ἐνέργεια ἦν, ἡ δ ̓ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου. . § 2 τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, διώκει ἢ φεύγει. καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις τοῦτο ᾗ κατ ̓ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ φευκτικόν, οὔτ ̓ ἀλλήλων οὔτε § 3 τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο. τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν τ ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει. διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή· ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ τὴν κόρην τοιανδὶ ἐποίησεν, αὐτὴ δ ̓ ἕτερον· καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡσαύτως τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἕν, καὶ μία μεσότης τὸ δ ̓ εἶναι αὐτῇ § 4 πλείω. τίνι δ ̓ ἐπικρίνει τί διαφέρει γλυκὺ καὶ θερμόν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, λεκτέον δὲ καὶ ὧδε. ἔστι γὰρ ἕν τι· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὡς ὅρος, καὶ ταῦτα ἓν τῷ ἀνάλογον καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὃν ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον, ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἀπορεῖν πῶς τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ κρίνει 7. ἦν om. LSUVX. || ἡ τοῦ] ἢ τοῦ Χ. 12. δὴ UWX Ald. Sylb., om. TV. || ταυτὸν Τ. τὸ αὐτὸ LV. τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο conj. Tor. || ἡ κατ' ἐνεργ. Vulg. conj. Trend. 18. αὕτη LSTX. Tor. ὅλως ὁ ὅρος conj. Tor. || ἐν] ἐν LSIX. 22. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ 24· τὰ μὴ ὁμ.] μή om. TVWy. 10 20 ment: for while movement is, as we have seen before, only the realization of something while incomplete, realization taken absolutely is something different, as relating to that which has been completed. Sense-perception, then, in itself is like mere simple assertion and conception: when, however, the sense perceives something as pleasant or painful, it, so to speak, affirms or denies it—that is, pursues or avoids it. Pleasure and pain, then, are due to the operation of the medium state involved in sense-perception upon that which is good or bad, as such: and pursuit and aversion are equivalent to this state as actual and realized. And thus the faculty of desire and of aversion are not different either from one another or from the faculty of sense: although, indeed, the mode in which they manifest themselves is different. So similarly to the understanding the images of sense-impressions are related just as the impressions themselves are to sense: it is only when the mind proceeds to assert something to be good or bad that it either pursues or avoids its object. The soul, then, never thinks of anything as good or bad without the help of images of sense. [But this sensuous image is only a condition of its exercise]: it is simply like the air which makes the pupil of such and such a character, while the pupil itself remains different from it, in the same manner as it is also with the hearing: and all the while the ultimate faculty and equalizing medium remain one, although their modes of manifestation may be several. This ultimate unity is, further, that by which the mind comes to distinguish between separate sensations, such as sweet and hot. This has been already explained, but we may state the matter also in the following manner. There is a unity which stands towards the different sensations much in the same manner as anything which serves as limit to a series: while, further, the ideas themselves are one by the proportion and the numerical relation which makes each stand towards the other in the same relation as that in which the outward qualities are associated with one another. And here, let it be granted, it makes no difference whether we ask how this unity judges of objects that do not fall within one and the same genus, or, on the other ἢ τἀναντία, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν; ἔστω δὴ ὡς τὸ Α τὸ 15 λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ Β τὸ μέλαν, τὸ Γ πρὸς τὸ Δ ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα· ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλάξ. εἰ δὴ τὰ ΓΔ ἑνὶ εἴη ὑπάρχοντα, οὕτως ἕξει ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ΑΒ, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν καὶ ἕν, τὸ δ ̓ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτό, κἀκεῖνο ὁμοίως. ὁ δ ̓ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν Α τὸ γλυκὺ εἴη, τὸ δὲ Β τὸ λευ-431 § 5 κόν. τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν καὶ φευκτόν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασμάτων ᾖ, κινεῖται, οἷον αἰσθανόμενος τὸν φρυκτὸν ὅτι πῦρ, τῇ κοινῇς § 6 γνωρίζει ὁρῶν κινούμενον, ὅτι πολέμιος. ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν ὥσπερ ὁρῶν λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα· καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ ὡς ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει, καὶ ὅλως ἐν πράξει. καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως, τὸ ἀληθὲς κ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστί, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ. § 7 ἀλλὰ τῷ γε ἁπλῶς διαφέρει καὶ τινί. τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαι· ρέσει λεγόμενα νοεῖ ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ σιμόν, ᾗ μὲν σιμόν, 28. καὶ τὰ] coni. κἂν εἰ τά. φρυκτὸν] φευκτὸν TUVWX Sylb. | κοινῇ] κινήσει Basil. Tor. 29. κἀκεῖνο] coni. Tor. κἀκεῖνα. 4315 5. hand, contraries, such as black and white [which do thus belong to one and the same conception]. [Consider, then the question, first of all, relatively to homogeneous objects and conceptions.] Whatever be the relation in which A (the objective quality white) stands to B (objective black); C and D [the idea of white and the idea of black] will stand to one another in the same relation as the former pair. (Hence, of course, also alternando: A will stand to C as B to D.) If, then, C and D attach themselves to some one act of mind, they will hold themselves just as A and B-that is, they will be one and the same, though their aspect or mode of existence differs; and the sameness and unity which thus attaches to them will be simply like that of the actual concrete qualities. And the same proportion would result were we to make A represent the sweet and B the white. Thus then the reason, while employing as its materials the images of sense, grasps from among them general ideas; and in the same manner as it determines for itself within these images what is to be pursued and what avoided, so also outside the actual perception of these objects it is, when engaged merely with the images of sense, stirred up to action. [Thus then the practical reason, in dealing with the perceptions and the images of sense, translates them into ideas of what is good and evil] much in the same way as a man on perceiving a torch-light, which sense presents to himself simply as a fire, comes, by the action of the central sense, when he sees it moved, to know that it signifies the approach of an enemy. Similarly also, when dealing with mere images or notions in the mind, we calculate as if we had the facts before our eyes, and deliberate upon the future in relation to the present. And, further, when the reason in the speculative sphere asserts something to be pleasant or painful, within the practical sphere it pursues it or avoids it, and, in a word, steps forth into action. Independently, however, of action, truth and falsehood are of the same character as good and evil: but they differ in so far as the two former are absolute, the two latter relative to some person or object. As for so-called abstractions, the mind thinks them just as it might snubnosedness: for just as qua snubnosed the mind cannot conceive this abstractedly and by itself, but qua hollow can by οὐ κεχωρισμένως, ᾗ δὲ κοῖλον, εἴ τις ἐνόει ἐνεργείᾳ, ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ᾗ τὸ κοῖλον. οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικά 15 § 8 οὐ κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῇ ἐκεῖνα. ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ κατ ̓ ἐνέργειαν τὰ πράγματα νοῶν. ἆρα δ ̓ ἐνδέχεται τῶν κεχωρισμένων τι νοεῖν ὄντα αὐτὸν μὴ κεχωρισμένον μεγέθους, ἢ οὔ, σκεπτέον ὕστερον. VIII. Νῦν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφαλαιώσαν- 10 τες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστι πάντα. ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι δ ̓ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δ ̓ αἴσθησις τὰ αἰσθητά· πῶς δὲ τοῦτο, § 2 δεῖ ζητεῖν. τέμνεται οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα, ἡ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δυνάμει, ἡ δ ̓ ἐντελε-15 χείᾳ εἰς τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ. τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταῦτά ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ αἰσθητόν. ἀνάγκη δ ̓ ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ τὰ εἴδη εἶναι. αὐτὰ μὲν γὰρ δὴ οὐ· οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος· ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ 4323 ὄργανόν ἐστιν ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴ § 3 σθησις εἶδος αἰσθητῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι, τά τε ἐν ἀφαι- 5 15. ἐν ᾗ om. SUν. ρισμένως ὡς κεχωρισμένως. 17. 16. Altera a Simplicio lectio traditur: οὐ κεχω EL. || εἰς τὰ πρ.] coni. Tor. ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ προ pr. E. 26. τὰ ἐντ.] ἐντελεχείας L. pr. E. Tor. 27. τὸ ante έπ. om. ELSUVX || ταῦτα STUVWXy ταὐτόν Bekk., | ἐστι, τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικὸν τὸ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ αἰσθητικὸν τὸ αἰσθητόν Tor. |