Injunction.-C. Burney, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature. Inland Revenue.-W. F. Craies.

Inn; Innkeeper.-D. M. Kerly. [A. Wood Renton, Puisne Justice of the Supreme Court of Ceylon, and J. S. Henderson.]

Inns of Court.-The late G. Pitt-Lewis, K.C. [N. G. L. Child.]

In Person.-F. A. Stringer, of the Central Office.

Inquiry, Writ of.-F. A. Stringer, of the Central Office.

International Law.-G. H. B. Kenrick.

Interpleader.-H. A. de Colyar, K.C., and C. Burney, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Interpretation.-Sir Howard Elphinstone, Bart.

Interpretation Act.-N. G. L. Child.

Interrogatories.-E. L. de Hart.

Intervention.-Sir Thomas Barclay, Knt. [A. Wood Renton, Puisne Justice of the Supreme Court of Ceylon, and J. S. Henderson.]

Ireland.-C. Maturin. [A. B. Babington.]

Issue.-J. S. Henderson.

Italy.-Alexander Pulling.

Jamaica.-Alexander Pulling.

Japan.-Alexander Pulling.

Joinder of Causes of Action.-W. Blake Odgers, K.C.

Joint-Tenancy.-J. D. Israel. [C. Johnston Edwards.]

Judge Advocate-General and Judge Advocate of the Fleet.-G. H. Knott. [E. L. de

Hart.]

Judge at Chambers and Judge's Notes.--C. Burney, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Judgment.-W. F. Craies.

Judgment in the Chancery Division.-C. Burney, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Judgments Extension.—F. A. Stringer, of the Central Office.

Judicial Separation.-H. Durley Grazebrook.

Judicial Trustee.-A. H. Withers. [C. Johnston Edwards.]

Jurisprudence.-Professor T. E. Holland.

Jus Gentium.-Sir Thomas Barclay, Knt. [G. H. B. Kendrick.]

Just Allowances.-C. Burney, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judi

cature.

Justice of the Peace.-W. W. Mackenzie. [W. F. Craies.]

Justices' Clerk.-W. F. Craies.

Justification.-W. Blake Odgers, K.C.

Knight; Knighthood.-G. H. Knott. [R. Geoffrey Ellis.]

Lancaster, Duchy and County Palatine of.-G. B. M. Coore. [C. Johnston Edwards.]

Land Charges.-J. G. Henderson. [C. F. Brickdale.]

Landlord and Tenant.-Edgar Foà.

CORRIGENDA.

Vol.

I. p. 201, 1. 20, for " 42 & 43 Vict. c. 29," read "42 & 43 Vict. c. 30." Vol. V. p. 342, 1. 22, for "Conveyancing Act, 1871," read "Conveyancing Act, 1881." Vol. VI. p. 110, 1. 9 from bottom, for "L. R. Eq. 382," read “L. R. 3 Eq. 382.”

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

Ice. See ACT OF GOD; AFFREIGHTMENT; FROST.

Identification.-Proof in a legal proceeding that a person, document, or other thing is that which it is alleged to be.

Identity. The identity of a person, document, or thing if in issue must be proved by some person who was acquainted at first hand with the person or thing, or is able as attesting witness or otherwise (28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, s. 7) to authenticate the document as genuine and as emanating from the person whose it purports to be. This rule is subject to exception in pedigree cases, with respect to the identity of persons who are dead and were not personally known to any available living witness (Taylor, s. 635).

Persons. It is the practice of the police where they have in custody a person suspected of crime or possession of goods supposed to have been criminally or unlawfully obtained to place the prisoner among persons of a similar appearance, and the goods with other like goods, and ask the prosecutor or other person to pick out the person or goods.

All prisoners convicted or unconvicted may be photographed or their anthropometric measurements (including finger prints) taken with a view to verifying their identity in future criminal proceedings (34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 6; 39 & 40 Vict. c. 23, s. 2; 54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 8; 61 & 62 Vict. c. 41). The Home Office has made regulations on the subject (see St. R. & O., Rev. 1904, vol. x., sub tit. "Prison, England," pp. 6, 77). The powers given under the Prisons Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. c. 41, for making regulations are extended to inebriates by the Inebriates Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. c. 60, and regulations under the latter Act have been made by the Home Secretary (see St. R. & O., Rev. 1904, vol. vi., sub tit. "Inebriate"). All regulations have to be laid before Parliament. Neither the Acts nor the Regulations make the photograph or measure evidence, but it is frequently used to establish identity in subsequent prosecutions, and the procedure appears to have been contemplated and to be lawful and regular (Beamish v. Beamish, 1876, Ir. Rep. 10 Eq. 413; R. v. Tolson, 1864, 4 F. & F. 103).

Identification by reference to photographs is permitted in divorce cases where the person to be identified cannot be brought before the Court to be confronted with the witness. But this mode of proof is narrowly watched, and except under very special circumstances, the

VOL. VII.

1

Court will not act upon identification by a photograph only (Frith v. Frith, [1896] P. 74).

Where the identity of parties to an action is called in question, the solicitor may be called to identify his client as party to any affidavit or pleading filed therein (Taylor, s. 935).

Collateral facts not otherwise relevant are admissible to show the identity of a person accused of crime or to rebut an alibi (Taylor, ss. 336, 337).

Presumptions in favour of identity are made from identity of name or from replies in correspondence (Taylor, ss. 1856-1860).

Goods. In the case of goods, if a question of identity arises it is usual to produce the articles in Court and let the jury judge by their own senses; but witnesses may be called who have seen the goods and can give their opinion as to whether they are the goods in question (Taylor, ss, 555a).

Where in an indictment an allegation is made descriptive of the identity of some thing, it must as a general rule be proved as made subject to the power to amend (14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 1), where the discrepancy between allegation and proof is not essential (Archbold, Cr. Pl., 23rd ed., 300).

Documents. Where identification of a document depends on questions as to handwriting, the evidence admissible is that of a man who knows the handwriting of the person alleged to have written or signed it or who is an expert in or experienced in handwriting, and comparison of authentic writings of the supposed writer is permitted (see 28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, s. 8; R. v. Silverlock, [1894] 2 Q. B. 766; Taylor, ss. 1862 et seq.).

In the case of documents, such as wills, deeds, etc., it is essential to prove the identity of the signatory with the testator or person as whose will or document it is tendered.

In the case of judgments and depositions or signed statements, the parties to the judgments and the deponents, etc., must be identified to render them admissible against the person against whom they are tendered (Taylor, ss. 467-469, 892, 1684-1710).

Authorities.-Taylor on Evidence (referred to above as Taylor), 1906, 10th ed.; Archbold's Criminal Pleading, 1905, 23rd ed.; and Stephen's Digest of Evidence, 1904, 6th ed. See EVIDENCE; and MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE.

Idiot.-Definition of Term.-The term "idiot" (Gr. idios, a private person, one who does not hold any public office, and ouúrns; Latin idiota, an ignorant and illiterate person) is defined by Coke (Beverley's Case, 1 Jac. I. 4 Co. Rep. 124) as one "who from his nativity, by a perpetual infirmity, is non compos mentis," and by Hale (1 P. C. 29) as fatuity, a nativitate vel dementia naturalis." The differentiating mark between idiocy and lunacy is that the former is a natural (a nativitate) while the latter is an acquired or supervening (accidentalis, adventitia) incapacity. It should be noted, however, that the word "lunatic" in sec. 341 of the Lunacy Act, 1890, includes "idiot" where not inconsistent with the context. For further information as to the distinctive terminology of the law of lunacy, see the article LUNACY.

Criteria of Idiocy.-Several of the old writers attempted to determine the presence or absence of idiocy for legal purposes by arbitrary tests, such as a capacity to count twenty pence (Fitzherbert, N. B. 233, and cp. Staund, Pr. Reg. 34), or to measure a yard of cloth (Swinburne,