αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας· αὐτή τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθή-15 σεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις. ὅτι δ ̓ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες), δοξάζειν δ ̓ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἢ το ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν. ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρρα λέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν § 5 οἱ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς ὑπολήψεως διαφοραί, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ 25 φρόνησις καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, περὶ ὧν τῆς διαφορᾶς ἔτερος ἔστω λόγος. περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου λεκτέον. § 6 εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ ̓ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι 4281 ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, μία τίς ἐστι τούτων δύναμις ἢ ἕξις, καθ ̓ ἣν κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα. τοιαῦται δ ̓ εἰσὶν αἴσθησις, δόξα, § 7 ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ 5 τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὅρασις, φαίνεται δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος τούτων, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. εἶτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι, and while imagination does not come into existence independently of sense-perception, conception is not found without the aid of imagination. But that imagination is a different kind of thought from conception or reflection is quite evident. Imagination is a condition subject to our own control whenever we desire—we can represent an object before our eyes just in the way those do who, in the exercise of memory, depict something with which the fact to be recalled has been associated-but conception or the forming an opinion does not in this way depend on us because it must needs be either true or false. And, further, when we form the opinion that something is terrible or fearful, we at the same time experience a feeling of fear along with it; and the result is similar when we think anything fitted to excite our confidence: whereas, with respect to merely forming an image of anything, our condition is simply like that of those who see scenes of terror and of courage pourtrayed in pictures. And, again, conception includes a number of specific forms-scientific knowledge, opinion, understanding, and their opposites, the difference between which will be dealt with elsewhere. Thought, on the other hand, is regarded as different from sense-perception, and is considered to embrace under itself two main forms-viz., imagination and conception. We will therefore, first of all, settle the nature of imagination, and then proceed to the consideration of the other faculty. Imagination, then, as that faculty in respect of which we say an image or mental picture presents itself before us, and not as it may be understood in any metaphorical or wider sense, might be supposed to be some one of those faculties or states through which we judge and conclude towards that which is true or false. Such faculties are sense-perception, opinion, scientific knowledge, reason. The following facts, however, shew that imagination is not identical with sense-perception. (1) Sense-perception may be taken either as potential or as actual, as we see, for instance, in the eyesight on the one hand, actual seeing on the other: but a picture of imagination presents itself without the presence of sense-perception in either of these forms, as for instance is the case with our visions in sleep. (2) Again, sense-perception is φαντασία δ ̓ οὔ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν· δοκεῖ δ ̓ οὔ, οἷον το μύρμηκι μὲν ἢ μελίττῃ, σκώληκι δ ̓ οὔ. εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς αἰεί, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς. ἔπειτ ̓ οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα, τότε ἢ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής, καὶ ὅπερ δὲ 15 § 8 ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὁράματα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθευόντων οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἢ νοῦς· ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής. λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα· γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής. ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μὲν ἔπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς 20 δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δὲ πολλοῖς. ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, πειθοῖ δὲ λόγος· τῶν δὲ θηρίων § 9 ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ ̓ οὔ. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ ̓ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι ̓ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ 15 συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως φαντασία ἂν εἴη, διά τε ταῦτα καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν ἡ δόξα, ἀλλ ̓ ἐκείνου ἐστὶν οὗ καὶ αἴσθησις· λέγω δ', ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἡ συμπλοκὴ φαντασία ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῆς δόξης μὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αἰσθήσεως δὲ τῆς τοῦ 30 λευκοῦ. τὸ οὖν φαίνεσθαί ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ὅπερ αἰσθάνεται 4280 § ιο μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ, περὶ ὧν ΙΟ. δοκεῖ δ ̓ οὔ, οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἡ σκώληκι ELSTUVWXy, com. Tor. 15. 8 STUVXy. 21. δοκεῖ] δοξάζει LUW. SXy. incl. Tor. 18. εἰ V. Trend., ἐκ Ald. Sylb. Bekk. Tor. 1. ἐστι] ἔσται Tor. 22. πάσῃ] εἰ πάσῃ 29. ή συμπλοκή unc. always ready to hand, imagination is not so. But (3) were they as actually realized identical, imagination might be possessed by every animal. This, however, is not generally thought to be the case the bee and ant would seem to have imagination, the worm would seem to be without it. (4) Further, the perceptions of the senses are as such always true, our pictures formed by imagination are to a great extent false. And, lastly, we do not, when our senses are vigorously and carefully directed towards. their object, say that such and such a thing "appears" the image of a man: it is only when we do not perceive the object clearly that the question of its truth or falsity arises. And, as we said before, pictures of imagination present themselves even to those whose eyes are closed. Neither, again, is imagination any of those faculties which invariably reveal us truth: as, for example, scientific knowledge or thought: because imagination may be false as well as true. It remains for us, then, to see whether opinion, which is both true and false, can be identified with imagination. But opinion is followed by belief: it is impossible, when holding an opinion, not to believe the views we have. Belief, however, is an attribute of no brute beast, whereas imagination is possessed by many. Besides, every opinion is accompanied by belief, belief by conviction, and conviction by reason; and while imagination is a property of some animals, reason is of none. It is clear, then, that imagination is neither opinion attended by sense-perception, nor acquired through sense-perception, nor again is it the combination of opinion and sense-perception. And from the facts already stated it is further evident that this opinion does not refer to something other than the object of sensation, but is restricted to that of which we have perception. Thus, for instance, it must be the combination of the opinion of white and of the sensation of white which constitutes imagination: it cannot be the result of the opinion of good and the sensation of white. The result of such a theory would be that imagining is the direct thinking or conceiving of the object of perception. Such a result, however, is directly at variance with facts. Objects in regard to which a man's opinion or conception is quite correct, assume an image which is altogether false: the sun, for exam ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος που διαῖος, πέπεισται δ ̓ εἶναι μείζων τῆς οἰκουμένης· συμβαίνει οὖν ἤτοι ἀποβεβληκέναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀληθῆ δόξαν, ἣν εἶχε 5 σωζομένου τοῦ πράγματος, μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενον μηδὲ μεταπεισθέντα, ἢ εἰ ἔτι ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ. (ἀλλὰ ψευδὴς ἐγένετο, ὅτε λάθοι μεταπεσὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα.) οὔτ ̓ ἄρα ἔν τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὔτ ̓ ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντα § 11 σία. ἀλλ ̓ ἐπειδή ἐστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ το τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ ̓ αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησις ἐστίν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθή σεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰ- 15 σθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ ̓ αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν § 12 καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει διὰ τάδε. ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθής ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος. δεύτερον δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα· καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνδέχεται διαψεύ- 10 δεσθαι· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευκὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται. τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἑπομέ ή νων τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἴδια· λέγω δ ̓ οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος, ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, περὶ ἃ § 13 μάλιστα ἤδη ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἡ δὲ 15 4. πέπεισται STUX Tor., πεπίστευται EVWy Trend. || μείζω ESTV Tor. 6. ἐπιλανθανόμενον LTUVWX. 8. ἐγίνετο LSUVXy. 12. αἰσθήσεις εἰσιν TUVW. 19. συμβεβηκότος Χ, τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκε καὶ ταῦτα Ald. Sylb., τοῦ ὁ συμβέβηκε τούτοις coni. Tor. 21. διαψεύδεται SUV Xy. 24. & ante συμβ. om. STUVWX. 20 |