quire no less power than the creation of matter. Nay possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would reach to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made and begin to exist by the power of that eternal first being: but to give beginning and being to a spirit, would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world is built, it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them; or to inquire so far as grammar itself would authorise, if the common settled opinion opposes it: especially in this place, where the received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose, and leaves this past doubt, that the creation or beginning of any one substance out of nothing being once admitted, the creation of all other except the Creator himself may with the same ease be supposed. 19. But you will say, 'Is it not impossible to admit of the making any thing out of nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive it?' I answer, No: 1. Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being, because we cannot comprehend it's operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the manner of their production. We cannot conceive how any thing but impulse of body can move body; and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny it possible, against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions, which are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our own minds, and are not, nor can be the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon our bodies; for, then, it could not be in our power or choice to alter it. For example: My right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still: what causes rest in one, and motion in the other? Nothing but my will, a thought of my mind: my thought only changing, the right hand rests, and the left hand moves. This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied: explain this, and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand creation. For the giving a new determination to the motion of the animal spirits (which some make use of to explain voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot: to alter the determination of motion being in this case no easier nor less, than to give motion itself; since the new determination given to the animal spirits must be either immediately by thought, or in some other body put in their way by thought, which was not in their way before, and so must owe it's motion to thought; either of which leaves voluntary motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the mean time, 'tis an overvaluing ourselves, to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities, and to conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our comprehension. This is to make our comprehension infinite, or God finite, when what he can do is limited to what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you, do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite mind, who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.' From the Musarum Oxoniensium Eλatopopia,' 1654. Ir Greece with so much mirth did entertain Both glorious lie, 'cause neither's conqueror. Our ships are now most beneficial grown, Since they bring home no spoils but what's their own. Nay, if to make a world 's but to compose Our ships do this: so that, whilst others take J. LOCKE, Student of Ch. Ch. 37 SIR GEORGE ROOKE.* [1650-1709.] SIR GEORGE ROOKE was the son of a private gentleman of ancient family, in the county of Kent. His father designing him for one of the learned professions, bestowed upon him a liberal education; but having discovered in him a strong propensity to the sea-service, he thought it prudent to comply with it. Accordingly, he procured him a station in the navy early in the reign of Charles II., from which he rose by his merit to the rank of a Captain, a short time previously to the death of that Monarch. In the succeeding reign he received no promotion, being merely retained in the service from the scarcity of good naval officers, as James knew that he wished well to the cause of civil liberty; and, upon the landing of the Prince of Orange, he was dismissed with several others. On this, he immediately enrolled himself under the banners of William, and thus became in some measure instrumental to the success of the Revolution. * AUTHORITIES. Burnet's History of his Own Times, Biographia Britannica, and Campbell's Lives of the Admirals. |