has committed many memorable errors. He has, in the first place, assailed Aristotle as a supporter of the IDEAL system. In the description which he has hazarded of the IDEAL system, Dr. Brown has, in the second place, utterly misapprehended its character. Many of the objections which Dr. Brown has urged against the IDEAL system, may, in the third place, be urged with absolute truth (as it so happens) against his own system of opinions.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth books of his Metaphysics, Aristotle appears as the opponent of the IDEAL system. Whether the objections there urged by Aristotle were urged in a serious spirit, has, indeed, been doubted by the profoundest of the commentators on his writings-more especially by Simplicius; but the objections which Aristotle did advance against the Platonic theory of IDEAS, are, at all events, incomparably more weighty than the objections which suggested themselves to Dr. Brown.

Dr. Brown, among his other errors, represents (pp. 153–169, 296, 287) the IDEAL system of Plato as, essentially, a system of materialism. We shall take occasion, in the course of our criticism, to indicate the exceedingly limited nature of Dr. Brown's knowledge of the Platonic writings. We shall show, moreover, as we have already indicated, that the charge of materialism attaches, in fact, to the tenets of Dr. Brown himself, as the same charge attached, undoubtedly, to the opinions of the Stoics.

Dr. Brown's account of the process of ABSTRACTION affords a glimpse of his own system, as well as a test of the extent of his acquaintance with the philosophy of Greece. He observes, p. 9,

In the course of our analysis of the intellectual phenomena, we shall have frequent opportunities of remarking the influence which errors with respect to these mere phenomena of mind must have had on the contemporary systems of general physics, and on the spirit of the prevailing plans of inquiry. It may be enough to remark, at present, the influence of one fundamental error, which, as long as it retained its hold of the understanding, must have rendered all its energies ineffectual, by wasting them in the search of objects which it never could attain, because, in truth, they had no real existence-to the neglect of objects that would have produced the very advantage which was sought. I allude to the belief of the schools, in the separate existence, or entity, as they technically termed it, of the various orders of universals, and the mode in which they conceived every acquisition of knowledge in reasoning to take place, by the intervention of certain intelligible forms, or species, existing separately in the intellect, as the direct objects of thought; in the same manner as they ascribed simple perception to the action of species of another order, which they termed sensible species -the images of things derived, indeed, from objects without, but when

thus derived, existing independently of them. When we amuse ourselves with inquiring into the history of human folly-that most comprehensive of all histories-which includes, at least for many ages, the whole history of philosophy, or rather, to use a word more appropriate than amusement, when we read with regret the melancholy annals of genius aspiring to be pre-eminently frivolous, and industry labouring to be ignorant, we often discover absurdities of the grossest kind, which almost cease to be absurdities, on account of other absurdities, probably as gross, which accompany them; and this is truly the case, in the grave extravagance of the logic of the schools. The scholastic mode of philosophizing, ridiculous as it now seems, was far from absurd, when taken in connexion with the scholastic philosophy. It was, indeed, the only mode of procedure which that philosophy could consistently admit. To those who believed that singular objects could afford no real knowledge, singularium nullam dari scientiam, and that this was to be obtained only from what they termed intelligible species, existing not in external things, but in the intellect itself, it must have seemed as absurd to wander in quest of knowledge, out of that region in which alone they supposed it to exist, and to seek it among things singular, as it would now to us seem hopeless and absurd to found a system of physical truths in the contemplation and comparison of universals. While this false theory of the mental phenomena prevailed, was it possible that the phenomena of matter should have been studied on sounder principles of investigation, when any better plan must have been absolutely inconsistent with the very theory of thought? It was in mind that the student of general nature was to seek his guiding light, without which all then was darkness. The intellectual philosopher, if any such had then arisen, to analyse simply the phenomena of thought, without any reference to general physics, would, in truth, have done more in that dark age for the benefit of every physical science, than if he had discovered a thousand properties of as many different sub

stances.

Let us suppose, for a moment, that an accurate view of the intellectual process of abstraction could have been communicated to a veteran sage of the schools, at the very moment when he was intently contemplating the tree of Porphyry, in all its branches of species and genera, between the individual and the summum genus, and when he was preparing, perhaps, by the contemplation of a few universals, to unfold all the philosophy of colours, or of the planetary movementswould the benefit which he received from this clearer view of a single process of thought, have terminated in the mere science of mind; or would not rather his new views of mind have extended a most important influence to his whole wide views of matter? He must immediately have learned, that in the whole tree of genera and species, the individual at the bottom of his scale was the only real independent existence, and that all the rest, the result of certain comparisons of agreement or disagreement, were simple modifications of his own mind, not produced by any thing existing in his intellect, but by the very constitution of his intellect itself; the consideration of a number of individuals as of one species being nothing more than the feeling of their agreement in certain respects, and the feeling of this agreement being as simple a

result of the observation of them together, as the perception of each, individually, was of its individual presence. It would surely have been impossible for him, with this new and important light, to return to his transcendental inquiries into entities, and quiddities, and substantial forms; and the simple discovery of a better theory of abstraction, as a process of the mind, would thus have supplied the place of many rules of philosophizing.'

Let us here observe, that it is not our intention to figure as champions of the Scholastic Philosophy. We do not mean, indeed, to admit that the Scholastic Philosophy is justly obnoxious to the imputations levelled against it by Dr. Brown; but we do mean to assert, that whatever may be the worth of Dr. Brown's criticisms on the opinions held by the schoolmen, those criticisms must be regarded as simply absurd, when directed against the Platonic and Peripatetic systems.

In the passage which we have quoted, Dr. Brown alludes contemptuously to the belief of the schools in the separate existence, or entity, as they termed it, of the various orders of 'universals.'

We shall presently prove that Dr. Brown himself was compelled, in his own despite, to profess his belief in the existence, and surpassing importance of universals.'

6

Dr. Brown alludes contemptuously, to 'images of things, derived indeed from objects without, but, when thus derived, existing independently of them.'

Dr. Brown himself believed, as we shall show, not perhaps in 'images of things' derived from without,-but believed, at all events, that all knowledge is derived from without'

Dr. Brown sneered at those who believed that singular objects could afford no real knowledge.' We shall see that he, not less than the schoolmen whom he derides, held this opinion. He would, moreover, if the opportunity had been vouchsafed to him, have convinced the student of Porphyry that the individual at the bottom of Porphyry's scale of perception is the only real independent existence.' Dr. Brown, however, (let us here observe,) attached to the term 'real' a meaning very different from that which the ancient philosophers attached to it. They denied 'reality' to matter. Dr. Brown, it is clear, held matter to be the only reality.' He was, in other words, essentially a materialist.

We are assured by Dr. Brown that comparisons of agreement or disagreement are simple modifications of mind, not produced by anything existing in intellect, but by the very constitution of intellect itself.'

Did Dr. Brown really imagine that the Peripapetics or Platonists taught that the things' which exist in intellect' are material things?' Porphyry, to whom Dr. Brown alludes,

assuredly inculcated no such doctrine. In his treatise on 'Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures,' Porphyry expressly declares that forms do not subsist in the soul like bodies, as things of a different essence from it; but they are certain energies of the soul. For the nature of soul possesses an infinite power. Every thing also that occurs in it is soul; and all souls are, in a certain respect, one. For as bodies, though divided to infinity, do not end in that which is incorporeal, but alone receive a difference of segments according to bulk; thus also soul, being a vital form, may be conceived to consist of forms ad infinitum.

Porphyry was, in short, far less inclined to materialism than Dr. Brown himself. It is scarcely necessary to add, that 'entities, and quiddities, and substantial forms, constituted no part of the nomenclature of Porphyry, or of any genuine Platonist. Had Dr. Brown, indeed, understood the spirit of the Platonic, or even of the Peripatetic system, he would have known that, by a Platonist or Peripatetic, the phrase 'substantial forms' must have been regarded as involving a contradiction in terms. Form' was regarded by Plato and Aristotle as, essentially, 'quality;' and quality' could never, as those mighty masters taught, become 'substance.'

6

We proceed to illustrate, by farther quotations, Dr. Brown's positive opinions. He asserts, p. 10,—

"There is indeed, no reason now to fear that the observation of particular objects, with a view to general science, will be despised as incapable of giving any direct knowledge, and all real science be confined to universals. Singularium datur scientia.'

According to Dr. Brown, in short, not only are things singular' the source of science; but as 'the individual at the bottom of Porphyry's scale of perception is the only real independent existence,' science is, if Dr. Brown has argued wisely, to be extracted from things singular' alone.

Subsequently (p. 39) Dr. Brown lays it down that there are in nature only substances; and all the substances in nature are every thing that truly exists in nature.'

In treating of form,' Dr. Brown seeks to enforce this proposition. He observes, p. 38,

'Power is not any thing that can exist separately from a substance, but is merely the substance itself, considered in relation to another substance; in the same manner as what we denominate form is not any thing separate from the elementary atoms of a mass, but is merely the relation of a number of atoms, as co-existing in apparent contact. The sculptor, at every stroke of his chisel, alters the form of the block of marble on which he works, not by communicating to it any new qualities, but merely by separating from it a number of corpuscles,

which were formerly included by us in our conception of the continuous whole; and when he has given the last delicate touches that finish the Jupiter, or the Venus, or Apollo, the divine form which we admire, as if it had assumed a new existence beneath the artist's hand, is still in itself unaltered; the same quiescent mass that slumbered for ages in the quarry of which it was a part.

"Quale fuscæ marmor in Africa
Solo recisum, sumere idoneum
Quoscunque vultus, seu Diana
Seu Cytherea magis placebit :
Informis, ater, sub pedibus jacet,
Donec politus Phidiacá manú
Formosa tandem destinate
Induitur lapis ora divæ,

Jam, jamque ponit duritiem placens,
Et nunc ocelli, et gratia mollium
Spirat genarum, nunc labella et

Per nivium coma sparsa collum.'.

"The form of bodies is the relation of their elements to each other in space; the power of bodies is their relation to each other in time; and both form and power, if considered separately from the number of elementary corpuscles, and from the changes that arise successively, are equally abstractions of the mind and nothing more. We give a name to some common quality of many substances, and we then suppose that there is in it something real, because we have given it a name, and strive to discover what that is in itself, which, in itself, has no existence. In the philosophy of Aristotle, form, which all now readily allow to be a mere abstraction of the mind, when considered separately from the figured substance, was regarded as something equally real with matter itself; and, indeed, matter, which was supposed to derive from form all its qualities, was rather the less important of the two!

6

Aristotle did undoubtedly teach, not merely that form is something equally 'real' with matter itself,' but, that while form possesses reality,' matter is, essentially, unreal.' The reasons on which this opinion of Aristotle rests, remain uncontroverted by Dr. Brown, or by any other of the followers of Locke.

In the first book of his Physics, Aristotle establishes the existence of three physical principles, MATTER, FORM, and the contrary to form, PRIVATION. Plato assumed the existence of only two physical principles, MATTER and MATERIAL FORM.

In his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, Simplicius, in illustration of Aristotle's views, has observed:-In every thing natural, there is form; except that in things perpetual, there is form alone, but in generable and corruptible natures, together with form, there is also privation, not of the same form, but of the opposite, into which it is naturally adapted to be changed. . . . . Surveying forms, which change into each other, and on this account require a subject capable of receiving the opposites in succession, we arrive at the conception of matter, by a negation of