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constructing, Aristotle means that it deals with and rests upon elementary truths which may be said to be the basis and starting-point (ὁρμητήριον in Themistius) for the other sciences: and still more perhaps that the science is self-contained: so in Eth. III. 5, 1112° 1, we have ἀκριβεῖς καὶ αὐτάρκεις τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. Psychology in fact like every mental science is more or less independent of external facts: the observer is also the observed, the subject and the object coincide. The physicist has to go outside himself for the materials of his study, the psychologist finds them within himself. Thus the expression does not mean the ingenii acumen required for the study of the science as Trendelenburg supposes: it refers to the fact that yʊxǹ being the prius in the phenomena of life, the ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων, as Aristotle almost immediately remarks, the science which investigates it reaches nearer to the real truth of things than is the case with more concrete sciences. Psychology in fact holds the same primary relation to Ethics, Politics, &c., as Arithmetic according to Meta. A. 2, does to Geometry. The commentators take the passage in somewhat of this sense. Themistius, e.g., paraphrases, τῷ μὲν ἀκριβεῖ διότι καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις παρὰ ψυχῆς ἡ ἀκρίβεια, τῷ θαυμασίῳ δὲ ὅτι σχεδὸν διὰ πάντων διήκει τῶν ὄντων ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀρχομένη τῆς φυσικῆς μέχρι τῆς πρώτης. Simplicius notes, ἀκριβεστέρα δὲ γνῶσις ἡ ἀναγκαία καὶ ἀπαράλειπτος καὶ ἡ οἰκεία τῷ γνωστῷ, and insists specially on the afinity between the subject knowing and the object known, the fact of συναίσθησις and the ἐπιστροφή of the soul upon itself implied in psychology.
402 3. τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν] Torstrik reads περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς on the ground that loropia means not cognitio but investigatio, and that the preposition is therefore necessary. On the meaning of ἱστορία as equivalent to enquiries or researches, De Quincey has some happy remarks (Essay on Philosophy of Herodotus). Cp. Introduction, p. xxiv.
402a 7. ἐπιζητοῦμεν δὲ θεωρῆσαι] \With this statement of the sphere and questions of psychology, compare and contrast Plato, Phaedrus, 271 A, δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ὁ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ ὃς ἂν ἄλλος σπουδῇ τέχνην ῥητορικὴν διδῷ πρῶτον πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἓν καὶ ὁμοῖον πέφυκεν, ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές, κ.τ.λ.
402 6. ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων] This view of the importance of yuxǹ in the study of animal life is especially emphasized in the Treatise on the Parts of Animals: so, e.g., 1. 1, 6, ἀπελθούσης γοῦν (ψυχῆς οὐκέτι ζῷόν ἐστι. For the meaning of ἀρχὴ in Aristotle, see Metaph. Δ. 1, 1013, where Aristotle distinguishes six senses in which apyǹ may be used and concludes 1013*, 17, πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅθεν ἢ ἔστιν ἡ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται. Cf. also De Gen. Anim. v. 7, 788* 14, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὴν μὲν αἰτίαν εἶναι πολλῶν, ταύτης δ ̓ ἄλλο ἄνωθεν μηδέν. See also Cope's Rhetcric, Vol. 1. p. 126. Its use in the present passage is almost identical with that of the De Coelo, 11. 2, 284° 26, ἀρχὰς γὰρ ταύτας λέγω ὅθεν ἄρχονται πρῶτον αἱ κινήσεις τοῖς ἔχουσιν. And still more closely does it agree with Meta. K. 1, 1060* 1, ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ συναναιροῦν: that is the
soul is so much the condition of animal life, that its removal involves also the destruction of the animal.
4028 7. τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν] Notwithstanding that in Meta. Δ. 4, 1014, φύσις is said to be sometimes equivalent to ἡ τῶν φύσει ὄντων οὐσία, and that further πᾶσα οὐσία φύσις λέγεται, a distinction would seem here to be intended to be drawn between the two terms, and Trendelenburg is probably right in referring φύσις to the external, οὐσία to the internal aspect of the soul: or rather perhaps we may say puois refers to the genetic account, the explanation of the process by which the soul passes from merely vegetative functions to the intellectual stage, while ovoía refers to the essential characteristic (that viz. of a first entelechy) which constitutes it equally in all its stages. So in fact the word would seem to be taken by Simplicius who refers puois to the investigations of the physical philosopher, οὐσία to the enquiries of the metaphysician.
402 8. εἶθ ̓ ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν] By the συμβεβηκότα we must understand not so much the merely accidental attributes of soul but rather what the modern logician would call its properties-those qualities, i. e., which are not immediately connoted by soul but are derivatives and consequences of it. See Metaph. Δ. 30, 1025* 30, λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλως συμβεβηκὸς οἷον ὅσα ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ καθ ̓ αὑτὸ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα, οἷον τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν. Similarly in Anal. Post. I. 7, 75* 42 science is said to involve a ὑποκείμενον οὗ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ καθ ̓ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα δηλοῖ ἡ ἀπόδειξις. Cp. Cope's Rhetoric, 1. 2, § 1, p. 27.
402 9. ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη] Here, as Trendelenburg remarks, there is at first sight no real opposition: and we must understand the antithesis to mean that while some properties belong to the mind in and by itself others attach to the soul in connection with the body (ζῷον). By the ἴδια πάθη we must understand particularly thought: by the second class pleasure, pain, sense-perceptions, &c., as Themistius explains.
§ 2. 4028 12. λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι] The words would seem practically to mean-the specific and the general character: but perhaps the distinction is not meant to be so sharply drawn as Trendelenburg supposes. By the τί ἐστι Aristotle would seem to understand the general or generic conception of anything-the statement mainly of its genus—while οὐσία is probably used here particularly in the sense of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and refers to this general conception embodied in the unity of a single type. Thus we have τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ὁ λέγεται ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τοῦτο γένος, illeta. Δ. 28, 1024° 5: τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνειν καὶ πρῶτον ὑποτίθεται τῶν ἐν τῷ ὁρισμῷ λεγομένων, Top. VI. 5, 142° 28.
402* 15. τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων] By ἴδια κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς Aristotle would seem to mean relative properties: qualities which attach to something when viewed in reference to something else. V. Top. v. 1, 128° 10, ἀποδίδοται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἢ καθ ̓ αὑτὸ καὶ ἀεὶ, ἢ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ποτὲ, οἷον καθ ̓ αὑτὸ μὲν ἀνθρώπου τὸ ζῷον ἥμερον φύσει, πρὸς ἕτερον δὲ οἷον ψυχῆς πρὸς σῶμα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν προστατικὸν τὸ δ ̓ ὑπηρετικόν ἐστι. Supremacy that is to say is not a
property of soul in and by itself but it is so relatively to body, and thus an ἴδιον κατὰ συμβεβηκός. So again it is an ἴδιον of man relatively to horse to be a biped.
402 18. To жраyparevoval] Cope, Rhet. 1. 1, § 3, notes "The primary sense of doing business or occupying oneself about anything passes to the more limited or special significations of an intellectual pursuit and thence of a 'special study,' 'a systematic treatment of a particular subject of investigation or practice."" Trendelenburg compares Meta. B. 2, 997b 21, K. 1, 10596 10, K. 7, 1064* 3.
402* 19. πότερον ἀπόδειξίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις] The difference between the two methods is that between the logical methods of Aristotle and Plato. For Aristotle's conception of anódeigis the following passages are of importance: Post. Anal. 1. 13, 81° 40, μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει. ἔστι δ ̓ ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δ ̓ ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος. But while maywyn is thus an important source of knowledge, it is wanting in the necessity and explanation-giving character of dmódeigis. Thus Aristotle writes, Post. Αnal. II. 5, 91° 32, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἐπάγων ἴσως ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἀλλ ̓ ὅμως onλoi T. But this weakness of induction which discovers merely a matter of fact uniformity is removed by the cogency of proof which attaches to dróδειξις. For ἀπόδειξις is a συλλογισμὸς δεικτικὸς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί (Post. An. 1. 24, 850 23); it is τῶν ἀναγκαίων and ἐξ ἀναγκαίων, and it cannot possibly attach to individual sensible things as such-τῶν οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ ̓ ἕκαστα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις (Meta. Z. 15, 1039° 28). But while ἀπόδειξις thus tries to educe the laws of facts from the general conception which overlies them, it does not do so by any instantaneous leap-it invariably passes from the universal to the particular dià Toû μéσov: through the help of the less general conception which will form the link of transition and be the cause which explains the particular phenomenon- τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον τὸ μέσον, ἐν ἅπασι δὲ τοῦτο ζητεῖται (Post. Αnal. II. 2, 90* 7). Διαίρεσις is defective just in wanting this gradual descent from the universal to the individual. As conceived by Plato and illustrated in the Sophist it was the method by means of which we determined the specific character of an object and found out its ri
oT by bringing it under some general conception and then by successively dividing it, by a lengthy process of dichotomy, caught it (to keep up Plato's metaphor) in the member or members of the division which exactly fitted it. Hence Aristotle regards the Platonic division as involving throughout a petitio principii. So he expresses himself in Prior. Anal. 1. 31, 46a31, COTɩ γὰρ ἡ διαίρεσις οἷον ἀσθενὴς συλλογισμός· ὁ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ δεῖξαι αἰτεῖται, συλλογίζεται δ ̓ ἀεί τι τῶν ἄνωθεν......ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν, ὅταν δέῃ τι συλλογίσασθαι ὑπάρχειν, δεῖ τὸ μέσον, δι' οὗ γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός, καὶ ἧττον ἀεὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ καθόλου τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ἄκρων· ἡ δὲ διαίρεσις τοὐναντίον βούλεται ̇ τὸ γὰρ καθόλου λαμβάνει μέσον. And in another passage he directs particular attention to the fact that in such dichotomy the difficulty as to why the subject of our enquiry must fall under one rather than another member of the division turns up at each single stage of the process. Post. Anal. 11.
5, 91° 37, ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμπεράσμασι τοῖς ἄνευ τῶν μέσων ἐάν τις εἴπῃ ὅτι τούτων ὄντων ἀνάγκη τοδὶ εἶναι, ἐνδέχεται ἐρωτῆσαι διὰ τί, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαιρετικοῖς ὅροις. τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος; ζῴον θνητόν, ὑπόπουν, δίπουν, ἄπτερον. διὰ τί; παρ ̓ ἑκάστην πρόσθεσιν· ἐρεῖ γὰρ καὶ δείξει τῇ διαιρέσει, ὡς οἴεται, ὅτι πᾶν ἡ θνητὸν ἢ ἀθάνατον. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἅπας οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός. ὥστ ̓ εἰ καὶ ἀπεδείκνυτο τῇ διαιρέσει, ἀλλ ̓ ὅ γ ̓ ὁρισμὸς οὐ συλλογισμὸς γίνεται. Το a similar effect does Aristotle shew in Part. Anim. 1. 3, 642 21, that a dichotomy of negatives is impracticable: ἔτι στερήσει μὲν ἀναγκαῖον διαιρεῖν καὶ διαιροῦσιν οἱ διχοτομοῦντες. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ διαφορὰ στερήσεως ᾗ στέρησις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἴδη εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον τῆς ἀποδίας ἢ τοῦ ἀπτέρου ὥσπερ πτερώσεως καὶ ποδῶν.
402* 21. ἄλλαι γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἐπιπέδων] The ἀρχαὶ of number would be the existence of the unit, the presupposition of superficies would be extension. Aristotle distinguishes between common or universal principles and special or οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί, restricted to a particular science and not to be transferred from one science to another. Anal. Post. 1. 32, 88° 27, αἱ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ διτταὶ ἐξ ὧν τε καὶ περὶ ὅ· αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐξ ὧν κοιναί, αἱ δὲ περὶ ὁ ἰδίαι, οἷον ἀριθμός, μέγεθος. And valid reasoning, Aristotle insists, must be conducted with special reference to these specific principles: oi μὴ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἀρχῶν λόγοι κενοί, Gen. Αn. 748 8. Cp. especially Post. Anal. I. 7, 75* 38, οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἐξ ἄλλου γένους μεταβάντα δεῖξαι οἷον τὸ γεωμετρικὸν ἀριθμητικῇ. Then after enumerating the three elements of every demonstration : ist, the conclusion which is proved: 2nd, the axiomatic principles: and 3rd, the subject-matter, he continues—ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐνδέχεται τὰ αὐτὰ εἶναι· ὧν δὲ τὸ γένος ἕτερον ὥσπερ ἀριθμητικῆς καὶ γεωμετρίας, οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐφαρμόσαι ἐπὶ τὰ τοῖς μεγέθεσι συμβεβηκότα, εἰ μὴ τὰ μεγέθη ἀριθμοί εἰσι.
§ 3. 402 24 πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιόν] The commentators refer these general expressions to definite names, Plato being the thinker who regarded soul as an οὐσία, Xenocrates the philosopher who viewed it as a πόσον and the physicists those who identified it with a ποιόν in so far as they considered it a harmony or blending of elements.
§4. 4025 3. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες] The reference as Philoponus points out can hardly be to the Timaeus of Plato: probably the older φυσιόλογοι are intended.
§ 5. 4020 7. τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἡ ὕστερον] The opinion which is here expressed is, as a little attention will shew, not the view of Aristotle himself, but simply a continuation of the hypothetical alternative suggested in the previous clause to the effect that we can define mind only according to its different particular forms and must not attempt to frame any one general definition of it. The older texts obscured the connection by placing a colon after coù: a comma is all that is required. The passage is interesting as containing one of the first anticipations of the question which afterwards divided the schools on the question of nominalism and realism. The question is still more definitely stated by Themistius: ἆρ ̓ οἱ τῶν γενῶν
καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν ὁρισμοὶ νοημάτων εἰσὶν ὁρισμοὶ ἡ φύσεων ἐν τοῖς καθ ̓ ἕκαστον ὑφισταμένων. This no doubt is conceived principally in regard to definition, but it is substantially the same question as Porphyry afterwards raised.
§7. 4020 15. ἀντικείμενα] For the meaning of the term see Metaph. Δ. 10, 1018* 20, ἀντικείμενα λέγεται ἀντίφασις καὶ τἀναντία καὶ τὰ πρός τι καὶ στέρησις καὶ ἕξις καὶ ἐξ ὧν καὶ εἰς ἃ ἔσχατα. Here the term would seem to be practically restricted to τὰ πρός τε and to be almost equal to ‘objects' as the things which are set over against the function. And so as Bonitz observes (Index 64* 18) the word is used here in its local significance.
§ 8. 402 16. With the section cp. Introduction, p. xxx.
402° 25. πάσης γὰρ ἀποδείξεως] γὰρ would seem intended to explain κάλλιστα : This knowledge of a thing through its related phenomena and effects is only practically as good a method as may be for &c.
403* 2. διαλεκτικῶς εἴρηνται καὶ κενῶς] The meaning of διαλεκτική in Aristotle may be gathered from the following passage :-Meta. Γ. 2, 10045 17, οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ταὐτὸν μὲν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ· ἡ γὰρ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη μόνον σοφία ἐστί, καὶ οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ διαλέγονται περὶ ἁπάντων ...ἔστι δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ σοφία γνωριστική, ἡ δὲ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη οὖσα δ ̓ οὔ. So also in detu. K. 3, 1061° 8, dialectic and sophistic are said to be both concerned with the συμβεβηκότα or relative and incidental properties of things. Similarly in Top. I. 1, 1004 3o we read διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογιζόμενος; and the πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ is described as that which is open to question, and still unsettled. ἔστι γὰρ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ πρὸς ἦν ἐστιν ἀποκρίνασθαι ναὶ ἢ οὔ. Cp. Anal. Pr. 1. 1, 2.4 25. Cp. Top. 1. 10, 104“ 12, εἰσὶ δὴ προτάσεις διαλεκτικαὶ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ὅμοια, καὶ τἀναντία κατ ̓ ἀντίφασιν· τοῖς δοκοῦσιν ἐνδόξοις εἶναι προτεινόμενα, καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσὶ τὰς εὑρημένας. Dialectic then it will be seen is to Aristotle mere formal argument based on probabilities and plausibilities, reasoning which like sophistic only takes up an abstract one-sided view of things, and does not attempt to grasp them in their concrete fulness. Thus further διαλεκτική is not unlike λογικὴ in Aristotle's use of the expression : it is vague, empty, verbal argument which deals merely with words, and takes but little account of things, so that Kevs is the epithet combined at once with ‘dialectical” and “logical’ discussion. The opposite mode of treatment corresponds to what Aristotle describes as φυσικώς. Cp. Simplicius (fol. 3) διαλεκτικῶς καὶ κενῶς, ἀντὶ τοῦ λογικῶς καὶ οὐ φυσικῶς....τὴν γὰρ ἐπιπολαιοτέραν καὶ οὐ πραγματειώδη γνῶσιν λογικὴν καὶ διαλεκτικὴν εἴωθε προσαγορεύειν.
§ 9. 403* 7. όλως αἰσθάνεσθαι] Perception in all its forms, as including sight, hearing, &c.
403* 8. εἰ δ ̓ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία] larly in Bh. III., chapters 6-10.
The question is discussed particu
§ 10. 403% 11. εἰ δὲ μηθέν ἐστιν ἴδιον] Aristotle's argument is that if any mental function is peculiar to the mind, the mind can be separated and exist apart from the body: but that if no function is thus peculiar, mind cannot exist apart from body. It may be remarked on this that the denial of the antece