Artaxerxes, being informed of the state of the Grecian affairs, sent a new en bassy thither to persuade the several cities and republics at war to lay down their arms, and accommodate their differences upon the plan of the treaty of Antalcides. By that peace, as has been observed in its place, it was concluded, that all the cities of Greece should enjoy their liberty, and be governed by their own laws. In virtue of this article, the Lacedæmonians pressed the Thebans to restore their liberty to all the cities of Boeotia, to rebuild Platææ and Thespiæ, which they had demolished, and to restore them with their dependencies to their ancient inhabitants. The Thebans on their side insisted also, that the Lacedæmonians should give liberty to all those of Laconia, and tha! the city of Messene should be restored to its ancient possessors. This was what equity required; but the Lacedæmonians, believing themselves much superior to the Thebans, were for imposing a law upon them, which they would not subinit to themselves.* All Greece, being weary of a war which had already lasted several campaigns, and had no other end than the aggrandizing of that state, was seriously intent upon a general peace, and with that view had sent deputies to Lacedæ mon, to concert together the means of attaining so desirable an object. Among these deputies, Epaminondas was of the first rank. He was at that time celebrated for his great erudition and profound knowledge in philosophy; but he had not yet given any very distinguished proofs of his great capacity for the command of armies, and the administration of public affairs. Seeing that all the deputies, out of respect for Agesilaus, who declared openly for the war, were afraid to contradict him, or to differ from his opinion in any thing; a very common effect of too imperious a power on one side, and too servile a submission on the other; he was the only one that spoke with a wise and noble boldness, as became a statesman who had no other view than the public good. He made a speech, not for the Thebans alone, but for Greece in general, in which he proved, that the war augmented only the power of Sparta while the rest of Greece was reduced and ruined by it. He insisted principally upon the necessity of establishing the peace in equality and justice, because no peace could be solid and of long duration, but that wherein all parties find an equal advantage.t A discourse like this, founded evidently upon reason and justice, and pronounced with a grave and serious tone, never fails of making an impression. Agesilaus plainly distinguished, from the attention and silence with which it was heard, that the deputies were extremely affected with it, and would not fail to act conformably to his opinion. To prevent that effect, he demanded of Epami nondas, whether he thought it just and reasonable, that Boeotia should be free and independent? that is to say, whether he agreed that the cities of Boeotia should depend no longer upon Thebes. Epaminondas immediately asked in his turn, with great vivacity, whether he thought it just and reasonable, that Laconia should enjoy the same independence and liberty? Upon which Agesilaus, rising from his seat in great rage, insisted upon his declaring plainly, whether he would consent that Boeotia should be free? Epaminondas retorted his question again, and asked, whether, on his side, he would consent that Laconia should be free? Agesilaus, who wanted only a pretext for breaking with the Thebans, struck them directly out of the treaty of alliance, which they were about to conclude. The rest of the allies signed it, not out of inclination, but from a fear of offending the Lacedæmonians whose power they dreaded. Ia consequence of this treaty, all the troops in the field were to be disbanded. Cleombrotus, one of the kings of Sparta, was then at Phocis, at the head of the army. He wrote to the ephori to know the republic's resolutions. Prothous, one of the principal senators, represented, that there was no room for deliberations; for that Sparta, by the late agreement, had made the recall of the Xenoph. Hist. Græc. 1. vi. p. 590-593. Dion. p. 365, 366. + Plut. in Agesil. p. 611 troops indispensable. Agesilaus was of a different opinion. Angry with the Thebans, and particularly with Epaminondas, he was absolutely bent on the war for an opportunity of revenge; and the present seemed most favourable, when all Greece was free and united, and only the Thebans excluded from the treaty of peace. The advice of Prothous was therefore rejected by the whole council, who treated him as an honest, well meaning dotard, who knew nothing of the matter; the divinity from thenceforth, as Xenophon observes, promoting their downfall.* The ephori wrote immediately to Cleombrotus to march against the Thebans with his troops; and, at the same time, sent orders for assembling the forces of their allies who were averse to this war, and did not join in it but with great reluctance, and out of fear of contradicting the Lacedæmonians, whom they did not yet dare to disobey. Though no happy consequences could be expected from a war, visibly undertaken contrary to all reason and justice, and from the sole motive of resentment and revenge, the Lacedæmonians, however, from the superiority of their numbers, assured themselves of success, and imagined that the Thebans, abandoned by their allies, were in no condition to oppose them.t The Thebans were much alarmed at first. They saw themselves alone, without allies or support, while all Greece looked upon them as utterly lost; not knowing that in a single man they had more than armies. This was Epaminondas. He was appointed general, and had several colleagues joined in com mission with him. He immediately raised all the troops he could, and began his march. His army did not amount to six thousand men, and the enemy had above four times that number. As several bad omens were told him to prevent his setting out, he replied only by a verse of Homer's, the sense of which is," there is but one good omen, to fight for one's country." However, to re-assure the soldiers, by nature superstitious, and whom he observed to be discouraged, he instructed several persons to come from different places, and report auguries and omens in his favour, which revived the spirit and hopes of the troops. Pelopidas was not then in office, but commanded the Sacred Battalion. When he left his house to go to the army, his wife, in taking her last adieu, conjured him with a flood of tears to take care of himself: "That," said he, "should be recommended to young people; but for generals, they have no occasion for such advice; the care of others should be recommended to them." Epaminondas had wisely taken care to secure a pass, by which Cleombrotus might have shortened his march considerably. The latter, after having taken a large compass, arrived at Leuctra, a small town of Boeotia, between Platææ and Thespiæ. Both parties consulted whether they should give battle, which Cleombrotus resolved to do by the advice of all his officers, who represented to him, that if he declined fighting with such a superiority of troops, it would confirm the current report, that he secretly favoured the Thebans. The latter had an essential reason for hastening a battle before the arrival of his troops, which the enemy daily expected. However, the six generals who formed the council of war differed in their sentiments. The seventh, who was Epaminondas, came in very good time to join the three that were for fighting; and his opinion carrying the question, the battle was resolved upon. This was the second year of the 102d Olympiad. The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Lacedæmonians, as has been said, consisted of twenty-four thousand foot, and sixteen hundred horse. The Thebans had only six thousand foot and four hundred horse; but all of them choice troops, animated by their experience in war, and determined to conquer or die. The Lacedæmonian cavalry, composed of men picked up by chance, without valour and ill disciplined, was as much inferior to their * Ἐκεῖνον μεν φλυαρεῖν ἡγήσατο, ηδη γαρ ώςε οιπε τό δαιμόνιον ηγεν. Xenoph. vi. p. 593-597. Diod. 1. xv. p. 365-371. Plut. in Agesil. p. 611, 612. Id. in Pelop. p. 288, 289 * Εις διωνος αριστος, αμυνεσθαι περί πάτρης lliad, xi. v. 423. A. M. 3634. Ant. J. C. 370. enemies in courage, as superior in number The infantry could not be depended on, except the Lacedæmonians; the allies, as has been said, having engaged in the war with reluctance, because they did not approve the motive of it, and were besides dissatisfied with the Lacedæmonians. The ability of the generals on either side supplied the place of numerous armies, especially of the Theban, who was the most accomplished captain of his time. He was supported by Pelopidas at the head of the Sacred Battalion composed of three hundred Thebans, united in a strict friendship and affec tion, and engaged under a particular oath never to fly, but to defend each other to the last drop of their blood. Upon the day of battle the two armies drew up on a plain. Cleombrotus was upon the right, consisting of Lacedæmonians, on whom he confided most, and whose files were twelve deep. To take the advantage which his superiority of horse gave him in an open country, he posted them in the front of the Lacedæmonians. Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, was at the head of the allies, who formed the left wing. Epaminondas, who resolved to charge with his left, which he commanded in person, strengthened it, with the choice of his heavy-armed troops, whom he drew up fifty deep. The Sacred Battalion was upon his left, and closed the wing. The rest of his infantry were posted upon his right in an oblique Ime, which, the farther it extended, the more distant it was from the enemy. By this uncommon disposition, his design was to cover his flank on the right, to keep off his right wing as a kind of reserve, that he might not hazard the event of the battle upon the weakest part of his army; and to begin the action with his left wing, where his best troops were posted, to turn the whole weight of the battle upon king Cleombrotus and the Spartans. He was assured, that if he could penetrate the Lacedæmonian phalanx, the rest of the army would soon be put to the rout. As for his horse, he disposed them, after the enemy's example, in the front of his left. The action began by the cavalry. As that of the Thebans were better mounted and braver troops than the Lacedæmonian horse, the latter were not long before they were broken and driven upon the infantry, which they threw into some confusion. Epaminondas, following the horse closely, marched swiftly up to Cleombrotus, and fell upon the phalanx with all the weight of his heavy battalion. The latter, to make a diversion, detached a body of troops with orders to take Epaminondas in flank, and to surround him. Pelopidas, upon the sight of that movement, advanced with incredible speed and boldness at the head of the Sacred Battalion, to prevent the enemy's design, and flanked Cleombrotus himself, who, by that sudden and unexpected attack, was thrown into disorder. The battle was very obstinate, and while Cleombrotus could act, the victory contínued in suspense, and declared for neither party When he fell dead with his wounds, the Thebans, to complete the victory and the Lacedæmonians, to avoid the shame of abandoning the body of their king, redoubled their efforts, and a great slaughter ensued on both sides. The Spartans fought with so much fury about the body, that at length they gained their point, and carried it off. Animated by so glorious an advantage, they prepared to return to the charge, which would perhaps have proved successful, had the allies seconded their ardour. But the left wing, seeing the Lacedæmonian phalanx broken, and believing all lost, especially when they heard that the king was dead, took to flight, and drew off the rest of the army along with them. Epaminondas followed them vigorously, and killed a great number in the pursuit. The Thebans remained masters of the field of battle, erected a trophy, and permitted the enemy to bury their dead. The Lacedæmonians had never received such a blow. The most bloody defeats till then had scarcely ever cost them more than four or five hundred of their citizens. They had been seen, however, animated, or rather violently incensed against Athers, to ransom, by a truce of fifty years, about three hun dred of their citizens, who had suffered themselves to be shut up in the little island of Sphacteria. Here they lost four thousand men, one thousand of whom were Lacedæmonians, and four hundred Spartans,* out of seven hun dred who were in the battle. The Thebans had only three hundred men killed, among whom were few of their citizens. The city of Sparta at that time celebrated the gymnastic games, and was full of strangers, whom curiosity had brought thither. When the couriers arrived from Leuctra with the terrible news of their defeat, the ephori, though perfectly sensible of all the consequences, and that the Spartan empire had received a mortal wound, would not permit the representations of the theatre to be suspended, nor any changes in the celebration of the festival. They sent to every family the names of their relations who were killed, and remained in the theatre, to see that the dances and games were continued without interruption to the end. The next day, the loss of each family being known, the fathers and relatives of those who had died in the battle, met in the public place, and saluted and embraced each other with great joy and serenity in their looks; while the others kept themselves close in their houses; or if necessity obliged them to go abroad, it was with a sadness and dejection of aspect, which sensibly expressed their profound anguish and affliction. That difference was still more remarkable in the women. Grief, silence, and tears, distinguished those who expected the return of their sons; but such as had lost their sons, were seen hurrying to the temples to thank the gods, and congratulating each other upon their glory and good fortune. It cannot be denied, that such sentiments argue great courage and resolution: but I would not have them entirely extinguish natural tenderness, and should have been better pleased had there been less of ferocity in them.† Sparta was under no small difficulty to know how to act in regard to those who had fled from the battle. As they were numerous, and of the most powerful families in the city, it was not safe to inflict upon them the punishments assigned by the laws, lest their despair should induce them to take some violent resolution fatal to the state. For such as fled were not only excluded from all offices and employments, but it was a disgrace to contract any alliance with them by marriage. Any person who met them in the streets might buffet them, which they were obliged to suffer. They were besides to wear dirty and ragged habits, full of patches of different colours. And lastly, they were to shave half their beards, and to let the other half grow. It was a great loss to the Spartans to be deprived of so many of their soldiery, at the time they had such pressing occasion for them. To remove this difficulty, they chose Agesilaus legislator, with absolute power to make such alterations in the laws as he should think fit. Agesilaus, without adding, retrenching, or changing any thing, found means to save the fugitives without prejudice to the state. In a full assembly of the Lacedæmonians, he decreed," that for the present day, the laws should be suspended, and of no effect; but ever after to remain in full force and authority." By these few words he preserved the Spartan laws entire, and at the same time restored to the state a great number of its members, in preventing their being for ever degraded, and consequently use less to the republic. After the battle of Leuctra, the two parties were industriously employed, the one in retrieving, and the other in improving their victory.‡ Agesilaus, to revive the courage of his troops, marched them into Arcadia; but with a full resolution carefully to avoid a battle. He confined himself to attacking some small towns of the Mantinæans, which he took, and laid the * Those were properly called Spartans who inhabited Sparta, the Lacedæmonians were settled in the Country. Mr. Rollin seems to speak here en Francois. The sentiments of the Spartans have no exception, and are strictly consistent with true greatness of soul. None but slaves will deny, that the next glory and gooa fortune to defending their country against its enemies, when its ruin is at stake, is to die is its, defence. Slaves have no country. Both belong to the tyrant. Xenoph. 1. vi. P. 598. Dion. 1. xv. p. 375-378 country waste. This gave the Spartans some joy; and they began to take cou rage, from believing their condition not entirely desperate.* The Thebans, soon after their victory, sent an account of it to Athens, and to demand aid at the same time against the common enemy. The senate was then sitting, which received the courier with great coldness, did not make him the usual presents, and dismissed him without taking any notice of aid. The Athenians, alarmed at the considerable advantage which the Thebans had gained over the Lacedæmonians, could not dissemble the umbrage and dissatisfaction which so sudden and unexpected an increase of a neighbouring pow er gave them, which might soon render itself formidable to all Greece. At Thebes, Epaminondas and Pelopidas had been elected joint governors of Boeotia. Having assembled all the troops of the Boctians and their allies, whose number daily increased, they entered Peloponnesus, and caused many places and people to revolt from the Lacedæmonians, Elis, Argos, Arcadia, and the greatest part of Laconia itself. It was then about the winter-solstice, and towards the end of the last month of the year; so that in a few days they were to quit their offices; the first day of the next month being assigned by law for their resigning them to the persons appointed to succeed them, upon pain of death, if they held them beyond that term. Their colleagues, apprehending the badness of the season, and more the dreadful consequences of infringing that law, were for marching back the army immediately to Thebes. Pelopidas was the first who, entering into the opinion of Epaminondas, animated the citizens, and engaged them to take the advantage of the enemy's alarm, and to pursue their enterprise in neglect of a formality, from the observance of which they might justly believe themselves dispensed by the state itself, as the service of the state, when founded in justice, is the sovereign law and rule of the people's obedience. They entered Laconia, therefore, at the head of an army of seventy thousand good soldiers, the twelfth part of whom were not Thebans. The great repu tation of the two generals was the cause that all the allies, even without order or public decree, obeyed them with respectful silence, and marched with entire confidence and courage under their command. It was six hundred years since the Dorians had established themselves at Lacedæmon; and in all that time they had never seen an enemy upon their lands; not daring till then to set foot in them, and much less to attack their city, though without walls. The Thebans and their allies, finding a country hitherto untouched by an enemy, ran through it with fire and sword, destroying and plundering as far as the river Eurotas, without any opposition whatever. Parties had been posted to defend some important passes. Ischolas the Spartan, who commanded one of these detachments, distinguished himself in a peculiar manner. Finding it impossible with his small body of troops to support the enemy's attack, and thinking it below a Spartan to abandon his post, he sent back the young men, who were of age and condition to serve their country effectually, and kept none with him but such as were advanced in years. Devoting himself with these, after the example of Leonidas, to the public good, they sold their lives dear; and after having defended themselves a long time, and made great slaughter of their enemies, they all perished to a man. Agesilaus acted upon this occasion with great address and wisdom. He looked upon this irruption of the enemy as an impetuous torrent, which it was not only vain, but dangerous to oppose; whose rapid course would be but of short duration, and after some ravages, subside of itself. He contented him self with distributing his best troops into the middle, and all the most important parts of the city, strongly securing all the posts. He was determined not to quit the town, nor to hazard a battle, and persisted in that resolution, without re gard to all the raillery, insults, and menaces of the Thebans, who defied him * Plut. in Agesil. p. 613-615 Id. in Pelop. p. 290. |