The offence is one against property, often trivial in detail, and manifestly unreasonable and absurd; but to raise the plea of insanity in such cases would, as a rule, be inadmissible, if not unadvisable; inadmissible, because, as is well remarked, the following facts can generally be established by the evidence:-"1st, A perfect consciousness of the act; 2ndly, That the article, though of trifling value, has still been of some use to the person; 3rdly, That there have been art and precaution in endeavouring to conceal the theft; and 4thly, A denial of the act when detected, or some evasive excuse. When circumstances of this kind are proved, either the parties should be made responsible, or theft should be openly tolerated." Also, it would be unadvisable to raise the plea, because if admitted it ought to necessitate a more serious control over the actions of the individual than would appertain to the crime itself; for if the disgrace attendant on visiting the act with its apportioned award be felt to be greatly oppressive, there would in reason appear to be no alternative between this and placing the individual under the restraint required by law, till such times as the mental unsoundness, with its accompanying tendency to the commission of crime, shall have disappeared. In these cases there is often discoverable very excellent reasoning power, and it seems by no means improbable that the effect of judicious punishment would be to prevent the repetition of

the act, by awakening the wholesome influence of fear; and, therefore, as a general rule on the principle of expediency, it would seem best to recognise the responsibility of such class of offenders.

We next arrive at the question of the responsibility during the lucid interval. "If a lunatic has lucid intervals of understanding, he shall answer for what he does in those intervals, as if he had no deficiency"—so saith the law! And here in limine I would object to the term, lucid interval, as calculated to give rise to erroneous ideas of the real condition of the person's mind, from the very different states it is employed to designate. It appears to have arisen from the ancient but exploded notions of insanity, being dependent upon lunar influences, and has been loosely applied alike to partial and temporary as well as to permanent periods of improvement. Now, we know, that in insanity it is common to talk coherently and act rationally, and then to subside at intervals more or less prolonged into the worst forms of madness; if to such an interval we attach the term "lucid interval," as has frequently been done, we are surely not justified in esteeming this merely transition state a responsible one! There is some analogy between the condition of the brain under such circumstances, and that of the lungs after a recent attack of pneumonia; the febrile symptoms have subsided, but the organ remains in an excitable state, highly susceptible to any disturbing influence,

and far from fitted for healthy action. The best definition of the lucid interval is that given by Haslam, and as the term will doubtless remain in spite of our protest against it, we propose to make it the test. It is "A complete recovery of the patient's intellects, ascertained by repeated examinations of his conversation, and by constant observation of his conduct, for a time sufficient to enable the superintendent to form a correct judgment." Taking this, then, to represent the lucid interval, we recognise by it a positive and actual return to the capacities and responsibilities of sanity, and therefore maintain that any one acting criminally in such interval ought to be regarded as accountable for his misdeeds. And this is in reality the view which, if not maintained, is at least acted upon in the majority of cases by our juries of the present day, for we find that they rarely convict, when it is proved that the accused was insane within a short period of the time of his perpetrating the crime, however rationally to all appearance it may have been carried out.

Finally, there is a reasonable distinction deservedly drawn between civil and criminal lunacy; a person's intellect may be so far impaired that he is unable to conduct the common affairs of life, to manage his property, or judge of the claims which his respective relations have upon him, and notwithstanding this, he may yet possess sufficient power of control over his actions to be held respon

sible for his criminal acts; in such instance the administration of the country deprives the individual of his civil rights by interdiction, appointing trustees to overlook his affairs, and preventing his exercising any conduct or control over them; but the fact of such interference is not alone sufficient to excuse criminal misbehaviour, so that a man may be civilly incompetent and yet criminally responsible.

The legitimate deduction from the contents of this chapter would seem to be, that the existence of mental unsoundness is not enough to establish irresponsibility; that some forms of mental unsoundness are held accountable on principles of true justice and equity, whilst others are on those of expediency alone; that expediency is a necessity originating in the adaptation of the machinery of human institutions to our ways and means of knowledge of human weakness and depravity.

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CHAPTER V.

UNSOUND MIND AS AN IRRESPONSIBLE CONDITION.

WE wish now to consider unsound mind in reference to the question of irresponsibility. The great practical difficulty in recognising this plea has hitherto generally arisen in the instances of homicide; and it is therefore more especially to the medical tests which have been proposed, for the purpose of establishing a sufficient amount of unsoundness to ensure impunity in such cases, that I shall allude. The principles involved would apply in the consideration of the irresponsibility of the individual for any criminal act; but as the tests are each of them more or less fallacious, it seems preferable to exhibit them in their special, rather than in their general, application. The following is the summary of those which have been advanced by various authorities on the subject.

1st. That the act of homicide has generally been preceded by other striking peculiarities of conduct in the individual; often by a total change of cha

racter.