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ple, bears the image of being but a foot in its diameter, while at the same time the observer is convinced that it is larger than the earth. Here, then, [imagination and opinion are at variance, and if imagination be opinion] one of two things must result. Either, we must say, the man, in having this imagination, must have thrown off the true opinion which he had in presence of the fact while it remained unaltered, unless we are to suppose that he has forgotten or been led to change his views, or if he still preserves his opinion, then it follows necessarily that the same opinion is true and false. (Of course, it might be said that an opinion previously true would become false, in case the object were to alter in its character without our cognizance.)
Imagination, then, is not to be identified with any of these faculties, nor is it the result of their combination. It is, however, a law of nature that whenever one object is moved, another is moved by it. Now imagination is thought to be a form of movement, and is believed to be dependent on the senses so far as to arise only in those who perceive, and relatively to the objects of perception. And while such movement must result from sense as actually realized, and must itself be like the senseperception, this movement, it follows, can neither exist without sense-perception nor can it be the property of any that do not have perceptive powers. It follows, further, that the possessor of this faculty may be both active and receptive in many ways regarding it, and the imagination itself may be both true and false. This results from the following considerations. The perception of the particular qualities of sense is true or marked by falsity only to the smallest possible degree. But, secondly, there is the perception of the concomitance of these qualities. And here error is possible: for while sense is never mistaken in that the object is for instance white, it may be mistaken as to whether it is this thing or some other object that is white. Thirdly, we must note the perception of the common sensibles -that is, of those properties which are associated with the objects to which the particular qualities belong-such objects, namely, of perception as movement and magnitude, which are concomitants of sensible phenomena, and with respect to which it is particularly possible to be deceived in our perception. Such,
κίνησις ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας γινομένη διοίσει τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν τριῶν αἰσθήσεων. καὶ ἡ μὲν πρώτη ρούσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθής, αἱ δ ̓ ἕτεραι καὶ παρούσης καὶ ἀπούσης εἶεν ἂν ψευδεῖς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν πόρρω τὸ αἰσθητὸν ᾖ. εἰ οὖν μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχει τὰ εἰρημένα ἢ ἡ φαν- 30 τασία, τοῦτο δ ̓ ἐστὶ τὸ λεχθέν, ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις 4293 § 14 ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ ̓ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένη. ἐπεὶ δ ̓ ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους § 15 εἴληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίως εἶναι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ ̓ αὐτὰς πράτ- 5 τει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι. περὶ μὲν οὖν φαντασίας, τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον.
IV. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ το ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τίν ̓ ἔχει δια§ 2 φοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτε γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν. εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ § 3 ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον, ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ 15 εἴδους καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν,
17. τῆς ἀπὸ] ἡ ἀπὸ y Ald. Tor. 29. αισθητήριον TUVWX. 30. ἢ ἡ φαντασία] ἢ μὴ φαντασίαν Trend. 4193 2. γιγνομένης Ald. Sylb. Bekk. 3. έστι om. STUVWX. 5. ὁμοίως] ὁμοίας ETUX Tor. 10. τοῦ ante τῆς om. LSTUWX.
then, being the varying degrees of truth in sense-perception, there will be a difference in the movement which results from the exercise of each of these three perceptive faculties. Thus the movement in the first instance is true while the perception itself is present: the movements in the other two cases might be both in the presence and in the absence of the sensation possibly false and this especially in any case in which the object of sensation is far distant from its organ.
Thus, then, if there be nothing but imagination which possesses the attributes that have been mentioned, and this be the faculty we have described, imagination will be a movement resulting from the actual operation of the faculty of sense. And, further, since it is the eye-sight that is the most important sense, imagination has received its name from 'light,' because without light it is impossible to see. And because the pictures of imagination continue to subsist in a way resembling the perceptions of the senses, animals act frequently in accordance with the pictures which imagination offers, some (as is the case with brute beasts) because they have no faculty of reason, others because their reason is at times obscured by passion, or disease, or sleep, as is the case with man. And here we conclude our account of the nature and conditions of imagination.
We must next discuss the cognitive and thinking part of soul, whether it be separated from our other mental faculties or whether it is not separated physically, but be so only by thought and abstraction, and inquire what is the specific character of thought, and how it is that at some stage or another thought begins to operate.
Thinking, we may assume, is like perception, and, if so, consists in being affected by the object of thought or in something else of this nature. Like sense then, thought or reason must be not entirely passive, but receptive of the form-that is, it must be potentially like this form, but not actually identical with it: it will stand, in fact, towards its objects in the same relation as
ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά. ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥστ περ φησὶν ̓Αναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ ̓ ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ· παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντι- 2ο φράττει· ὥστε μηδ ̓ αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ ̓ ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν. ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή) § 4 οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποιός τις γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτο, ψυ- 15 χρὸς ἢ θερμός, ἢ κἂν ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δ ̓ οὐθέν ἐστιν. καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ ̓ ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελε§ 5 χείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη. ὅτι δ ̓ οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀπάθεια τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ, φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων 30 καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐ δύναται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων 429° ψόφων, οὐδ ̓ ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν οὔτε ὁρᾶν οὔτε ὀσμᾶσθαι· ἀλλ ̓ ὁ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον· τὸ § 6 μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος, ὁ δὲ χωριστός. ὅταν 5 δ ̓ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται ὡς ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ ̓ ἐνέργειαν (τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι ̓ αὑτοῦ), ἔστι μὲν ὁμοίως καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ
18. ἐπειδὴ SUVWXy.
τοῦ ψ. STVXy.
25. γὰρ ἄν τις LSTUWVX.
6. ὡς ὁ ἐπ. ELTUVX Tor.
429° 1. οἶον
ὁμοίως pr. om. pr.
that in which the faculty of sense stands towards the objects of perception. Reason therefore, since it thinks everything must be free from all admixture, in order that, to use the phrase of Anaxagoras, it may rule the world—that is, acquire knowledge: for the adjacent light of any foreign body obstructs it and eclipses it. Its very nature, then, is nothing but just this comprehensive potentiality: and the reason-that is, that function through which the soul is ratiocinative and frames notions -is therefore, previously to the exercise of thought, actually identical with nothing which exists.
This consideration shews how improbable it is that reason should be incorporated with the bodily organism: for if so, it would be of some definite character, either hot or cold, or it would have some organ for its operation, just as is the case with sense. But, as matter of fact, reason has nothing of this character. There is truth, too, in the view of those who say the soul is the source of general ideas: only it is soul not as a whole but in its faculty of reason: and the forms or ideas in question exist within the mind, not as endowments which we already possess, but only as capacities to be developed.
The difference, however, between the impassivity of the faculty of reason and of the faculty of sense is clear from a consideration of the organs and the processes of sense-perception. Sense, for example, is unable to acquire perception from an object which is in too great excess-cannot, to take an instance, perceive sound from extremely loud noises, nor see nor smell anything from too violent colours and odours. Reason, on the contrary, when it applies itself to something extremely intellectual, does not lessen but rather increases its power of thinking inferior objects, the explanation being that the faculty of sense is not independent of the body, whereas reason is separated from it. And since reason becomes each of its objects in the sense in which he who is in actual possession of knowledge is described as knowing-this resulting when he can apply his knowledge by himself-the reason as a developed capacity is similar to what it was previously as a mere unformed faculty though not the same as what it was before it learned or