2. Have all the roads and footpaths abutting on the property been taken to by the parish or other local or public authority? Evidence should be furnished that all charges (if any) for making, repairing, and draining the same have been fully satisfied.

This requisition is a necessary one, as until all the roads and footpaths have been adopted by the vestry or local authority, all expenses of making, keeping in repair, and draining the same must be borne by the owners of the adjoining properties.

Private roads and footpaths may be converted into public highways either by their dedication by the owner to the use of the public generally, or by their adoption by the local authorities, whether rural or urban, under the Public Health Acts, or, in the metropolis, under the Metropolis Local Management Acts. (See the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), ss. 150 and 152, the Public Health Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 59), s. 41, and the Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57), ss. 19 and 20, and the Acts of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 106, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 80.)

The owners of land within the metropolitan area (to which the two last-mentioned Acts apply), which bounds or abuts upon any "new street" within the meaning of the Acts, are liable to contribute to the expenses of paving the roadway or footway of such street.

The word "pave" is extended to include the formation of the roadway or footway. (See sect. 112 of 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102.) The authorities adopting any new street may accept payment of the paving expenses by annual payments in lieu of a lump sum, and are authorized to recover the same from the then present or any future owner of the premises. (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 105, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 77.) The term "owner" is defined by the former Act to mean the person for the time being receiving the rack rent of the premises.

The following cases are important as bearing upon the question of "ownership" as regards the above provisions, viz. :-Lady Holland v. Kensington Vestry, L. R. 2 C. P. 565; Plumstead Board of Works v. British Land Company, L. R. 10 Q. B. 203; Plumstead Board of Works v. Ingoldby, L. R. 8 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 63, 174; Vestry of Bermondsey v. Ramsey, L. R. 6 C. P. 247; The Barry & Cadoxton Local Board v. Parry, 72 L. T. Rep. 692; (1895) 2 Q. B. 110; and Davis v. Greenwich Board of Works, (1895) 2 Q. B.

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3. Are there any rights of way, water, or other easement affecting the property, and not disclosed by the abstract or particulars?

The importance of this requisition is obvious when we are dealing with what are termed patent defects in the property (such as a public footpath across a field), which could be discovered on an inspection of the property, For although the vendor is not bound to disclose such defects (see Prid. Conv. 25; and Fry on Sp. Perf., 3rd edit., 556, 557), yet it is probable he would not be justified in concealing the fact of their existence in the face of such an inquiry as the one in question.

With regard to latent defects or easements so called, the case is somewhat different, as although the conditions usually provide that the property is sold subject to all easements affecting it, yet this does not exempt the vendor from disclosing an easement if he were aware of it. If such a burden were discovered by a purchaser subsequently to the date of the contract, it would be a good ground of objection to the title, although perhaps it is more often a matter of compensation. (See Dykes v. Blake, 4 Bing. N. C. 463.) But where it is proved that the purchaser was aware of the easement at the time he contracted to purchase, he

2. Have all the roads and footpaths abutting on the property been taken to by the parish or other local or public authority? Evidence should be furnished that all charges (if any) for making, repairing, and draining the same have been fully satisfied.

This requisition is a necessary one, as until all the roads and footpaths have been adopted by the vestry or local authority, all expenses of making, keeping in repair, and draining the same must be borne by the owners of the adjoining properties.

Private roads and footpaths may be converted into public highways either by their dedication by the owner to the use of the public generally, or by their adoption by the local authorities, whether rural or urban, under the Public Health Acts, or, in the metropolis, under the Metropolis Local Management Acts. (See the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), ss. 150 and 152, the Public Health Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 59), s. 41, and the Private Street Works Act, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 57), ss. 19 and 20, and the Acts of 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 106, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 80.)

The owners of land within the metropolitan area (to which the two last-mentioned Acts apply), which bounds or abuts upon any "new street" within the meaning of the Acts, are liable to contribute to the expenses of paving the roadway or footway of such street.

The word "pave" is extended to include the formation of the roadway or footway. (See sect. 112 of 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102.) The authorities adopting any new street may accept payment of the paving expenses by annual payments in lieu of a lump sum, and are authorized to recover the same from the then present or any future owner of the premises. (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 105, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 77.) The term "owner" is defined by the former Act to mean the person for the time being receiving the rack rent of the premises.

The following cases are important as bearing upon the question of "ownership" as regards the above provisions, viz. :-Lady Holland v. Kensington Vestry, L. R. 2 C. P. 565; Plumstead Board of Works v. British Land Company, L. R. 10 Q. B. 203; Plumstead Board of Works v. Ingoldby, L. R. 8 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 63, 174; Vestry of Bermondsey v. Ramsey, L. R. 6 C. P. 247; The Barry & Cadoxton Local Board v. Parry, 72 L. T. Rep. 692; (1895) 2 Q. B. 110; and Davis v. Greenwich Board of Works, (1895) 2 Q. B.

219.

3. Are there any rights of way, water, or other easement affecting the property, and not disclosed by the abstract or particulars?

The importance of this requisition is obvious when we are dealing with what are termed patent defects in the property (such as a public footpath across a field), which could be discovered on an inspection of the property, For although the vendor is not bound to disclose such defects (see Prid. Conv. 25; and Fry on Sp. Perf., 3rd edit., 556, 557), yet it is probable he would not be justified in concealing the fact of their existence in the face of such an inquiry as the one in question.

With regard to latent defects or easements so called, the case is somewhat different, as although the conditions usually provide that the property is sold subject to all easements affecting it, yet this does not exempt the vendor from disclosing an easement if he were aware of it. If such a burden were discovered by a purchaser subsequently to the date of the contract, it would be a good ground of objection to the title, although perhaps it is more often a matter of compensation. (See Dykes v. Blake, 4 Bing. N. C. 463.) But where it is proved that the purchaser was aware of the easement at the time he contracted to purchase, he

could not afterwards rescind the contract or claim compensation unless the vendor expressly contracted to sell "free from incumbrances." (See Cato v. Thompson, 9 Q. B. D. 616; Prid. Conv. 21.)

4. It is assumed that all the abstracted deeds and documents will be handed over to the purchaser on completion.

The form of this inquiry will naturally vary to accord with the facts as disclosed in the abstract. It is always better, when the conditions of sale or contract are silent on the point, to have a clear understanding as to the ultimate possession of the documents of title. Where the deeds are not to be handed over to the purchaser, it is advisable to inquire further whether they are to be retained by the vendor or to be handed over to some other person. In the latter case the purchaser should ascertain who will give him the usual statutory acknowledgment and undertaking.

A vendor is entitled to retain the deeds if they relate to other property not sold to the purchaser, so long as he retains such property. (Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, s. 2, rule 5.) In this case the purchaser is entitled at his own expense to attested or other copies of such deeds.

A vendor retaining deeds is bound to give the statutory acknowledgment for their production and an undertaking for their safe custody where he is the beneficial owner of the property. As it seems to be doubtful whether a trustee is bound to give both the acknowledgment and undertaking, it is generally provided in the conditions or contract that the vendor, being a trustee for sale, shall give the acknowledgment for the production of the deeds only.

Where the property is sold in lots, the purchaser of the lot which is the largest in value is, in the absence of stipulations to the contrary, entitled to the custody of the deeds,