Narcissus instabat, aperiret ambages et veri copiam faceret: sed non ideo pervicit, quin suspensa et quo ducerentur inclinatura responderet. Dictum Hebræorum huc pertinet: si quis אם יודע אדם להמוד את דבריו מוטב ואם לא ישתוק norit uti perplexiloquio, recte: sin minus, taceat. 3 Contra accidere potest, ut tali loquendi genere uti non modo illaudabile sit, sed et improbum, puta cum Dei honos, Caut amor proximo debitus, aut reverentia adversus superiorem, aut rei quæ agitur natura exigunt, ut quod animo. cogitatur omnino patefiat: sicut in contractibus diximus id aperiendum quod natura contractus intelligitur exigere: quo sensu non incommode accipi potest Ciceronis illud, tollendum De Offic. iii. esse ex rebus contrahendis omne mendacium, desumtum ex veteri lege Attica κατὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἀψευδεῖν: quibus in Demosth. in locis mendacii vox videtur ita laxe accipi ut etiam obscuram locutionem includat. At nos proprie loquendo a mendacii notione id ipsum jam exclusimus. ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀληθεύειν. ἀλήθεια γὰρ ὁπαδὸς Θεοῦ· de factis loquor quæ ad Dei honorem pertinent, in quibus solis veracem esse oportuit, etiam si quis ceterum ingenio esset mendace. Veritas enim Dei comes. (Pag. 679 E.) Augustinus epistola VIII. Alia quæstio est, sitne aliquando mentiri viri boni: et alia quæstio est, utrum scriptorem sanctarum scripturarum mentiri oportuerit. Vide quæ infra § xv. c Aut amor proximo debitus] Es- Λέξω τορῶς σοι πᾶν, ὅ τι χρήζεις μαθεῖν, may take from profane history in the case of L. Vitellius, whom Narcissus urged to explain the plot and tell the truth; but only got him to use doubtful expressions which might be drawn either way. There is a Hebrew proverb, that if any one cannot talk without saying anything decided, he had better hold his peace. 3 On the other hand, it may happen that to use such a mode of speech is not only unbecoming, but wicked; for example, when the honour due to God or the love due to our neighbour, or the reverence due to a superior, or the nature of the matter, requires us to say what we have in our mind: as in contracts, we have said that all is to be disclosed which the nature of a contract is understood to require; in which sense we very properly understand that of Cicero, that lying must altogether be taken away from contracts: in which case lying is, it would seem, to be understood so laxly as to include even obscure language; which however we have excluded from our notion of a lie. 15. Lept.p. 363 A. XI. 1 Ad communem ergo mendacii notionem requiritur, ut quod dicitur, scribitur, notatur, innuitur, intelligi aliter nequeat, quam in eum sensum, qui a mente proferentis discrepet. Huic autem notioni laxiori strictior mendacii, qua naturaliter illicitum est, significatio differentiam aliquam propriam adjiciat necesse est, quæ, si recte res inspiciatur, saltem secundum communem gentium existimationem, nulla videtur alia dari posse præter repugnantiam cum jure existente ac manente ejus ad quem sermo aut nota dirigitur: nam sibi neminem mentiri, ut maxime falsum proferat, satis constat. Jus hic intelligo non quodvis et rei extrinsecum, sed quod proprium sit huic negotio atque cognatum. Id autem nihil est aliud quam judicandi libertas, quam homines colloquentes his quibus colloquuntur debere, quasi pacto quodam tacito, intelliguntur. Hæc enim nec alia est mutua illa obligatio quam homines introduci voluerant, simul atque sermone notisque similibus uti instituerunt: nam sine tali obligatione inane fuisset tale repertum. 2 Desideramus autem ut quo tempore sermo fit, jus illud d Judicandi libertas] Hinc furari cor Hebræis dicitur qui adimit sciendi vias: Genes. xxxi. 26, 27. et ibi Onkelos et LXX. Rabbi David libro radicum, et Rabbi Salomo in commentario, et Abenesdra. 6 Addidi vocem falso, quæ in omnibus Edd. excidit, et necessariam om XI. 1 To the common notion of a lie, then, it is required that what is said, written, conveyed by signs or gestures, cannot be understood otherwise than in that sense which differs from the mind of the utterer. But to this laxer notion of a lie in general, must be added some stricter proper difference, to define a lie as unlawful by Natural Law: and this difference, if we examine the matter, can be no other, according to the common estimation of nations, than a discrepancy with some existing and permanent right of the person to whom the words or signs are addressed: for that no one lies to himself, is sufficiently evident. By right, I do not here mean any right extrinsic to the matter, but something proper and cognate to the matter in hand. But this right is no other than the liberty of judging of my future acts, which I, speaking with other men, am understood to owe to them. This is merely that mutual obligation which men wished to introduce when they instituted the use of speech and the like signs. For without such an obligation the invention of such means of communication would be useless. 2 We desire then, that while speech is thus used, this right should subsist and remain: for it may be that the right may have existed, subsistat ac maneat: fieri enim potest ut jus quidem fuerit, sed sublatum sit, aut tollatur ex alio jure superveniente, sicut debitum acceptilatione aut conditionis cessatione. Tum vero requiritur ut jus quod læditur ejus sit quicum loquimur, non alterius (sicut et in contractibus injustitia non nascitur, nisi ex læso jure contrahentium). Huc forte non male referas, quod veriloquium ad justitiam refert post Simonidem Plato, et quod L. 1. de Rep. mendacium, illud vetitum, sacræ literæ sæpe describunt falso testimonio sive elocutione adversus proximum, et quod ipse Augustinus in mendacii natura constituenda ponit fallendi voluntatem. Et Cicero quæstionem de veritate eloquenda De Offic, i. 10. referri vult ad justitiæ fundamenta. 3 Tolli autem videtur posse jus quod diximus, sicut consensu ejus quicum agimus expresso, ut si quis prædixerit se falsa dicturum et alter permiserit, ita et tacito æquave ratione præsumto, aut oppositione juris alterius quod communi omnium judicio multo plus valeat. Hæc recte intellecta multas nobis suppeditabunt illationes, quæ ad concilianda sententiarum supra designatarum dissidia non parum valituræ sint. nino esse, vel nonum Præceptum Decalogi, manifestum facit cuivis. J. B. e Fallendi voluntatem] Lactantius Institutionum VI. 18: Ut non mentiatur unquam decipiendi aut nocendi causa. [Locus autem Augustini est in Enchi- but may have been taken away, or may be taken away by some supervenient right, as a debt is taken away by an acknowledgment of payment, or by the cessation of the condition. It is also required that the right which is violated, be a right of the person with whom we speak, not of another, (as in contracts injustice does not arise, except from the violation of the right of the contracting parties). To this view you may properly apply what Plato says, after Simonides, referring veracity to justice; and also that lies, that is, forbidden lies, are often described in Scripture as false witness, or speaking against our neighbour; and that Augustine makes the essential nature of a lie consist in the intention to deceive. Also Cicero wishes the question of speaking truth to be referred to justice as its principle. 3 Now the right of which we have spoken, may be taken away either by the express permission of him with whom we deal; as if any one have announced that he would tell falsehoods, and the other have permitted it; or by tacit permission, or permission presumed on fair reason; or by the opposition of another right which, by the common opinion of all, is of much more importance. These principles, rightly understood, will give us many conse p. 331 c, D. Lucret. i. Inst. Orat. xii. 1. XII. Primum est, etiamsi quid dicatur quod falsam habeat significationem infanti aut amenti, in eo mendacii culpam Videtur enim communi omnium hominum sensu non esse. permissum esse, Ut puerorum ætas improvida ludificetur. Et Quintilianus de pueris locutus: utilitatis, inquit, eorum gratia multa fingimus. Ratio proxima est, quia cum in infantibus et amentibus non sit judicii libertas, non potest eis circa eam libertatem injuria fieri. XIII. 1 Secundum est, quoties sermo ad eum dirigitur qui non decipitur, etiamsi tertius inde falsam hauriat persuasionem, nullum esse mendacium: Non ratione ejus ad quem sermo est: quia illi libertas manet integra, plane ut illis quibus id intelligentibus fabula narratur, aut apud quos profertur sermo figuratus, κατ ̓ εἰρωνείαν aut καθ' ὑπερβολὴν, quæ figura, ut Seneca ait, fad verum mendacio venit: et Quintiliano ementiens superjectio dicitur. Neque ratione ejus qui obiter id audit: quia cum eo non agitur, ideoque nulla est ad illum decens legit. obligatio. Imo si ipse sibi opinionem informat de eo quod non ipsi, sed alteri dicitur, habet quod sibi non alteri rem Lib. vii. de Benef. 23. Inst. Orat. viii. 6. § 67, ubi tamen Spaldingius f Ad verum mendacio venit] Incredibilia affirmat, ut ad credibilia perve niat. Seneca ibidem. & Chrysostomus et Hieronymus] Ad quences, which will be of great use in reconciling the dissentient opinions above mentioned. XII. The first result is, that though any thing be said to an infant, or a person out of his mind, which has a false signification, it does not involve the guilt of a lie. The common sense of mankind permits the thoughtless age of childhood to be deluded. So Quintilian. The reason is that they have no liberty of judgment, and therefore they cannot be wronged with regard to such liberty. XIII. 1 The second remark is, that so long as our speech is directed to him who is not deceived, it is no lie, although a third person should thereby imbibe a false persuasion. It is not a lie with regard to him whom we address, because his liberty of judging is not disturbed, as in the case of those to whom a fable is told, which they know to be such, or to whom figurative language is used, or irony, or hyperbole; which figure, as Seneca says, arrives at the truth by a lie, and which Quintilian calls an allowable exaggeration. Nor is it a lie with regard to him who accidentally hears it: because we have nothing to do with him, and therefore have no obligation to him. If he form an opinion from what is said to another, and not to himself, he must take the responsibility of his opinion on himself, and not imputet. Quippe, si recte judicare volumus, illius respectu sermo non sermo est, sed res quæ significare quidlibet potest. 12. p. 301. p. 505 c. 2 Nihil ergo peccavit aut Cato Censorius, qui sociis aux- Liv. xxxiv. ilia falso est pollicitus, aut Flaccus, qui hostium urbem ab App. Hisp. Emilio expugnatam aliis narravit, quanquam eo hostes decepti sunt cui rei similem de Agesilao narrat Plutarchus. Nihil In Agesil. enim hic dictum hostibus: nocumentum autem quod inde secutum est extrinsecum quid est, et per se non illicitum optari aut procurari. Ad hoc genus Chrysostomus et Hieronymus Chrysost. in retulerunt Pauli sermonem, quo Antiochæ Petrum ut nimium II. p. 730. judaizantem reprehendit. Censent enim Petrum satis intellexisse non id serio fieri: interim vero consultum infirmitati 4. adstantium. XIV. 1 Tertium est, quoties certum est eum ad quem sermo est, libertatis suæ in judicando læsionem non ægre laturum, imo gratias habiturum eo nomine, ob commodum aliquod quod inde assequitur, tunc quoque mendacium stricte dictum, id est injuriosum, non committi, sicut furtum non perpetraret qui ex præsumta domini voluntate rem ipsius exiguam consumeret, ut inde magnam eidem utilitatem pararet. In his enim de Cyrillum adversum Julianum libro IX. circa finem. Nec multo aliter Ter tullianus primo et tertio contra Mar- Galat. Tom. Hier. Epist. Tom. II. p. 336, et seqq. ad August. throw it on another. For properly speaking, the speech is, with regard to him, no speech, but a mere thing which may signify any thing. 2 Therefore Cato the Censor was not guilty of a lie when he falsely promised assistance to his allies; nor Flaccus, who related to others that the enemy's city was taken; though the enemy was thus deceived; and Plutarch relates a similar act of Agesilaus. For in these cases nothing was said to the enemy: and the damage to them which followed is extrinsic to our act, and is in itself not unlawful to be wished or procured. To this head Chrysostom and others refer the discourse of Paul, in which at Antioch he reprehended Peter as judaizing too far: for they conceive that Peter sufficiently understood that that was not seriously done; and in the mean time, that the infirmity of the bystanders was consulted. XIV. 1 A third case [in which there is no lie] is when it is certain that he who is addressed will not be dissatisfied with the disturbance of his liberty in judging, but rather will be gratified at the course taken, on account of some advantage which follows therefrom. In this case there is not a lie strictly so called, that is, a wrongful lie; just as he would not be guilty of theft who, presuming the consent |