Constitutionalism and Democracy
Jon Elster, Rune Slagstad
Cambridge University Press, Jul 30, 1993 - Philosophy - 359 pages
The eleven essays in this volume, supplemented by an editorial introduction, center around three overlapping problems. First, why would a society want to limit its own sovereign power by imposing constitutional constraints on democratic decision-making? Second, what are the contributions of democracy and constitutions to efficient government? Third, what are the relations among democracy, constitutionalism, and private property? This comprehensive discussion of the problems inherent in constitutional democracy will be of interest to students in a variety of social sciences. It illuminates particularly the current efforts of many countries, especially in Latin America, to establish stable democratic regimes.
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Notes on contributors
Gag rules or the politics of omission
Democracy as a contingent outcome of conflicts
Consequences of constitutional choice reflections on Tocqueville
Liberal constitutionalism and its critics Carl Schmitt and Max Weber
Democracy and the rule of law some historical experiences of contradictions in the striving for good government
Precommitment and the paradox of democracy
American constitutionalism and the paradox of private property
From liberal constitutionalism to corporate pluralism the conflict over the enabling acts in Norway after the Second World War and the subsequent c...
Arguments for constitutional choice reflections on the transition to socialism
Constitutions and democracies an epilogue
Other editions - View all
action American Constitution argued argument authoritarian authority basic binding Bruce Ackerman Carl Schmitt compromise concept of property conflict consequences consequentialist consti constitutionalism constitutionalism and democracy constitutionalists corporativism debate decision democratic discussion economic effect elected electoral Elster enabling acts example Federalist forces Framers freedom fundamental gag rules groups guarantee higher law-making Ibid idea important individual institutions interests issue Jefferson Jon Elster judicial review justice Labor Party legislative legitimacy liberal liberal democracy liberty limits Madison means normal politics norms outcomes participation political power positive positive liberty possible power apparatus precommitment preferences present principle private citizen private property problem promise property rights proposal protection Publian question Rechtsstaat reform regime regulation religious representatives revolution revolutionary rule of law Schmitt Sejersted separation of powers slavery social society Storting substantive Supreme Court tension Thagaard theory Tocqueville tradition Treatises of Government tutional University Press values Weber