Jos. viii. 4 Exemplum posterioris est in ficta fuga, qualem Josue Bell p. 1. n. 8. suis præcepit ad Haium expugnandum, et alii duces sæpe. Nam hic quod sequitur nocumentum licitum esse ponimus ex belli justitia; ipsa autem fuga ex instituto nihil significat, quanquam hostis eam accipit ut signum pavoris, quod alter cavere non tenetur, utens sua libertate huc vel illuc eundi, et magis minusve celeriter, et hoc vel illo gestu habituve. Eodem referri debet eorum actus qui hostium armis, signis, vestibus, velis usi passim leguntur. 5 Hæc enim omnia ejus sunt generis ut a quovis pro arbitrio etiam contra consuetudinem usurpari possint, quia consuetudo ipsa singulorum arbitrio, non quasi consensu communi, introducta est, qualis consuetudo neminem obligat. IX. 1 Gravior est disputatio de illis notis, quæ, ut ita dicam, in commercio hominum versantur, in quo genere proprie mendacium situm est. Multa enim sunt contra mendacium in sacris literis. Verbum mendax odio habebit justus, id est, vir bonus. Proverb. xiii. 5. Falsiloquentiam et verbum mendax amove a me. Proverb. xxx. 8. Perdes loquentes mendacium. Psalm. v. 7. Ne mentimini alter alteri. Coloss. iii. 9. Et hanc partem rigide tuetur Augustinus: et sunt etiam inter philosophos et poëtas, qui cum eo sentire videantur. Notum illud Homeri (Iliad. ix. 312, 313): 5 Ψεύδος δὲ μισεῖ πᾶς σοφὸς, καὶ Xenopov. Hoc etiam ex STOBEO, sed qui Menandro, non Cleobulo, tribuit. J. B. t Laudatorum hominum sine reprehensionis nota] Irenæus ex veteris pres 4 An example of the latter (where the damage to the other party is lawful) we have in the feigned flight which Joshua advised his men to execute in order to take Aï; and which other generals have often practised. For here the damage is approved to be lawful in virtue of the justice of the war. And the flight itself means nothing by institution, though the enemy takes it as a sign of fear, which the other is not bound to prevent, using his liberty of going one way or another, quickly or slowly, with gestures and movements such or such. To the same head we must refer the cases in which soldiers have used the arms, standards, uniforms, rigging, of the enemy*. 5 All these things are of such kind that they may be used by any at his own choice, even contrary to custom: because the custom was Quere: Whether the standards or colours of each party have not an instituted meaning; and whether a party which deceives the enemy by simulating them is not liable to a severity beyond the usual rules? W. iv. 13. Aristoteles dixit, κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκ- Εις Nic. τὸν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν per se mendacium turpe atque vituperabile, veritas pulchra ac laudabilis. 2 Neque tamen deest in alteram quoque partem auctoritas: primum in sacris literis exempla laudatorum hominum sine reprehensionis nota: deinde veterum Christianorum pronuntiata, Origenis, Clementis, Tertulliani, Lactantii, Chrysostomi, Hieronymi, Cassiani, imo pene omnium, ut ipse fatetur Augustinus, ita dissentiens, ut tamen magnam quæstionem, latebrosam tractationem, disputationem inter doctos alternantem (hæc enim omnia ipsius verba sunt) agnoscat. 3 Inter philosophos aperte hinc stant Socrates et discipuli ejus Plato, Xenophon, et alicubi Cicero, et, si Plutarcho ac Quintiliano credimus, Stoici, qui inter sapientis dotes ponunt byteri institutione didicit docuitque : de quibus scripturæ non increpant, sed simpliciter sunt posita, nos non debere fieri accusatores. Locus est libro iv. cap. 50. [Vide quæ de eo loco Lib. i. et ii. et v. de Rep. iv. 2. §§ 16, 17. diximus Plut. de Stoic. contradict. Morali pp. 1055, 1056. Orat. Inst. xii. 1. introduced by the arbitrary choice of individuals, not as it were by common consent, and is such a custom as binds no one. IX. 1 More grave is the question concerning those signs which belong to the usual intercourse of men, and to which, when used deceitfully, lies properly belong. There are many passages against lying in the Scriptures, Prov. xiii. 5; xxx. 8; Psalm v. 7; Coloss. iii. 9. And Augustine is rigid on this side, as are some of the philosophers and poets. So Homer, Sophocles, Cleobulus [rather Menander, J. B.], Aristotle. 2 There are, however, authorities on the other side; first, examples of persons in Scripture who told lies, and who are not blamed: and next, opinions of the old Christians, Origen, Clemens, Tertullian, Lactantius, Chrysostom, Jerome, Cassian; indeed almost all, as Augustine himself confesses. 3 Among the philosophers, we have evidently on this side Socrates, and his disciples Plato and Xenophon; and in some places Cicero, Nic. ii. 7; iv. 13. Nic. v. 8. p. 297. mentiri ubi et quomodo oportet: neque videtur dissentire aliquot in locis Aristoteles, cujus illud kae' avrò quod diximus exponi potest communiter, sive re spectata sepositis circumParaph. Eth. stantiis. Interpres autem ejus Andronicus Rhodius de medico apud ægrotum mentiente sic ait: ἀπατᾷ μὲν, ἀπατεῶν δὲ οὐκ EOTI decipit quidem, at deceptor non est: Causam addit: οὐ γὰρ τέλος ἔχει τὴν ἀπάτην τοῦ νοσοῦντος, ἀλλὰ τὴν owτnρiav non enim propositum sibi habet decipere, sed servare ægrotum. Inst. Orat. xii. 1. 4 Quintilianus, quem dixi, hanc ipsam partem defendens, pleraque esse ait quæ non tam factis, quam causis eorum vel Apud Stob. honesta fiant, vel turpia. Diphilus, Tit. xii. ii. 17. Quod pro salute dicitur mendacium Me judice habere nil potest incommodi. Quærenti apud Sophoclem Neoptolemo (Philoctet. vers. 107): Respondet Ulysses, Non, si salus nascatur ex mendacio. Cui similia ex Pisandro et Euripide adferuntur. Et apud Inst. Orat. Quintilianum lego: nam et mendacium dicere etiam sapienti aliquando concessum est. Eustathius Metropolita Thessalonicensis ad secundum Odysseæ: ψεύσεται "κατὰ καιρὸν ὁ u Kara Kαιρov] In tempore, ut Donatus loquitur ad Adelphos iv. 3. (vers. 18.) Et ipsum fallere in tempore, quidam de officiis scribentes rectum putant. Cicero pro Q. Ligario, aliquod mendacium honestum et misericors vocat. (Cap. 5.) * Quatenus et imprudenti accidit] Ream linguam non facit nisi rea mens. Et: Nemo mentiens judicandus est qui dicit falsum quod putat verum, quia, quantum in ipso est, non fallit ipse, sed fallitur. Sunt hæc Augustini, de Verbis Apostoli sermone XXVIII. [180. num. and if we believe Plutarch and Quintilian, the Stoics, who, among the gifts of the wise man, place that, to know how and when to lie. Aristotle in some places appears to be of the same opinion. Andronicus Rhodius, speaking of a physician who tells a lie to his patient, says, he deceives, but is not a deceiver; and adds the reason, that his object is not to deceive, but to save the man. 4 Many others defend lies for good purposes: Quintilian, Diphilus, Sophocles, Pisander, Euripides, Quintilian again, Eustathius, who brings testimonies from Herodotus and Isocrates. X. 1 Opinions so widely differing, perhaps we may in some measure conciliate, by a larger or stricter acceptation of the term lie. For we do not here use the term lie, so as to apply where it is unintended; we may distinguish a falsehood and a lie. We mean that oopós mentietur sapiens re urgente: ubi et ex Herodoto et Lib. iii. 72. Isocrate testimonia adfert. q. 110. art. 1. X. 1 Tam dissidentium sententiarum conciliatio forte aliqua reperiri poterit ex largiore aut strictiore mendacii ac- Thom. 2, 2. ceptione. Neque enim hic mendacium sumimus quatenus et in resp. imprudenti accidit, quomodo mendacium dicere et mentiri apud Gellium discernuntur: sed de eo agimus quod scienter Gell. xi. 11. profertur cum significatione quæ mentis conceptui, sive in intelligendo, sive in volendo, disconveniat. Nam quod primo kai auéows verbis et similibus notis indicatur, sunt mentis conceptus: ideoque non mentitur qui dicit rem falsam quam. veram existimat, sed qui dicit rem veram quidem, sed quam falsam putat, mentitur. Significationis ergo falsitas id est quod ad communem mendacii naturam requirimus. Cui consequens est, cum vox aliqua aut sermonis complexio est πoXuonuos, id est, plures uno significatus admittit, sive ex vulgi usu, sive ex artis consuetudine, sive ex figura aliqua intelligibili, tunc si animi conceptus uni istarum significationum congruat, non admitti mendacium, etiamsi putetur is qui audit. in aliam partem id accepturus. 2 Verum quidem est talem locutionem usurpatam temere non probandam: sed potest ex accedentibus causis honestari: 2. ed. B.] et Enchiridii cap. 18. relata a Gratiano in causam XXII. quæstione ii. cap. 3, 4. Etiamsi putetur is qui audit in aliam partem id accepturus] Quomodo Abraham captiose loquebatur cum servulis, ita judicante et probante Ambro sio, (De Abrah. cap. 8) quem sequitur which is knowingly uttered with a meaning which is at variance with the conception of the mind, either as to what it understands or as to what it wills. For that which is primarily and immediately indicated by words and the like signs, is the conception of the mind; and therefore he does not lie who says a thing which is false, but which he believes to be true; and he does lie who says a thing which is true which he believes to be false. Therefore the falsity of the meaning is what we require to the common notion of a lie. From which it follows that if any word or phrase have several significations, either by common usage, or technically, or figuratively, then if the conceptions of the mind conform to one of these significations, there is no lie, though he who hears it takes it in another. 2 But still it is true that such a mode of speaking, lightly used, is not to be approved of; although, from accidental causes, it may puta si id pertineat ad erudiendum eum qui curæ nostræ est traditus, aut ad evitandam iniquam interrogationem. Prioris Joh. xi. 11. generis exemplum ipse Christus dedit, cum diceret, Lazarus amicus noster dormit, quod apostoli accipiebant tanquam de Joh. ii. 20, 21. dormitione somni diceretur. Et quod de templo instaurando ipse dixerat, intelligens hoc de suo corpore, Judæos sciebat accipere de templo proprie dicto. Sic et cum apostolis Luc. xxii. 30. adinstar Phylarcharum apud Hebræos sedes eximias et regi Matth. xxvi. proximas duodecim promitteret, et alibi vini novi potationem in patris regno, satis scivisse videtur non aliter hoc ab illis accipi quam de regno aliquo hujus vitæ, cujus spe ad ipsum momentum Christi ad cœlum ascensuri pleni erant. Idem Matth. xiii. alibi per fabularum ambages populum alloquitur, ne audientes ipsum intelligerent, nisi scilicet animi attentionem talem ac docilitatem afferrent qualem afferri par erat. Posterioris usus Tacit. Ann. exemplum ex profana historia dari potest in L. Vitellio, cui 29. Act. i. 6. 13. xi. 34. 2 Quin suspensa et quo ducerentur inclinatura responderet] Idem Tacitus Historiarum III. (cap. 3.) Incerta disseruit, tracturus interpretationem prout conduxisset. Item: ita compositus, ut ex eventu rerum adversa abnueret vel prospera agnosceret. (Ibid. c. 52.) a Hebræorum] Quorum et hoc est: quæstione XXXVII. Chrysostomus 1. de Sacerdotio : ἀπατεῶν ἐκεῖνος ἂν εἴη καλεῖσθαι δίκαιος, ὁ τῷ πράγματι κει χρημένος ἀδίκως, οὐχ ὁ μεθ ̓ ὑγιους γνώμης τοῦτο ποιῶν· fallax jure vocetur qui re tali injuste utitur, non qui salutari proposito. (in fin. Lib.) -licet perplexre lo מותר לשנית מפני השלום qui boni causa. Citat doctissimus Ma- b Puta cum Dei honos] Philo de Vita Mosis: ἐπ' ἔργοις ἅπερ ἀναφέρεται εἰς Θεοῦ τιμὴν, δι ̓ ἃ μόνα καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἦθος κατεψευσμένον, become proper: as for instance, if it be used in instructing him who is committed to our care, or to evade an unfair question. Of the former kind Christ himself gave an example, when he said, Our friend Lazarus sleepeth which the Apostles received as if he had spoken of ordinary sleep. And what he said of rebuilding the temple, intending his own body, he knew that the Jews would accept of the temple, properly so called. So when he promised his disciples that they should sit upon twelve thrones and judge the twelve tribes of Israel; and when he spoke of drinking new wine in his Father's kingdom; he appears to have known that they would take his words as implying some kingdom and authority to be given him in this life, of which hope they were full to the very moment of Christ's ascension. And in other places he teaches the people by fables and parables, that hearing they might not understand; that is, except they brought to the work of listening proper attention and docility. An example of the latter kind (to avoid unfair questions) we |