川 HUGONIS GROTII DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS. LIBER TERTIUS. CAPUT I. QUANTUM IN BELLO LICEAT, REGULÆ GENERALES EX VI. Quid liceat in eos qui hostibus res subministrant, per distinctiones explica tur. An dolo uti in bello liceat. VII. Dolus in actu negativo per se non est illicitus. VIII. Dolus in actu positivo distinguitur in eum qui fit per actus libere significantes, et per actus significantes velut ex conventione: et ostenditur dolum prioris generis licitum esse. IX. In secundo genere indicatur quæstionis difficultas. X. Non omnem usurpationem locutionis quæ sciatur in alium sensum accipienda, esse illicitam. XI. Mendacii qua illicitum est formam consistere in re [GROT. III.] pugnantia cum jure alterius, quod explicatur. XII. Et ostenditur licitum esse falsum loqui apud infan tes et amentes: XIII. Et cum is decipitur ad quem sermo non est, et quem extra sermonem decipere li ceret: XIV. Et cum sermo est ad eum qui velit ita decipi: XV. Et cum qui loquitur utitur jure supereminente in sibi subditum : XVI. Forte et cum vitam innocentis aut par aliquid tueri aliter non possumus. XVII. Apud hostes licitum falsiloquium qui senserint auc tores. XVIII. Non extendendum hoc ad Generosius tamen esse, ac tur. XXI. Non licere nobis quenquam impellere ad id quod nobis licet, ipsi non licet. XXII. Licere tamen uti opera ul tro oblata. 1 Vict. de Jure I. a ET T qui bellum gerant, et quibus ex causis belligerare liceat vidimus. Sequitur, expendamus quid quantumque in bello liceat, et quibus modis: quod aut nude spectatur, aut ex promisso antecedente. Nude, ex naturæ primum, deinde ex gentium jure. Quid ergo natura liceat videamus. II. 1 Primum, ut jam ante diximus aliquoties, ea quæ ad finem ducunt in morali materia, æstimationem intrinsecam accipiunt ab ipso fine: quare quæ ad finem juris consequendi sunt necessaria, necessitate sumta non secundum physicam subtilitatem sed moraliter, ad ea jus habere intelligimur. Jus dico illud quod stricte ita dicitur, et facultatem agendi in solo societatis respectu significat. Quare si vitam aliter servare non possum, licet mihi vi qualicumque arcere eum qui eam impetit, etiamsi forte is peccato vacet, ut notavimus alibi: quia jus hoc non proprie ex peccato alterius oritur, sed ex jure quod mihi pro me natura concedit. a Quid quantumque in bello liceat] Bene Augustinus Epistola LXX. ad Bonifacium comitem: (Ep. 220 in fin. Edit. Benedict.) ut in ipsis bellis (si adhuc in eis versari te opus est) fidem teneas, pacem quæras. Epistola ccv. (189. § 6.) Esto ergo etiam bellando pacificus. De justitia in bello gerendo servanda dissertatio est egregia Belisarii ad milites apud Procopium Vandalicorum iv. (cap. 16.) Orosius libro vII. Ecce regibus et temporibus Christianis, qualiter bella civilia, cum vitari nequeunt, transiguntur. Idem de Theodosio: CHAPTER I. General Rules as to what is lawful in War by Natural I. We have seen who may carry on war, and from what causes they may do it lawfully. It follows that we consider what is lawful in war, and to what extent; and this is to be considered either nakedly, or as depending on antecedent promise: and nakedly, first by Natural Law, and next by the Law of Nations. Let us then see what is allowed by Natural Law. II. 1 First, as we have already repeatedly said, the means which lead to an end in a moral matter receive their intrinsic value from the end wherefore the steps that are necessary [to a lawful end], necessity being taken not in physical exactness but morally, we have a right to use. By Right, I mean Right taken strictly, such as implies a competence to act in respect of society alone. Wherefore, if I cannot otherwise preserve my life, I may, by any force which I can use, repel him who assails it, even if he be without fault; as we have elsewhere noted: because this right does not properly arise from the fault of another, but from the right which nature gives me for my own preservation. 2 Further, I may take possession of a thing belonging to another, Bell. n. 18. et 2 Quin et rem alienam, ex qua certum mihi periculum Vict. de Jure imminet, citra culpæ alienæ considerationem invadere possum: 39. et 55. non tamen dominus fieri (id enim ad eum finem accommodatum non est) sed custodire, donec securitati meæ satis cautum sit: quod ipsum quoque tractatum est a nobis alibi. Sic rem Lib. ii. 11. meam quam alius detinet eripere ei naturaliter mihi jus est: et si id difficilius, aliud tantundem valens: ut et debiti consequendi gratia: quibus ex causis dominium quoque sequitur, Silv. in Verb. quia alio modo læsa æqualitas reparari nequit. 3. Sic ubi justa est punitio, justa ctiam vis omnis, sine qua ad pœnam veniri non potest: et omne quod pœnæ pars est, ut rerum corruptio per incendium aut aliter, intra justum scilicet et qui peccato respondeat modum. III. Sciendum secundo est: jus nostrum non ex solo belli principio spectandum, sed et ex causis subnascentibus, sicut et in judiciis post litem contestatam jus sæpe parti novum unum aliquod ab initio urbis conditæ bellum proferant, tam pia necessitate susceptum, tam divina felicitate confectum, ubi nec pugna gravem cædem, nec victoria cruentam exegerit ultionem. (Cap. 21 et 23. Edit. Paris. 1506.) 1 Agitur heic de rebus, quæ quidem alias fieri non possent, extra connexio- from which a certain danger impends over me, without consideration of another's fault: not however so as to become the owner of it, (for that is not a step suitable to the end,) but to keep it till sufficient provision is made for my security: which question we have also elsewhere treated. So by Natural Law I have a right to take from another a thing of mine which he detains; and if that is too difficult, another thing of the same value: and the like I may do for the sake of recovering a debt: and in this case my ownership also is consequent, because the equality which has been disturbed cannot be restored in any other way. 3 So also when punishment is just, all force is just without which punishment cannot be attained: and every thing which is part of the punishment, as the destruction of property by burning or otherwise; that is, within just limits, corresponding to the offense. III. It is to be noted in the second place, that these rights are not only to be regarded with reference to the origin of the war, but also with reference to causes subnascent, that is, growing up during the progress of the war: as also in civil suits, after the point in dispute is dealt with, there often arises a new right to the party. Thus those who join themselves to the party which attacks me, whether as § 10. Bell. p. 1. n. 10. v. prima. De Rep. V. p. 471 B. Vict. d. lib. num. 37. Lib. 1. c. § 4, add. ej. 1. c. xxi. 9, i. paritur. Sic qui se aggregant me impetenti, sive socii sive subditi, in se quoque jus tuendi me mihi porrigunt. Sic qui bello se miscent quod injustum est, præsertim si ipsi id injustum esse scire possunt ac debent, obligant se ad sumtus et damna resarcienda, quia culpa damnum dant. Sic qui bello sine probabili ratione suscepto accedunt, ipsi quoque pœnæ meritum contrahunt, pro ratione injustitiæ quæ ipsorum actui inest. Ita Plato probat bellum μέχρι οὗ ἂν οἱ αἴτιοι ἀναγκασθώσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναιτίων ἀλγούντων δοῦναι δίκην, donec hi qui sontes sunt cogantur insontibus malo affectis pœnas dare. IV. 1 Observandum tertio, bad jus agendi multa consequi indirecte et extra agentis propositum, ad quæ per se jus non esset. In sui defensione quomodo id locum habeat explicavimus alibi. Sic ut nostrum consequamur, si tantundem accipi non potest, plus accipere nobis jus est, sub obligatione tamen restituendi pretium ejus quod redundat. Sic navis pie vii. 2, et ratis plena, aut domus latronibus, tormentis peti potest, etiamsi intra eandem navem aut domum sint pauci infantes, mulieres, aut alioqui innocentes quibus inde creetur periculum. Nec reus est mortis aliena, inquit Augustinus, qui suæ possessioni 10, et c. xxvi. 86] [V. Lib. 11. modo § 2, n. 2.] Ad Publ. b Ad jus agendi multa consequi indirecte et extra agentis propositum] Vide hac de re Thomam prima secundæ, quæstione LXXIII. art. 8. Molinam tractatu secundo, disputatione cxxi. allies or as subjects, give me a right of defending myself against them. So again those who mingle themselves in a war which is unjust, especially if they may know and ought to know that it is unjust, become bound to make good the expense and damage, because they occasion damage with fault. Thus too, those who join in a war undertaken without a plausible reason, incur the desert of punishment, in proportion to the injustice which belongs to their act. So Plato approves a war carried on till those who are guilty are compelled to undergo penalties to the satisfaction of the innocent who suffer by it. IV. 1 It is to be observed in the third place, that upon the right of thus acting, many consequences follow indirectly and extraneously to the intent of the actor, to which of themselves he would not have a right. How this holds in self-defense we have elsewhere explained. Thus in order to recover what is ours, if we cannot take exactly so much, we have a right to take more; under the obligation however of restoring the excess of value. Thus a ship occupied by pirates, or a house by robbers, may be battered to pieces, although there may be in the ship or in the house a few infants or women, or other innocent persons who may thus be put in danger. He is not |