whole hecatomb, that is, a sacrifice of one hundred oxen, as a thanksgiving for the happy re-establishment of Athens, he made a feast, to which all the citizens without exception were invited.* Sparta could not see without extreme affliction so glorious a revolution. She fooked upon the grandeur and power of a city, her ancient rival, and almost continual enemy, as her own ruin, which made the Lacedæmonians take the mean resolution of avenging themselves at once upon Athens, and Conon her restorer, by making peace with the king of Persia. With this view they despatched Antalcides to Tiribasus. His commission consisted of two principa. articles. The first was to accuse Conon to that satrap of having defrauded the king of the money, which he had employed in the re-establishment of Athens; and of having formed the design of depriving the Persians of Æolia and Ionia, and to subject them anew to the republic of Athens, upon which they had formerly depended. By the second, he had orders to make the most advantageous proposals to Tiribasus which his master could desire, who, without giving himself any manner of trouble in regard to Asia, only stipulated, that all the islands and other cities should enjoy their laws and liberty. The Lacedæmonians thus gave up to the king, with the greatest injustice and the utmost baseness, all the Greeks settled in Asia, for whose liberty Agesilaus had so long fought. It is true, he had no share in this most infamous negotiation; the whole reproach of which ought to fall on Antalcides, who, being the sworn enemy of the king of Sparta, hastened the peace by all means, because the war augmented the authority, glory, and reputation of Agesilaus.† The most considerable cities of Greece had sent deputies at the same time to Tiribasus; and Conon was at the head of those from Athens. They were unanimous in rejecting such proposals. Without speaking of the interests of the Greeks of Asia, with which they were extremely affected, they saw themselves exposed by this treaty; the Athenians, to the loss of the isles of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; the Thebans, to abandon the cities of Bœotia, of which they were in possession, and which would thereby regain their independence; and the Argives, to renounce Corinth, with the loss of which Argos itself would soon, in all probability, be attended. The deputies there fore withdrew, without concluding any thing. Tiribasus seized Conon, and put him in prison. Not daring to declare openly for the Lacedæmonians, without an express order to that purpose, he contented himself with supplying them privately with considerable sums of money for fitting out a fleet, in order that the other cities of Greece might not be in a condition to oppose them. After having taken these precautions, he set out directly for the court to give the king an account of the state of his negotiation. That prince was well satisfied with it, and directed him in the strongest terms to effect its completion. Tiribasus also laid before him the accusation of Conon by the Lacedæmonians. Some authors, according to Cornelius Nepos, have written, that he was carried to Susa, and there executed by the king's order. The silence of Xenophon, who was his cotemporary, in regard to his death, makes it doubtful whether he did not escape from prison, or suffer, as has been said. While this treaty was negotiating, several inconsiderable actions passed between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. It was also at the same time that Evagoras extended his conquest in the island of Cyprus, of which we shall soon treat. Tiribasus at length, upon his return, summoned the deputies of the Grecian cities to be present at the reading of the treaty. It imported, that all the Grecian cities of Asia should remain dependent on the king, and that the rest, as well small as great, should have full possession of their liberty. The king farther reserved to himself the isles of Cyprus and Clazomenæ, and oft those of Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, to the Athenians, to whom they had long apper ained. By the same treaty he engaged to join with such people as came into *Athen. I. i. p. 3. VOL. II. 12 Xenoph. Hist. Græc. 1. iv. p. 537, 538. Plut. in Agesil. p. 60. it, in order to make war by sea and land against all who should refuse to agree to it. We have already said that Sparta herself proposed these conditions. All the other cities of Greece, or at least the greatest part of them, rejected so infamous a treaty with horror. However, as they were weakened and exhausted by domestic divisions, and not in a condition to support a war against so powerful a prince, who threatened to fall with all his forces upon those who should refuse to come into this peace, they were obliged against their will to comply with it; except the Thebans, who had the courage to oppose it openly at first, but were at length reduced to accept it, with the others, by whom they found themselves universally abandoned. Such was the fruit of the jealousy and divisions which armed the Grecian cities against each other, and was the end proposed by the policy of Artaxerxes, in distributing sums of money among the several states; invincible in arms, and by the sword, but not by the gold and presents of the Persians; so much did they differ in this respect from the character of the ancient Greeks their forefathers. To comprehend rightly how much Sparta and Athens differed from what they had been in former times, we have only to compare the two treaties concluded between the Greeks and Persians; the former by Cimon the Athenian, under Artaxerxes Longimanus, above sixty years before, and the latter by Antalcides the Lacedæmonian, under Artaxerxes Mnemon. In the first, Greece victorious and triumphant, assures the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks, gives laws to the Persians, imposes what conditions she pleases, and prescribes bounds and limits, by prohibiting them to approach nearer to the sea with their troops than the distance of three days march; or to appear with vessels of war in any of the seas between the Cyanæan and Chalidonian islands; that is to say, from the Euxine to the coasts of Pamphylia. In the second, on the contrary, Persia, grown haughty and imperious, takes pleasure in humbling its conquerors, in depriving them, with a single stroke of the pen, of their empire in Asia Minor, in compelling them to abandon basely all the Greeks established in those rich provinces, to subscribe to their own subjection, and to conîìne themselves in their turn within the narrow bounds of Greece.f From whence can so strange an alteration arise? Are there not on both sides the same cities, the same people, the same forces, and the same interest? No doubt there are; but they are not the same men, or rather they have no longer the same principles of policy. Let us recall those happy times of Greece, so glorious for Athens and Sparta, when Persia came pouring like a deluge upon this little country with all the forces of the east. What was it hat rendered the two cities invincible, and superior to such numerous and formidable armies? Their union and good understanding. No dissention between the two states, no jealousy of command, no private view of interest; in fine, no other contests between them but of honour, glory, and the love of their country. To so laudable an union may be added an irreconcileable hatred for the Persians, which became a kind of nature in the Greeks, and was the most distin guishing character of that nation. It was a capital crime, and punished with death, only to mention peace, or propose any accommodation with them; and an Athenian mother was seen to throw the first stone at her son, who had dared to make such a motion, and to set others the example of stoning him.‡ This strict union of the two states, and declared abhorrence of the common enemy, were a long time the potent barriers of their security, rendered them invincible, and may be said to have been the source and principle of ail the glorious successes which raised the reputation of Greece to so high a pitch But by misfortune common to the most flourishing states, those very suc cesses became the cause of its ruin, ard prepared the way for the disgraces il experienced in the sequel. A. M. 3617. Ant. J. C. 337. Xenoph. 1. v. p. 548 -651. † Diod. 1. xii. p. 74, 75. These two states, which might have carried their victorious arms into the neart of Persia, and have attacked in their turn the great king even upon his throne; instead of forming in concert such an enterprise, which would at once have crowned them with glory, and laden them with riches, have the folly to leave their common enemy at repose, to embroil thems 'ves with each other upon trivial points of honour and interests of small importance, and to exhaust he forces ineffectually against themselves, which ought to have been employed solely against the barbarians, who could not have resisted them. For it is remarkable, that the Persians never had any advantage over the Athenians, and Lacedæmonians, while they united with each other, and that it was their own divisions only which supplied them with the means to conquer both alternately, and always the one by the other.* These divisions induced them to take such measures as neither Sparta nor Athens would ever have otherwise been capable of. We see them both dishonouring themselves by their mean and abject flatteries, not only of the king of Persia, but even of his satraps: paying homage to them, earnestly soliciting their favour, cringing to them, and even suffering their ill humour; and all this to obtain some aid of troops or money, forgetting that the Persians, haughty and insolent to such as seemed afraid of them, became timorous and mean to those who had the courage to despise them. But, in fine, what did they gain by all these mean condescensions? The treaty which gave occasion for these reflections, and will for ever be the reproach of Sparta and Athens SECTION VI.-WAR OF ARTAXERXES AGAINST EVAGORAS. WHAT I have said upon the facility with which the Greeks might have rendered themselves formidable to their enemies, will be more evident, if we consider, on one side, the diversity of people, and extent of country, which composed the vast empire of the Persians, and, on the other, the weakness of the government, incapable of animating so great a mass, and of supporting the weight of so much business and application. In that court, every thing was determined by the intrigues of women, and the cabals of favourites, whose only merit often consisted in flattering their prince, and soothing his passions. It was by their influence officers were chosen, and the first dignities disposed of; by their opinion the services of the generals of armies were judged, and their rewards decided. The sequel will show, that from the same source arose the insurrection of provinces, the distrust of the greatest part of the governors, the discontent and consequent revolt of the best cfficers, and ill success of almost all the enterprises that were formed. Artaxerxes, having got rid of the care and perplexity which the war with the Greeks had occasioned, applied himself to the terminating that of Cyprus, which had lasted several years, but had been carried on with little vigour, and turned the greatest part of his forces that way. Evagoras reigned at that time in Salamin, the capital city of the isle of Cyprus. He was descended from Teucer† of Salamin, who at his return from Troy built this city, and gave it the name of his country. His descendants had reigned there from that time; but a stranger of Phoenicia, having dispossessed the lawful king, had taken his place, and to maintain himself in the usurpation, had filled the city with barbarians, and subjected the whole island to the king of Persia. Under this tyrant Evagoras was born. He had been carefully educated, and was distinguished among the youth by the beauty of his countenance, the vigour of his body, and more by the modesty and innocence of his manners, which were the greatest ornaments of that age. As he advanced in years, the greatest virtues, valour, wisdom, and justice, were observed to brighten in him. He afterwards carried these virtues to so conspicuous a height, as to give jealousy Isoc. in Panegyr. p. 132-137. This Teicer was of Salamin, a little island near Athens, Isoc. in Evag. p. 380. In Panath. p. 524, 525. celebrated for the famous batt'e under Xerxes Et qui ornat ætatem, pudor -Cic. to those who governed; who perceived justly that so shining a merit could not continue in the obscurity of a private condition; but his modesty, probity, and integrity, re-assured them, and they reposed an entire confidence in him, to which he always answered by an inviolable fidelity, without ever meditating their expulsion from the throne by violence or treachery. A more justifiable means conducted him to it, Divine Providence, as Isocrates says, preparing the way for him. One of the principal citizens murdered the person upon the throne, and had contrived to seize Evagoras, and to rid himself of him, in order to secure the crown to himself; but that prince es caping his pursuit, retired to Solos, a city of Cilicia. His banishment was so far from abating his courage, that it gave him new vigour. Attended only with fifty followers, determined like himself to conquer or die, he returned to Salamin, and expelled the usurpers, though supported by the credit and protection of the king of Persia. Having re-established himself in Salamin, he soon rendered his little kingdom most flourishing, by his application to the relief of his subjects, and by protecting them in all things; by governing them with justice and benevolence; by making them active and laborious; by inspiring them with a taste for the cultivation of lands, the breeding of cattle, commerce, and navigation. He formed them also for war, and made them excellent soldiers. He was already very powerful, and had acquired great reputation, when Conon the Athenian general, after his defeat at Egospotamos, took refuge with him; not thinking it possible to find a safer asylum for himself, nor a more powerful support of his country. The resemblance of their manners and sentiments soon made them contract a strict amity with each other, which continued ever after, and proved equally advantageous to both. Conon was in great credit at the king of Persia's court, which he employed with that prince, by the means of Ctesias the physician, to accommodate his differences with his host Evagoras, and happily effected it.† Evagoras and Conon, with the noble design of subverting, or at least of re ducing the great power of Sparta, which had rendered itself formidable to all Greece, concerted together the means for the attainment of that end. They were both citizens of Athens; the latter by birth, and the other by right of adoption, which his great services and zeal for that republic mérited. The satraps of Asia saw with pain their country ravaged by the Lacedæmonians, and found themselves in great difficulties, from not being in a condition to resist them. Evagoras remonstrated to them, that it was necessary to attack the enemy as well by sea as land; and he did not contribute a little, by his influence with the king of Persia, to Conon's being appointed general of his fleet. The celebrated victory over the Lacedæmonians at Cnidos was the consequence, and gave the mortal wound to that republic.§ The Athenians, in acknowledgment of the important services Evagoras and Conon had rendered them with Artaxerxes, erected statues in honour of them. Evagoras on his side, extending his conquests from city to city, endeavoured to make himself master of the whole island. The Cypriots had recourse to the king of Persia. That prince, alarmed by the rapid progress of Evagoras, of which he apprehended the effects, and conscious of what importance it was to him to prevent an island's falling into the hands of an eremy, so favourably situated for holding Asia Minor in awe, promised thern an ir.mediate and pow erful support, without declaring openly however against Evagoras. T Being employed elsewhere by more important affairs, he could not keep his word with them so soon as he expected, and had engaged. The war of Cyprus continued six years, and the success with which Evagoras supported it against the great king, ought to have banished from the Greeks all terror of the Persian name, and united them against the common enemy. It is true, the A. M. 3590 Ant. J. C. 405. Isocrat. in Evag. p. 393, 395. ** †A. M. 3505. Ant. J C. 99 { A. M. 3610. Ant. J. C. $94. Pausan. 1. i. p. 5. Diod. 1. xiv. p. 311. **A. M. 3614. Ant. J. C. $90. Isocrat. in Paneg. p. 135, 136. succours sent by Artaxerxes till then were very inconsiderable as they also were the two following years. During all that time, it was less a real war, than a preparation for war: but when he had disengaged himself from the Greeks, he applied to it vigorously, and attacked Evagoras with all his forces.* The army by land, commanded by Orontes, his son-in-law, consisted of three hundred thousand men, and the fleet of three hundred galleys; of which Tiribasus, a person of the highest rank and greatest reputation, was admiral Gaos, his son-in-law, commanded under him. Evagoras on his side assembled as many troops and ships as he could; but they were a handful in comparison with the formidable preparations of the Persians. He had a fleet of only ninety galleys, and his army scarcely amounted to twenty thousand men. As he had abundance of light vessels, he laid snares for those that carried the provisions of the enemy, of which he sunk a great number, took many, and prevented the rest from arriving; which occasioned a famine among the Persians, attended with violent seditions, which could only be appeased by the coming of fresh convoys from Cilicia. Evagoras strengthened his fleet with sixty galleys which he caused to be built, and fifty sent him by Achoris, king of Egypt, with all the money and corn he could have occasion for. Evagoras with his land forces immediately attacked a part of the enemy's army which was separate from the rest, and entirely routed it. This first action was soon followed by another at sea, in which the Persians were worsted for some time, till animated by the warm reproaches and remonstrances of their admiral, they resumed courage, and obtained a complete victory. Salamin was immediately besieged by sea and land. Evagoras, leaving the defence of the city to his son, Pythagoras, quitted it in the night with ten galleys, and sailed for Egypt, to engage the king to support him vigorously against the common enemy. He did not obtain from him all the aid he expo ted. At his return, be found the city in exceeding distress; and finding himself without resource or hope, he was obliged to capitulate. The proposals made to him were, that he should abandon all the cities of Cyprus except Salamin, where he should content himself to reign; that he should pay an annual tribute to the king, and remain in obedience to him, as a servant to a master. The extremity to which he was reduced obliged him to accept the other conditions, hard as they were; but he could never resolve to comply with the last, and persisted always in declaring, that he could only treat as a king with a king. Tiribasus, who commanded the siege, would abate nothing of his pretensions. Orontes, the other general, jealous of his colleague's glory, had written secretly to court against him, accusing him, among other things, of forming designs against the king, and strengthened his accusation from his continuing to hold a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, and his manifest endeavours to make the chiefs of the army his creatures, by means of presents, promises, and a complacency of manners, not natural to him. Artaxerxes, upon these letters, believed he had no time to lose, and that it was necessary to prevent a conspiracy ready to break out. He despatched orders immediately to Orantes to seize Tiribasus, and send him to court in chains, which was instantly put in execution. Tiribasus, upon his arrival, demanded to be brought to a trial in form; that the heads of the accusation should be communicated to him, and the proofs and witnesses produced. The king, employed in other cares, had no leisure at that time to take cognizance of the affair. Orontes in the mean time, seeing that the besieged made a vigorous defence, and that the soldiers of the army, discontented with the removal of Tiribasus, quitted the service, and refused to obey him, was afraid that affairs would take a bad turn with regard to him. He therefore caused Evagoras to be spoken to privately; the negotiation was resumed; the offers made at first by the lat ter were accepted; and the mortifying article, which had prevented the conclusion of the treaty, retrenched. The siege was raised in consequence. Evagoras continued king of Salamin only, and engaged tɔ pay an annual tribute.f A. M. 3613. Ant. J. C. 386. Diod. I. xv. p. 323–333. † A. M. 3619. Ant. J. C. 385 |