BELL x. HOBSON. [ *241 ] [ *242 ] to any port or ports, place or places, in the Baltic, backwards +11 R. R. 628 (2 Taunt. 416). at to such goods as were loaded on board at Gottenburgh, particularly as a liberty was reserved in the former policies to take in and discharge goods wherever the ship might touch at: but Lord ELLENBOROUGH, Ch. J. was of opinion that the words at the foot of this policy, stating it to be in continuation of former policies, shewed that the parties contemplated the taking up the insurance on goods loaded before the ship arrived at Gottenburgh; and that the circumstance of this defendant not having been an underwriter upon the former policies, which was pressed upon his Lordship, would not vary the case. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. The Solicitor-General moved for a new trial, renewing the above objections, and insisting more fully upon the effect of the liberty reserved in the former policy, to take in and discharge goods wheresoever, &c., and also of the stipulation for the return of premium if the voyage ended at Gottenburgh; as shewing that the parties contemplated an entire change of cargo in the voyage from Virginia, and that probably it would be determined and a new voyage commenced at Gottenburgh: and that even if these inferences failed, still that the defendant would not be liable as upon a continued voyage from Virginia, unless the policy underwritten by him was in clear and distinct terms upon a continuation of the identical cargo loaded in Virginia. LORD ELLENBOROUGH, Ch. J.: A very strict and certainly a construction not to be favoured, and still less to be extended, was adopted in the case of Spitta v. Woodman, where it was holden that the words beginning the adventure from the loading on board, were to be confined to the place from whence the risk commenced. But if there be anything to indicate that a prior loading was contemplated by the parties, it will release the case from that strict construction.t Then can there be anything more indicative of such an understanding between the parties, than the statement made at the Cited and applied by BLACKBURN, J. in Joyce v. Realm Ins. Co. (1872) L. R. 7 Q. B. 580, 583, 41 BELL v. HOBSON. [243] BELL v. HOPSON. foot of this policy, that it was in continuation of former policies, which were distinctly upon a voyage from Virginia. This was taking up the voyage from a period in the former policies. The conclusion therefore, which was drawn in Spitta v. Woodman, is completely rebutted by the reference in this policy to an antecedent loading. LE BLANC, J.: The statement inserted at the foot of this policy seems intended to take it out of the strict construction adopted in Spitta v. Woodman. Per CURIAM: Rule refused. 1812. Nov. 11. [244] BECK AND OTHERS v. EVANS AND ANOTHER. A public notice given by carriers that they will not be answerable for certain specified articles or any other goods of what nature or kind soever above the value of 5l., if lost, stolen, or damaged, unless a special agreement is made, and a premium paid, such value to be entered at the time of delivery, seems not to extend to goods which do not fall within any of the specified articles, and which from their bulk and quality, communicated to the carriers at the time of delivery, must be known to them to exceed the value of 51.: and therefore it seems they will be liable for any damage to the goods arising from the carriage, although no special agreement be made, nor any premium paid; but at all events they will be liable for damage arising from gross negligence notwithstanding such notice. THE plaintiffs were spirit merchants at Shrewsbury, and brought this action on the case, for damages, against the defendants, as common carriers, for improperly and negligently carrying a cask of brandy, which the plaintiffs sent by the defendants' waggon from Shrewsbury to London, by which it was damaged and the greater part of the brandy lost. The case proved before Le Blanc, J., at Shrewsbury, was in substance this: The cask of brandy which was of the value of 70l. and upwards, was sent by the defendants' waggon, and 1s. 6d. were paid at the time for booking, which was the common charge independent of the carriage price: a permit was delivered with it, which shewed that the contents of the cask were brandy; but no special agreement was made for the price of the carriage, nor anything said as to the value of the cask. Before the waggon got to Birmingham it was perceived by persons in the waggon, that the cask was leaking fast, and the waggoner was informed of the circumstance; but though he staid three hours in Birmingham after his arrival there, he made no examination of the cask, nor took any step to prevent the leakage. He passed in like manner through Wolverhampton, where the waggon also made some stay, without regard to the cask, though the leakage still continued and increased, and he was again informed of it: but at the next stage beyond Wolverhampton, having some parcels to deliver *out of the waggon, he there took the cask out, and the remainder of the brandy was saved. There was some attempt in defence to shew that the cask was in a damaged state when it was put into the waggon; which attempt however failed in the opinion of the Court and jury; but the principal ground of defence was a public notice given by the defendants, which was conspicuously exhibited over their warehouse, where the goods to be carried were received, and which was in these terms: "The proprietors of the London and Salop waggons give this public notice, that they will not be answerable for cash, banknotes, writings, jewels, plate, watches, lace, silk, hose, wool, muslins, china, glass, paintings, or any other goods of what nature or kind soever, above the value of 5l., if lost, stolen, or damaged, unless a special agreement is made, and an adequate premium paid, over and above the common carriage; such value to be specified and entered at the time of the delivery here, or to any of their officers or agents in the different parts of the kingdom." Upon this evidence the learned Judge left it to the jury to consider, whether the injury arose from the negligence of the defendants' waggoner, in not examining the cask, after he was informed of its leaky state, at either of the places where he halted; and he was also of opinion that the notice given by the defendants did not apply to a case of this kind, where the cask had been signified to them to be a cask of brandy, and therefore they must have known its value exceeded 51.; but that such notices applied only to packages which, from their dimension and quality, could not be known to be necessarily above that BECK v EVA NS. [*245] BECK v. EVANS. [ *246 ] [247] value. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the learned Judge reserved to the defendants liberty to move to enter a nonsuit, in case the *Court should be of opinion that the defendants were protected by their notice. Jervis accordingly moved upon this point, and also upon the ground of a misdirection; upon the first he cited Clay v. Willan,† Izett v. Mountain, and Nicholson v. Willan, § to shew that these notices had been established to be binding on the public; and in Ellis v. Turner, where the carrier, notwithstanding such notice, was held liable for the loss of the goods, it appeared that he had carried them beyond the place to which they were consigned, and that was the ground on which he was held liable. Upon the ground of misdirection, he contended that the waggoner was not bound upon notice of the leakage to unload his waggon at any intermediate stage of the journey; and that it appeared, that as soon as he had occasion to unload the first parcel of goods for delivery, he looked to the cask and removed it, which was all that he was bound by law to do. LORD ELLENBOROUGH, Ch. J.: If the first point, upon which this rule is prayed, was unmixed with any other upon which the defendants were liable, I should be disposed to have it considered; not that my opinion upon it is in favour of the defendants, but on the contrary I am inclined against them. The notice, although in its terms it is made to extend to any goods of what nature or kind soever, cannot be indefinite, but must be construed with reference to the subjectmatter, and *to cases where the party has no means of knowing of what nature the goods are. In that case the party stipulates that he will not be answerable for goods above the value of 5l., unless the value has been notified to him, and they are paid for as such. But this was known to the defendants to be a cask of brandy, and does not fall within the description of cash or notes, or of any of the goods enumerated in the notice. Such is the inclination of my opinion upon this point, and yet it is singular reported in 15 R. R.-F. P.] † 1 H. Bl. 298. 4 East, 371. § 5 East, 507. [This case will be | 5 R. R. 441 (8 T. R. 531). |