καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσιν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων τέλεια καὶ οὐ πηρώματά ἐστιν· σημεῖον δ ̓ ὅτι ἔστι γεννητικὰ καὶ ἀκμὴν ἔχει καὶ φθίσιν· ὥστ ̓ εἶχεν ἂν καὶ τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη τῆς 15 § 7 πορείας. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κινῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν νοεῖ πρακτόν, οὐδὲ λέγει περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ διωκτοῦ οὐθέν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἢ φεύγον τός τι ἢ διώκοντός τί ἐστιν. ἀλλ ̓ οὐδ ̓ ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον, ἤδη κελεύει φεύγειν ἢ διώκειν, οἷον πολλάκις διανοεῖται 30 φοβερόν τι ἢ ἡδύ, οὐ κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ καρδία § 8 κινεῖται, ἂν δ ̓ ἡδύ, ἕτερόν τι μόριον. ἔτι καὶ ἐπιτάττοντος 4332 τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν οὐ κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον ὁ ἀκρατής. καὶ ὅλως δὲ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἰατρικὴν οὐκ ἰᾶται, ὡς ἑτέρου τινὸς κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ ̓ 5 οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ ̓ ἡ ὄρεξις ταύτης κυρία τῆς η κινήσεως· οἱ γὰρ ἐγκρατεῖς ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες οὐ πράττουσιν ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν ὄρεξιν, ἀλλ ̓ ἀκολουθοῦσι τῷ νῷ. Χ. Φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα. πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ το τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις οὐ νόησις οὐδὲ λογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. 14. ἔστι om. LSTUVWXY. ἀλόγοις W. 27. νοεῖ] θεωρεί EL. 433 11. ἄλλοις] the animals in question are perfect, and not mutilated. they possess generative powers, and exhibit both development and decay. And therefore [-if sense alone were a sufficient reason for the exercise of local movement-] such animals would possess all the parts instrumental for movement. Neither, further, is the ratiocinative part, nor the so-called reason, that which produces movement. The speculative reason thinks nothing which relates to action, nor does it assert anything with regard to the object of pursuit and aversion: whereas movement is invariably connected with one either pursuing or avoiding something. Nor indeed, even when the reason reflects on something of this character, does it even then advise the individual either to pursuit or to aversion. Frequently, for example, the reason thinks of something terrible or pleasant, but it does not thereby produce fear: the only result is that the heart, in case the object be terrible, or some other part, in case it be pleasant, is excited. Furthermore, even when reason gives a command, and understanding bids us either avoid or pursue something, the individual is not moved accordingly, but follows the direction of appetite, as may be seen in the incontinent. So also, in general, we see that the man who understands the art of healing does not on that account therefore heal, a fact which shews that it requires something besides knowledge to produce the results of knowledge: and that scientific knowledge is itself unable to effect this end. Lastly, desire is not fitted to produce this movement: the continent, though subject to desire and appetite, do not do these things for which they possess a desire, but follow, on the contrary, the lead of reason. CHAPTER X. There are, however, at least two faculties which are manifestly motive-viz., desire or reason, if we regard imagination as a form of reason. Frequently, in fact, it is the pictures of imagination as against knowledge that people follow, and among animals other than man it is not thought nor ratiocination, but simply this power of representing images of sense, W. AR. 12 ἄμφω ἄρα ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις. § 2 νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός· διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει. καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ἕνεκά του πᾶσα· οὗ τις γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ· τὸ δ ̓ ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως. ὥστε εὐλόγως ταῦτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ κινοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική· τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν γὰρ κι νεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ § 3 ὀρεκτόν. καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέ 20 ξεως. ἓν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν, τὸ ὀρεκτόν. εἰ γὰρ δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν, κατὰ κοινὸν ἄν τι ἐκίνουν εἶδος. νῦν δὲ ὁ μὲν νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως· ἡ γὰρ βούλησις ὄρεξις· ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν κινῆται, καὶ κατὰ βούλησιν κι νεῖται. ἡ δ ̓ ὄρεξις κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν· ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυ- 25 § 4 μία ὄρεξίς τις ἐστίν. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός, ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ ̓ ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν· οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν πρακτὸν δ ̓ ἐστὶ § 5 τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύ- 30 ναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ καλουμένη ὄρεξις, φανερόν. τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι τὰ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐὰν κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις 43. διαιρῶσι καὶ χωρίζωσι, πάμπολλα γίνεται, θρεπτικόν, αἰ 18. ὀρεκτὸν EL. Trend. Tor.: ceteri ὀρεκτικόν. 29. πρακτικὸν ἀγ. L. which guides them. Both then reason and desire are fitted to produce and lead to local movement. The reason which is here intended is that which calculates for some purpose-that is, it is the practical reason, distinguished from the speculative by its end. As for desire, it is always directed to some object: in fact, it is the object at which desire aims that forms the startingpoint of the practical reason, although it is some particular detail which forms the beginning of the action. It is then on good grounds that people have viewed as springs of action these two faculties of desire and practical intellect for the faculty of desire has itself a motive force, and the intellect excites to action just in so far as the object of desire supplies it with a starting-point: just as, similarly, imagination when it moves to action does not do so independently of desire. The spring of action thus resolves itself into one single thing, viz. the object of desire. For if there were two faculties acting as springs to action-reason on the one hand, desire on the other— they would have to move in virtue of some common character they shared. Now reason, it is found, does not act as a spring of action independently of desire: for settled wish is a form of desire, and when a man is led to act according to his reasonable conviction he is moved also in a manner corresponding to his wish. Desire, however, excites to action contrarily to reason, appetite, which so acts, being one of the forms of desire. And thus, then, it would seem, reason is always true and right, whereas desire and imagination may be both right and not right. It is then always the object of desire that moves to action : and this is either the good or the apparent good-not good, however, as a whole, but simply that form of it which relates to action—that is, which is contingent and admits of being other than it is. Evidently, therefore, it is such a faculty of the soul, the socalled principle of desire, which moves to action. Those, then, that divide the soul into different parts must, if a difference of powers be the basis of their separation, recognise a great variety of such parts-the nutrient, sentient, rational, deliberative, and, σθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, ἔτι ὀρεκτικόν· ταῦτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ θυμικόν. § 6 ἐπεὶ δ ̓ ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναντίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμ- 5 βαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντίαι ὦσι, γίνεται δ ̓ ἐν τοῖς χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ ̓ ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ ἤδη φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον), εἴδει μὲν ἓν ἂν εἴη τὸ κινοῦν τὸ το ὀρεκτικόν, ᾗ ὀρεκτικόν, πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν (τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆναι), ἀριθμῷ § 7 δὲ πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα. ἐπειδὴ δ ̓ ἐστὶ τρία, ἓν μὲν τὸ κινοῦν, δεύτερον δ ̓ ᾧ κινεῖ, τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν διττόν, τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον· ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν 15 ἀκίνητον τὸ πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρεκτικόν (κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὀρεγόμενον ᾗ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν ᾗ ἐνέργεια), τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργάνῳ ἡ ὄρεξις, ἤδη τοῦτο σωματικόν ἐστιν· διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις θεωρητέον περὶ 10 § 8 αὐτοῦ. νῦν δὲ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτό, οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐν ταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ ̓ ἀρχή· διὸ τὸ μὲν ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα 433 9. ήδη om. Ε. κινούμενον ELSUVW Bekk. Tor. 16. το post κιν. om. ELSUV. 18. 17. ὀρεγόμενον] τις om. TWXy. | ᾗ ἐνέργεια] ἡ ἐνεργείᾳ 22. γινγλυκός Ε. γιγλυκός Χ. γιγλυσμός STV. γιγγλυμός, Bekk. Tor. 20 |