attachments were levied on the lots above described. Four days later certain other creditors brought a suit in the Garland Chancery Court in the nature of a creditors' bill, seeking to have certain conveyances made by John J. Sumpter, among them the deed from him to his mother conveying the lots named above, set aside as fraudulent and void as to creditors. On October 9, 1896, the execution issued on the bond staying the Cameron judgment was levied on the lots above described, upon which the writs of attachment had also been levied. On October 31, 1896, the lots were sold under the stay-bond execution, and bought by Cameron, the execution creditor. On January 9, 1897, Lula W. Cook and other creditors also filed a creditors' bill against the Sumpters to set aside fraudulent conveyances. On June 30, 1897, the two creditors' bills above referred to were consolidated. On January 6, 1898, the sheriff executed a deed to Cameron, conveying him one-third interest in lots 4 and 5, which he purchased at execution sale. On January 28, 1898, the plaintiffs in the attachment suits and creditors' bills made application for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the property attached and involved in the litigation, and the court, on the 28th day of that month, made an order to that effect. The order recites that the property is valuable, and yields monthly rentals aggregating about $700 a month, and "that it is proper and necessary for the preservation of the property for the benefit of plaintiffs and other creditors of John J. and William Sumpter that a receiver should be appointed to take charge of said property, rent the same out, and collect the rents accruing therefrom, and that said application of plaintiffs should be granted. It is therefore considered, ordered and adjudged that W. H. Martin be, and is hereby, appointed receiver of this court to take charge of all of said property at once, and that he be authorized, empowered and is hereby directed to rent the same to the best advantage for terms not exceeding twelve months," etc.

The receiver was also empowered to make such repairs, pay taxes and such water and light charges as should be necessary for the preservation of the property. On the same day W. H. Martin qualified as receiver by giving bond for the faithful discharge of the duties of the office as required by the order of the court.

On February 14, 1898, Cameron conveyed the lots to M. E. Gaines. On April 4, 1898, appellant filed an amendment to the creditors' bill, praying that Cameron be made a party defendant; that he be enjoined from selling the land, and that the sheriff's deed to him be cancelled. On the day following M. E. Gaines conveyed the two lots to Mamie K. Martin, the purchase being made through her husband, W. H. Martin, the receiver, acting as her agent. On May 9, 1898, the final decree was rendered. on the complaint of appellant and other creditors, setting aside all of the conveyances made by Sumpter as fraudulent and void to his creditors, and ordering them sold at public sale. by W. H. Martin, the receiver, who was appointed commissioner for that purpose. This decree did not refer to the

Cameron title.

On July 19, 1898, the deeds of Cameron to Gaines and of Gaines to Mrs. Martin were filed for record. On September 21, 1898, Mrs. Martin filed her intervening petition in the creditors' action, in which she claimed title to the lots through the deeds from the sheriff to Cameron, from Cameron to Mrs. Gaines, and from Mrs. Gaines to her, and asked that her title be quieted. On June 8, 1898, a one-third interest in the lots 4 and 5, belonging to another party, were sold by Belding, special commissioner, at public sale to Annie E. Little, Mary E. Sumpter and Losetta E. Fourbler, for the sum of $4,300.

On June 15, 1901, the plaintiffs in the creditors' bill filed a response to the intervening petition of Mrs. Martin, in which they set up that the lien acquired by them on the lots was superior to that acquired by Cameron, and that the deed from the sheriff to Cameron, from Cameron to Mrs. Gaines, and from Mrs. Gaines to Mrs. Martin conveyed no title. They further alleged that Mrs. Martin purchased the lots from Mrs. Gaines through her husband, W. H. Martin, acting as her agent. "That at the time of so purchasing said lots, for his wife, W. H. Martin held the same as receiver and as trustee for the plaintiffs, and his said act in so purchasing said lots was inconsistent with his duties as such receiver, and whatever benefits he obtained, or could have obtained, by such purchase will inure to the benefit of these plaintiffs." Wherefore they ask that the deeds under which

Mrs. Martin claims be cancelled and set aside, and for other relief.

Mrs. Martin filed an answer to this amendment and reponse, in which she alleged that her title was valid and superior to the liens acquired by plaintiffs. She further alleged that, at the time W. H. Martin was appointed receiver, the title to the lots had already passed to Cameron and his grantee, Mrs. Gaines, and she denies that he ever held such lots as receiver or as trustee for plaintiffs, and she therefore asked that her title to the premises be quieted.

On the hearing the chancellor found the issues in favor of Mrs. Martin, and rendered a decree quieting her title, from which decree plaintiffs appealed.

Wood & Henderson, for appellants.

The lien which Cameron acquired by the judgment of the circuit court was merged in the lien of the statutory judgment fixed by the execution of the stay bond. 29 Ark. 475; 20 Ark. 68; 14 Ark. 595, 568; 16 Ark. 599; 20 Ark. 98; 19 Ark. 265; 25 Ark. 469, 606; 12 Ark. 613; 67 Ark. 325. Appellants' lien was superior to any rights of Cameron by reason of his levy. 5 Am. St. 657; 36 Fed. 29; 17 N. E. 823; 22 N. E. 533; Black, Judg. §§ 420, 454; 94 U. S. 300; 27 Fed. 420; 11 Ala. 988; 43 Pac. 1103; 61 Ark. 189. If Cameron's title is superior to appellants', appellee can only hold to the extent of lien for money paid as the purchase price. 24 N. E. 111; 64 N. W. 141; 77 N. W. 43; 82 N. W. 655; 39 Atl. 63; 14 Pac. 725; 39 S. W. 600; 23 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 1085; 53 Ark. 81.

Rose, Hemingway & Rose, for appellee.

The lien of the judgment was not destroyed by the stay bond. 57 Ark. 638; 32 Ark. 346; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 807; 43 Am. Dec. 523; 63 Id. 708; 39 Id. 301; 2 Freeman, Judg. § 382. Cameron had first lien under the execution. 56 Ark. 292; Kirby's Dig. § 3227; 1 Freeman, Exec. § 207; 11 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 672; 42 Ark. 305. Appellee was not prejudiced by the decree of May 9, 1898. 16 Ark. 543; 28 Ark. 85, 523; 30 Ark. 111; 33 Ark. 328; 44 Ark. 92.

RIDDICK, J., (after stating the facts.) This is a contest over the title of one-third interest in two lots in the city of Hot Springs, formerly owned by John J. Sumpter. It is admitted that Cameron, under whom Mrs. Martin, the intervener, holds, obtained a judgment against Sumpter which was a lien on the lots before the attachment of plaintiffs was either issued or levied. But it is said that Sumpter afterwards made a fraudulent conveyance of this property, and that after this conveyance was made he executed a stay bond, staying the Cameron judgment, and that the lien of the judgment was merged in that of the stay bond, and that the lien of the stay bond only relates back to the date of its execution. But in this we think learned counsel for plaintiffs are in error, for in our opinion the lien of the judgment is continued in the stay bond, and this lien relates back to the rendition of the judgment, so as to protect the judgment creditor against subsequent liens or conveyances by the judgment debtor. As the Cameron judgment antedated the attachment and the creditors' bill filed by plaintiffs, we think that the lien of this judgment took precedence over the lien acquired by plaintiffs, and it was not affected by the subsequent execution of the stay bond or the fraudulent conveyance made by Sumpter.

It follows, from what we have stated, that the title of Mrs. Martin, who holds under the title acquired by Cameron by virtue of an execution on his stay bond and a sale of the lots under such execution, is superior to that of plaintiffs acquired by a sale under the subsequent attachment and creditors' bill, and must prevail over their title, unless there are equitable reasons why she cannot assert that title against them. Now, this Cameron title to a one-third interest in these lots was purchased by W. H. Martin for the interevener, his wife, on April 5, 1898. He purchased a one-third interest in the lots for his wife from Mrs. Gaines, to whom Cameron had conveyed it. At the time he made this purchase for his wife he had charge of the property as receiver, having been appointed such receiver on the 28th day of January in the action by the creditors to subject this property to their claims against Sumpter. The order appointing him receiver directed that he should take charge of the

property, collect rents, and pay taxes, and do other things necessary for the preservation of the property. There is no rule of equity better settled or more inflexible than that which declares that a trustee shall not deal with the trust property to his own advantage against the consent of the cestui que trust. "Absolute and most scrupulous good faith is the very essence of the trustee's obligation," says Prof. Pomeroy. The first and principal duty arising from his fiduciary relation is to act in all matters of the trust wholly for the benefit of the beneficiary. The trustee is not permitted to manage the affairs of the trust, or to deal with the trust property so as to gain any advantage, directly or indirectly, for himself, beyond his lawful compensation." 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. 1075.

While a receiver is an officer of the court, he is also a quasi trustee, and occupies a fiduciary relation towards the parties to the action in which he is appointed; and both by reason of the fact that he holds the property as an officer of the court, and also occupies such fiduciary relation, he will not be permitted to deal with the trust estate for his own benefit or advantage. There is no reason why a distinction should be made between a receiver and other persons occupying a relation of that kind, and the decisions make none. It has often been held that a receiver occupies a fiduciary relation to the parties to the action, and is trustee for all of them who are interested in the property intrusted to his charge by the court, and he cannot deal with or purchase such property for his individual benefit or for that of any third party. "It is hardly possible," said the court in Jewett v. Miller, speaking of an attempted purchase by a receiver, "to state the rule of equity too broadly or too strongly. It will not permit a trustee to subject himself to the temptation which arises out of the conflict between the interests of a purchaser and the duty of a trustee. The rule is entirely independent of the question whether in point of fact any fraud has intervened. It is to avoid the necessity of any such inquiry, in which justice might be balked, that the rule takes so general a form." Jewett v. Miller, 61 Am. Dec. 751; Gilbert v. Hewetson, 79 Minn. 326; Donahue v. Quackenbush, 75 Minn. 43; Shadewald v. White, 74 Minn. 208; Donahue v. Quackenbush, 62 Minn. 132; Herrick v. Miller, 123 Ind. 304; Johnson v. Gun

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