or the negation of all being, should produce a positive being or matter.

12. Though this discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal mind does sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God, since it will hence follow that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend on him, and have no other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what he gives them; and therefore if he made those, he made also the less excellent pieces of this universe (all inanimate beings) whereby his omniscience, power, and providence will be established, and all his other attributes necessarily follow; yet to clear up this a little farther, we will see what doubts can be raised against it.

13. First, perhaps it will be said, that though it be as clear as demonstration can make it, that there must be an eternal being, and that being must also be knowing, yet it does not follow but that a thinking being may also be material.' Let it be so: it equally still follows, that there is a God. For if there be an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent being, it is certain that there is a God, whether you imagine that being to be material or no. But herein, I suppose, lies the danger and deceit of that supposition: there being no way to avoid the demonstration that there is an eternal knowing being, men devoted to matter would willingly have it granted, that this knowing being is material; and then letting slide out of their minds, or the discourse, the demonstration whereby an eternal knowing being was proved necessarily to exist, would argue all to be matter, and so deny a God, that is, an eternal cogitative being: whereby they are so far from establishing, that they

destroy their own hypothesis. For if there can be, in their opinion, eternal matter without any eternal cogitative being, they manifestly separate matter and thinking, and suppose no necessary connexion of the one with the other, and so establish the necessity of an eternal spirit, but not of matter; since it has been proved already, that an eternal cogitative being is unavoidably granted. Now if thinking and matter may be separated, the eternal existence of matter will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative being, and they suppose it to no purpose.

14. But, now, let us see how they can satisfy themselves or others, that this eternal thinking being is material.

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• First, I would ask them, whether they imagine that all matter, every particle of matter, thinks? This, I suppose, they will scarcely say; since then there would be as many eternal thinking beings as there are particles of matter, and so an infinity of Gods. And yet if they will allow matter as matter, that is, every particle of matter to be as well cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended parts, if I may so speak.

15. Secondly, If all matter does not think, I next ask, whether it be only one atom that does so? This has as many absurdities as the other; for then this atom of matter must be alone eternal, or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone, by it's powerful thought or will, made all the rest of matter. And so we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought, which is that the materialists stick at. For if they suppose one single thinking atom to have produced

all the rest of matter, they cannot ascribe that preeminency to it upon any other account than that of it's thinking, the only supposed difference. But allow it to be by some other way, which is above our conception, it must be still creation, and these men must give up their great maxim, Ex nihilo nil fit. If it be said, that all the rest of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom,' it will be to say any thing at pleasure, though ever so absurd. For to suppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle in knowledge and power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least appearance of reason to frame an hypothesis. Every particle of matter, as matter, is capable of all the same figures and motions as any other; and I challenge any one in his thoughts to add any thing else to one above another.

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16. If then neither one peculiar atom alone can be this eternal thinking being, nor all matter as matter, i. e. every particle of matter, can be it; it only remains, that it is some certain system of matter duly put together, that is this thinking eternal being. This is that which, I imagine, is that notion which men are aptest to have of God; who would have him a material being, as most readily suggested to them by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men, which they take to be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however more natural, is no less absurd than the other: for to suppose the eternal thinking being to be nothing else but a composition of particles of matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the wisdom and knowledge of that eternal being only to the juxta-position of parts; than which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking particles of matter, however put together,

can have nothing thereby added to them but a new relation of position, which 'tis impossible should give thought and knowledge to them.

17. But farther, this corporeal system either has all it's parts at rest, or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein it's thinking consists. If it be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privileges above one atom.

'If it be the motion of it's parts, on which it's thinking depends, all the thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since of all the particles that by motion cause thought, each being in itself without any thought cannot regulate it's own motions, much less be regulated by the thought of the whole; since that thought is not the cause of motion (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it) but the consequence of it, whereby freedom, power, choice, and all rational and wise thinking or acting will be quite taken away: so that such a thinking being will be no better, nor wiser, than pure blind matter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter, or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind matter, is the same thing not to mention the narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge, that must depend on the motion of such parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilities in this hypothesis (however full of them it be) than that beforementioned; since let this thinking system be all, or a part of the matter of the universe, it is impossible that any one particle should either know it's own or the motion of any other particle, or the whole know the motion of every particular, and so

regulate it's own thoughts or motions, or indeed have any thoughts resulting from such motion.

18. Others would have matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, cogitative, immaterial being. This, though it take not away the being of God, yet since it denies one and the first great piece of his workmanship, the creation, let us consider it a little. Matter must be allowed eternal: Why? Because you cannot conceive, how it can be made out of nothing; why do you not, also, think yourself eternal? You will answer, perhaps, because about twenty or forty years since you began to be.' But if I ask you what that You is, which began then to be?' you can scarcely tell me. The matter, whereof you are made, began not then to be; for if it did, then it is not eternal: but it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your body; but yet that frame of particles is not you, it makes not that thinking thing You are (for I have now to do with one, who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking being, but would have unthinking matter eternal too): therefore, when did that thinking thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, then have you always been a thinking thing from eternity? The absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one who is so void of understanding as to own it. If, therefore, you can allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing (as all things, that are not eternal, must be) why, also, can you not allow it possible for a material being to be made out of nothing, by an equal power, but that you have the experience of the one in view, and not the other? Though, when well considered, creation of a spirit will be found to re