stands towards the materials on which it operates. Thus reason is, on the one hand, of such a character as to become all things, on the other hand of such a nature as to create all things, acting then much in the same way as some positive quality, such as for instance light: for light also in a way creates actual out of potential colour.

This phase of reason is separate from and uncompounded with material conditions, and, being in its essential character fully and actually realized, it is not subject to impressions from without: for the creative is in every case more honourable than the passive, just as the originating principle is superior to the matter which it forms. And thus, though knowledge as an actually realized condition is identical with its object, this knowledge as a potential capacity is in time prior in the individual, though in universal existence it is not even in time thus prior to actual thought. Further, this creative reason does not at one time think, at another time not think: [it thinks eternally] and when separated from the body it remains nothing but what it essentially is: and thus it is alone immortal and eternal. Of this unceasing work of thought, however, we retain no memory, because this reason is unaffected by its objects; whereas the receptive passive intellect (which is affected) is perishable, and can really think nothing without the support of the creative intellect.

CHAPTER VI.

With regard then to the exercise of reason, the thinking of isolated single terms falls within a sphere in which there is no falsity: when, on the other hand, we find both falsity and truth, there we reach a certain combination of ideas as constituting one conception: much in the same way as Empedocles said: "Thereupon many there were whose heads grew up neckless entirely" but were afterwards brought together by friendship. In a corresponding fashion is it that those notions which are originally separate are afterwards connected, as is, for instance, the case with the two notions incommensurate and

W. AR.

II

μένων ἢ ἐσομένων, τὸν χρόνον προσεννοῶν καὶ συντιθείς. τὸ 4330 γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει ἀεί· καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ λευκὸν μὴ λευκόν, τὸ μὴ λευκὸν συνέθηκεν. (ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν φάναι πάντα.) ἀλλ ̓ οὖν ἔστι γε οὐ μόνον τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ ἀληθές, ὅτι λευκὸς Κλέων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἦν ἢ ἔσται. τὸ δὲ ἓν 5 § 3 ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἕκαστον. τὸ δ ̓ ἀδιαίρετον ἐπεὶ διχῶς, ἢ

δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐθὲν κωλύει νοεῖν τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ὅταν νοῇ, τὸ μῆκος (ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ἐνεργεία) καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἀδιαιρέτῳ· ὁμοίως γὰρ ὁ χρόνος διαιρετὸς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος τῷ μήκει. οὔκουν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐν τῷ ἡμίσει τί ἐνόει ἑκατέρῳ· οὐ το γάρ ἐστιν, ἂν μὴ διαιρεθῇ, ἀλλ ̓ ἢ δυνάμει. χωρὶς δ ̓ ἑκάτερον νοῶν τῶν ἡμίσεων διαιρεῖ καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἅμα· τότε δ' οἱονεὶ μήκη. εἰ δ ̓ ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ § 4 ἐπ ̓ ἀμφοῖν. τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴ

δει νοεῖ ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς· 15 κατὰ συμβεβηκός δέ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ἐκεῖνα διαιρετά, ᾧ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ ̓ ᾧ ἀδιαίρετα· ἔνεστι γὰρ κἀν τούτοις τι ἀδιαίρετον, ἀλλ ̓ ἴσως οὐ χωριστόν, ὃ ποιεῖ ἕνα τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸ μῆκος. καὶ τοῦθ ̓ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπαντί ἐστι τῷ συνεχεῖ

diagonal. Should the notions in question be, however, related to the past or to the future, thought then adds on the idea of time to that of mere connection. Falsehood, in fact, always involves combination and connection: even in asserting the white to be not white we bring not-white into a combination. It should be added, at the same time, that all this process might be described, not as combination, but rather as disjunction or division. Anyhow it follows that truth or falsehood is not limited to saying that "Cleon is white," but includes the judgment that he was or will be: and the process of thus reducing our ideas into the unity of a single judgment is in each case the work of

reason.

Further light is thrown upon this unity of thought by considering that the indivisible and continuous presents itself before us in two forms, either as potential or as actual. There is therefore nothing to prevent us conceiving extended and thus divisible space, at the time when we think it, as indivisible (because as it actually exists it is thus indivisible): and also doing so within an indivisible moment of time, because time, just as extended length, may be conceived of either as divided or as undivided. And therefore it is impossible to state what was thought in each of the two halves of time: because, unless it be divided, there is no such half existing actually, but only potentially: although, in so far as the reason thinks of the two halves separately, it divides the time likewise, and thinks it just as two lengths. If, on the other hand, the reason think its object as consisting of two halves, then it thinks them also in a time which is spread over two halves.

With respect to what is indivisible, not quantitatively but specifically, this the reason thinks within an undivided space of time and with the undivided action of the soul [and this not as an essential property of the object which is indivisible], but as an incidental concomitant of the mental process, and thus not in so far as the mental action and the time are divisible, but rather in so far as they are indivisible. For in such objects also there is something which is indivisible, though perhaps it cannot be separated from its setting-something which makes the time and the length into one; and this also is the case with everything

§ 5 καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ μήκει. ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ καὶ πᾶσα διαίρεσις, καὶ 10 τὸ οὕτως ἀδιαίρετον, δηλοῦται ὥσπερ ἡ στέρησις. καὶ ὅμοιος

ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οἷον πῶς τὸ κακὸν γνωρίζει ἢ § 6 τὸ μέλαν· τῷ ἐναντίῳ γάρ πως γνωρίζει. δεῖ δὲ δυνάμει εἶναι τὸ γνωρίζον καὶ ἓν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ. εἰ δέ τινι μή ἐστιν ἐναντίον τῶν αἰτίων, αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ γινώσκει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶ 25 § 7 καὶ χωριστόν. ἔστι δ ̓ ἡ μὲν φάσις τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ ἡ

κατάφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς πᾶσα· ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ ̓ ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἀληθής, καὶ οὐ τὶ κατά τινος· ἀλλ ̓ ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρᾶν τοῦ ἰδίου ἀληθές, εἰ δ ̓ ἄνθρωπος τὸ λευκὸν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀεί, οὕτως ἔχει ὅσα 30 ἄνευ ὕλης.

VII. Τὸ δ ̓ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγ- 4314 ματι. ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ· ἔστι γὰρ ἐξ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ για γνόμενα. φαίνεται δὲ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν· οὐ γὰρ πάσχει οὐδ ̓ ἀλλοιοῦται. 5 διὸ ἄλλο εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως· ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἀτελοῦς

24. καὶ ἓν εἶναι LTVWX. ἐνεῖναι SUy Trend. Bekk. ] ἐν om. W. καὶ μὴ ἐν εἶναι αὐτῶν coni. Tor. 26. coni. Tor. ἔστι δ'

25. αἰτίων] ἐναντίων S.

ἡ μὲν κατάφασις τι κατά τινος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις.

TUVXY.

4. αἰσθητήριον SVX.

431 I. τὸ αὐτὸ δ'

continuous, whether it be so in time or space. But as for the point and everything which is thus arrived at by division, and yet is in this sense indivisible, its character comes to be elucidated in the same way as negation.

A similar account holds good of other cases. How, for instance, do we come to know evil or black? We may say it is through their opposites. And thus the cognitive faculty must be in such cases potentially both qualities, while at the same time it remains at unity within itself. If, however, there be a causal mental force, which has no contrary opposed to it, such a faculty knows itself by its own agency, and is realized in full activity and independently of all bodily conditions. And thus while every statement, as for instance an affirmation, asserts something of something else, and is in every case either true or false, reason is not in every case placed between the alternatives of truth and falsehood: the conception of the notion in its real nature is intrinsically true, and is not merely an assertion that something belongs to something else. Just in fact as the seeing of the particular quality of sense is always true, while the judgment, whether the white colour is or is not a man is not always true: so similarly the conceptions which are entirely independent of material surroundings are as such always true.

CHAPTER VII.

Actual knowledge has thus been shewn to be identical with the object of knowledge. Potential knowledge is, it is true, in point of time earlier in the individual, although absolutely it is not even so in time, because it is from something actually existing that everything which comes into being is derived. It appears, however, that in sense-perception it is a potential faculty of sense which the sensible object transforms into actuality: in fact, the faculty is not affected or altered by the object of sense [-rather it is realized by its object]. Hence, then, the movement implied in sense-perception is different from ordinary move