name of their nominee for any elective office. Election would have been by the city at large to a highly paid, conspicuous position for a three year term, with no party designation and no primary; and, after the first year, there would never have been more than two offices in the city council to be filled annually. The man who could survive such a test must win on his own merit; not drift into office on a party label unknown to most of his fellow citizens. Every candidate would stand on his own feet; no boss would dictate who should or who should

not run.

The preferential ballot enables the voters of a city in one election to arrive at a majority choice irrespective of the number of candidates, provided there is anyone in the list of candidates acceptable on any terms to a majority. If there is none such in the list, it is obviously not the fault of the preferential ballot; besides, we get the next best thing, and the only thing possible with that list of nominees-a legitimate plurality election:

Beware of the man who tells of an absolute majority system. There is no such thing. What goes by that name is always something that chokes off candidates by a primary election or by dropping low men, as in some of the older preferential systems, and forcing an appearance of a majority for what in fact is only a plurality candidate. A man is no true majority candidate unless in a free and open field and with full range of choice by the voters he can get the support of the majority. We must, in a word, either have a majority man among the nominees, or put up with a plurality choice, in fact if not in form.

The modern preferential ballot is arranged like the ordinary Australian ballot, except that instead of one column for crosses there are three provided, headed respectively, "first choice." "second choice," and "other choices." The voter places a cross in the first column after the name of his first choice for that office. If there is another candidate who, he thinks, would be a suitable incumbent,

he places a cross after his name in the second column. If there are others acceptable, and still others quite undesirable, the voter will place a cross after all the other acceptable men in the third column if he so desires. This means that he not only has the opportunity to vote for all the good men, but also against all the undesirable ones.

If some candidate polls a majority of all the votes in the first column, he is elected; failing that, the first and second choice votes are added together. If the candidate now highest has a majority of these, he wins; if no man can command a majority of the firsts and seconds, meaning that there are a number of nearly equally desirable candidates, the choices in the third column are added. The highest man then wins whether he has a majority or not. This will always result in a majority selection unless the list of candidates happens to contain no one on whom the majority can freely and automatically unite-a condition clearly not due to the system of voting.

Under our present system, a voter can register his choice for but one man, whatever the number of good or bad candidates; and the chances are that the undesirable man will win, because the machine can prevent the scattering of its vote among a lot of nominees: whereas if the citizens had a real opportunity for free expression, a large majority might get together behind some independent candidate. For instance, about a year ago, a man was elected mayor of a Massachusetts city by 1800 votes out of 7200; the remaining 5400 votes being divided nearly equally among four other candidates. In order to prevent such mishaps and the risk of party defeat through a split ticket, the partisan primary system must often choke off desirable candidates. And the irony of it is that, after the citizen has been deprived of the opportunity of voting for any but machine candidates, blame for the failure of the present system is attributed to the fact that some abstain from voting altogether.

The present system necessitates the expenditure of large sums of money and a great deal of time and energy in order that a man may be nominated or elected. Under the preferential system, no money or time need be expended in campaigns. A man can be elected on his reputation, as is proved by the fact that the president of the chamber of commerce was elected to the Spokane city council during his absence from the city.

Previous systems of preferential voting have attracted no general favor. They overdid the straining for "scientific" accuracy. They were too complicated. They involved a fundamental fallacy in expecting the voter to select not only his first and second choices, but precisely to grade all his others as third, fourth, and so on indefinitely.

The Grand Junction plan is admirably adapted to the support of all the clearly acceptable candidates, as distinct from the objectionable or doubtful. It is assumed that a first choice may be clear in the voter's mind, and possibly a second; but that beyond this, niceties in the gradation of choices are illusory. The voter is thus enabled quickly to make his crosses after all the names he cares to support, without need of facing the vexatious task of making up his mind whether this man is sixth and that man is seventh choice, or vice versa. Rather than go through this process, many would doubtless refrain from voting for such remote choices at all, thus robbing the nominees of support they ought to have and which the Grand Junction system makes it easy to give them.

If a voter wishes to express only one choice, he is, of course, free to do so; it is his duty to do so if there is only one acceptable candidate. But such voters are likely to be organization men, bound to some boss, or else supporters of a good nominee up for reelection. In the former case, they are almost sure to be a minority, and likely to lose anywayif not, they ought of course to win. In the other case, the probably preeminent. claims of the candidate should make him an easy winner in the first column. If

he has no such claims, the result ought to include the other columns; and the voter who expresses no second choice for fear of hurting his first one, puts his candidate's interest ahead of the public interest-provided there are other good nominees, or provided any of the rest are thoroughly bad.

The Grand Junction system, with the minimum of turmoil and expense, selects from a large number of nominees a safe choice in a manner far more likely to reflect the calm, candid judgment of the voters than either the second election system or much alleged majority selection as is arrived at in the pulling and hauling of repeated balloting at a nominating convention. The voter has only to make a few crosses on a ballot, put the ballot in the box, and await results. The result is known before the excitement can become very bitter. Contrast this with second elections or repeated ballotings!

There is one point that has been found, strange as it may seem, to influence some persons against the preferential system. An opponent of it says, whether sincerely or not we are unaware, "Well, there were 3305 votes cast against Todd at Grand Junction, and only 1051 for him, and he ought to have won." Of course, the absurdity of this contention can be seen from the fact that there were only 1847 voters in the entire city, of whom 1051 had expressed their preference for Todd. Moreover, Todd's 1051 votes expressed the preference of voters who had also registered their choice of one of the other candidates, in case they could not have Todd, and vice versa.

The fact is there were only 794 voters (the difference between Todd's total vote and the total number of voters) who did not want Todd for mayor; and of the 1155 voters who put in a first choice vote for a pro-charter candidate, 1051 automatically came to agreement Todd.

on

Another advantage of the preferential system is revealed by this election in Grand Junction. Campaigns will be carried on with less mud-slinging than in former days. Every decent candidate. will bid for the second and third choices of the friends of the other candidates by abstaining from unjust criticisms; but if there is a sharp line between enforcement. and non-enforcement of law, or any other definite issue of good and bad government, all the candidates of each class will freely criticise those of the other class. The lines will be sharply drawn. Probably each side will be able to find two or more candidates in the list who will adequately represent its point of view. In this way, the majority of people who want decent government—as we believe they do can find men who will satisfy their demands, and their independence will not count against them as it does at present. The majority will be able automatomatically to get behind. some man who commands their confidence.

Ballots cannot readily be spoiled. If a man marks more than one choice for any

one man, only his first is counted, and he does not lose his vote for that man. If a voter marks two first choices, that means that he does not show which of the two he prefers and each receives one second choice. If he marks more than two first or two second choices, those votes are credited in the "other choices." Whatever preferences the voter unmistakably expresses will be counted.

In October, 1909, Mayor N. S. Pratt of Spokane, appointed a committee of seventeen citizens to report upon the general plan of a new charter. After five months' investigation, this committee advised a commission charter and recommended that a board of freeholders be elected to frame such a charter. The city council objected to this. After petitions had been filed, the citizens by mandamus proceedings compelled the city council to appoint September 27, 1910, for the freeholders' election. This committee submitted the new charter, which embodied the Grand Junction plan of preferential voting with the Cambridge modifications, except that the commissioners are not elected to a specific office as in Grand Junction and in the proposed Cambridge charter. The Spokane charter was adopted by popular vote December 28, 1910, and the first election was held March 7, 1911. (1)

Even with a large list of candidates, the voters were not confused. The fear of too large a number is exaggerated. Moreover, it is not undesirable in a free, open campaign before the people; and all the candidates went before the people. Hundreds of meetings were held throughout the city. Candidates were discussed day and night; the large num

men, and they succeeded. Everyone was proud of the high tone of the campaign, and their pride and satisfaction will not permit any other kind hereafter. The undesirable and improper candidates found their level.

The Grand Junction system of preferential voting was devised for the sole purpose of protecting the rights of the majority in the election of officers. The worst evils of city government have come from the ease with which selfish minorities have been able to control it.

There is but one thing that a majority of the citizens as yet want, and that is efficient administration of the city's business, and responsiveness to the popular will, whether it be for retrenchment or expansion. Elections reflecting the will of the majority can be attained by direct and easy nominations, the elimination of the primary, and the preferential system of voting. Responsiveness to the people is secured partly by these and partly by the initiative, referendum, and recall. Of course, neither the preferential nor any other system of voting will by itself alone bring about the best government, although the lack of it may prevent the best results. Neither will a combination of these and other good features insure good government if the people are apathetic to their own best interest. But the preferential system, direct legislation, and other modern political machinery will make it reasonably easy for citizens to get the best government of which they are capable. More than this, no form of government can do. (1) Charter relating to the preferential system of voting.

(1) The writer desires to record that in preparing this paper he has had the close cooperation and counsel of Professor Lewis J Johnson, who has had much experience with popularizing preferential voting and to whom he acknowledges his indebtedness.

For the use of those interested in the preferential system of voting, an appendix is attached to this paper containing Sections 35-55, inclusive of Chapter 531, Acts of 1911 of the Massachusetts Legislature, which are the sections of the Cambridge charter relating to the preferential system of voting.

election of all elective officers of the city to be voted for at any municipal election shall be as provided in this act and not otherwise.

Section 37. The name of the candidate shall be printed upon the ballot, when a petition of nomination shall have been filed in his behalf in the manner and form and under the conditions hereinafter set forth.

Section 38. The petition of nomination for each candidate shall be signed by not less than fifty qualified voters of the city either on individual certificates in form substantially as follows or on joint papers to the same purport:

the

Section 40. Each certificate shall be a separate paper. All certificates shall be of uniform size as determined by the city clerk. Each certificate shall contain the name and signature of one signer thereof and no more. shall Each certificate contain name of one candidate and no more. In case a voter has signed two or more conflicting petitions only that one of his conflicting signatures which was included in the petition first presented to the city clerk, as provided in section forty-one of this act, shall be valid. Each witness may be any qualified voter of Cambridge except the candidate named in the certificate.

Nominating Petitions-How and When Presented.

Section 41. Petitions of nomination shall be presented to the city clerk not earlier than thirty nor later than twenty days before the election. The city clerk shall endorse on each petition the date upon which it was presented to him, and by whom it was presented. All papers constituting a petition of nomination shall be presented to the city clerk at one time, except as is provided in section forty-two of this act.

Nominating Petitions May Be Amended. Section 42. When a petition of nomination is presented to the city clerk for filing. he shall forthwith examine the same and

ascertain whether it conforms to the provisions of this act. If found not to conform thereto, he shall then and there in writing on said petition state the reason why such petition cannot be filed, and shall within three days return the petition to the person named therein as the person to whom it shall be returned. The petition may then be amended and again, but not later than three days after said petition shall have been returned, presented to the city clerk, as in the first instance. The city clerk shall forthwith proceed to examine the amended petition as hereinbefore provided.

Section 43. If either the original or the amended petition of nomination be found sufficiently signed and witnessed as hereinbefore provided, the city clerk shall file the same forthwith: provided, that no petition, amended or otherwise, shall be presented later than twenty days before the election. Date of Filing Nominee's Acceptance. Section 44. Any person nominated under this article shall file his acceptance, his signature thereto witnessed by a qualified voter of Cambridge, with the city clerk not later than twenty days before the day of election, and in the absence of such acceptance the name of the candidate shall not appear on the ballot.

Form of Nominee's Acceptance. Section 45.

The acceptance mentioned in the preceding section shall be substantially in the following form:

Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
County of Middlesex.

City of Cambridge,

}

SS.

having heretofore been

nominated for the office of

in the city of Cambridge, to be voted for at the municipal election to be held in said city on the day of 19...., do hereby accept the said nomination, and I hereby declare that I am a qualified voter of said city, that my residence is at No. Street, Cambridge, and that I have not become, and am not a candidate for any other office to be voted for at said election.

Publication of Lists of Candidates. Section 47. The city clerk shall, not later than the fifteenth day before every city election, certify the list of candidates, with their residences, whose names are entitled to appear on the ballot, as being the list of candidates nominated as required by this act, together with the offices for which they are respectively candidates at such election, designating whether such election is for a full or for an unexpired term; and he shall file in his office said certified list of names and offices, and he shall cause to be published before such election, in two successive issues of at least two newspapers of general circulation published in the city of Cambridge, or in any different or additional manner that may be provided by ordinance, an election notice which shall contain said certified list of names of candidates and offices to be filled, and the time and the places of holding such election.

Preparation of Ballots.

Section 48. The city clerk shall cause ballots for each general and special municipal election to be prepared, printed, and authenticated as provided by the constitution and laws of the commonwealth, except as is otherwise required by this act. The ballots shall contain the full list and correct names