice to show the nature of the argument § 190.

Such being the variety of opinions among philosophers as to the divine existence, and such the grounds assigned on either side, the Sceptics have preferred to suspend their judgment, and they have felt themselves con