appear in a very questionable light. He must in this case change with his changeable creatures, and immutability will then no more attach to him than it does now to us. The conduct of God must in this case appear dependent upon the actions of man; controlled by caprice, and subjected to those directions which the wayward sallies of our passions would impose.

But the conduct of God is fixed upon principles of a more permanent nature. The irregularities

which are visible both in the moral and the natural world, are attributable to other causes; while the immutability of God stands unimpeached. It is because we have retired from that station in which his goodness had placed us, and in which his immutability had engaged to protect us, that our bodies die. And the evils of which we complain, do not overtake us because God is changeable, but because God is immutable in all his ways, and because we are changeable,

SECTION III.

That the Human Body must have been originally Immortal, proved from the primeval State of Man, and the Immutability of God considered together.

FROM those general views, which, in the preceding section, we have taken of the immutability of God, and of those changes with which it is compat

able, let us now turn our attention to the same attribute, and consider it in connection with man in his primeval state; and the evidence in favour of primative immortality, will perhaps appear in a conspicuous light. And, therefore, without inquiring into the motives or cause which induced God to create the world, I shall fix on the fact itself, and only presume that creation did take place. For whatever the cause or motives were, certain it is, that such cause and motives did exist, and hence Almighty Power and goodness called the universe into being.

That a design to create man did exist in God at the time of creation, is demonstrated by fact; and therefore a design to destroy the human body could not then have had a being. For if we suppose that a design to destroy the human body, did exist in God at the moment in which he created it, we must suppose him to have been actuated by two opposite designs, the one to create, and the other to destroy the thing created. But in thus supposing, we place the designs of God, not only in a state of hostility to each other, but in a state of hostility to his attributes; and we make a principle of immutability to produce designs, which, in the same moment, are destructive to each other. But since these suppositions are contrary to the divine perfections, and perfectly incompatible with the immutability of his nature, we must conclude, that those suppositions which are irreconcileable with the nature of God, are at once inapplicable to him, and false in fact. Hence then the conclusion appears to be inevitable, that no design to destroy the hu

man body, could, at the moment of creation, have existed in God; and while we retain our idea of his immutability, we are precluded from admitting the possibility of any such subsequent design from taking place. For since, under our present consideration, man is presumed to sustain the same relative situation to God, which he sustained in the moment of his creation, no cause of a design to destroy him could originate with him. And as God must be immutable in his nature, as has been proved in the preceding section, we are forbidden to suppose that any such design could possibly originate with him. And hence it follows, that as no design to destroy the human body, could, under actual and existing facts, have originated either with man or God, so no such design could possibly have existed; and, therefore the human body must have been exempt from dissolution and decay.

Indeed, while we admit God to be the creator of man, we must view him as an infinite being, and consequently as one that is immutable; and while we consider him thus as an immutable being, it will be impossible for us to admit the possibility, either of dissolution or death. For a man, standing precisely in the same situation in which he stood, when God first called him into existence, must have sustained the same relation to his maker; to suppose that he can be both created and destroyed, and yet uniformly in both cases sustain the same relation to the cause of both; while we admit, at the same time, the cause of both to be absolutely immutable, will

amount to something more than a simple contradiction.

A being which continues the same after it is created that it was when called into existence, can include no more cause of its dissolution, the moment after, than it did in the moment of its creation. The same reasonings which will hold good to day, will, upon the same principle, hold equally good to-morrow; they will be equally available the day following, and we may extend our observations through the whole progress of duration. If, therefore, the human body can possibly be destroyed, during any period of existence subsequently to creation, without containing within itself any cause of that destruction, it is evident that this cause must be lodged in some other source. But since no other source can possibly be found but God, if the destruction of the human body were possible, we must, under these considerations, either attribute to him the destruction of the human body upon the same identical principle which gave birth to creation, or we must suppose the Almighty to be actu. ated by contradictory designs. But as we can no more conceive it possible that the Almighty can be actuated by contradictory designs, than we can conceive that destruction and creation can arise from the same principle, (which is making two opposite effects to result from the same cause,) the destruction of the human body, under present circumstances, cannot possibly be imputed to God. And since the supposition, in either case, involves a plain and positive contradiction, the result is in

evitable, namely, that the human body must necessarily have been immortal.

The same moral causes which exist when the body is destroyed, must have been in existence when it was created; because God is necessarily immutable, and the creature is presumed to have undergone no change. If, therefore, under these given circumstances, the body could have been dissolved, we must presume, either that creation and dissolution are the same thing, or that two opposite effects have resulted from the same cause. To suppose the former we are forbidden by fact, and to suppose the latter is a contradiction. The final result must therefore be, that the human body must have been immortal. And hence also, since this theory and present fact are at variance with each other, the dissolution which the human body undergoes, must be attributed to some other cause; a cause distinct from any which has hitherto been explored; a cause which could not have existed when man was first called into being; a cause which did not then reside in man, and which could not at any period whatsoever reside in God.

What the precise state of Adam's body was, previously to his fall, is a question, which has employed the pens of many writers, and has been productive of a multitude of conjectures. And, indeed, in cases where we are left without decisive evidence, conjecture and probability must become our only guides.

With some, the body of Adam has been supposed luminous, with others transparent, and with others