ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ Α. 51 Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, 4028 μᾶλλον δ ̓ ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ κατ ̓ ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι' ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλ- 5 λεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν· ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων. ἐπιζητοῦμεν δὲ θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνῶναι τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, εἶθ ̓ ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν· ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι' § 2 ἐκείνην καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν. πάντῃ δὲ πάντως ἐστὶ τῶν το χαλεπωτάτων λαβεῖν τινὰ πίστιν περὶ αὐτῆς. καὶ γὰρ ὄντος κοινοῦ τοῦ ζητήματος πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι, τάχ ̓ ἄν τῳ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν 3. Te om. E Tor. 9. δι' ἐκείνην] κοινά γ. πολλοῖς STUVW Tor. E ταῦτα om. Ε Tor. ] τὴν τῆς] τὴν περὶ τῆς E. Tor. 13. το] τοῦ SVWX Bekk. Trend. 12. ζητήματος καὶ ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY. BOOK FIRST. CHAPTER I. The acquisition of knowledge is, we conceive, always something high and honourable: but one form of knowledge is superior to another either in virtue of the self-contained simplicity of its truths or by the greater dignity and wondrousness of its contents: and on both these grounds the investigation of the soul might with justice claim a foremost place. And, besides, the knowledge of it is thought to have important bearings on truth generally and especially on nature: for soul is as it were the prime factor in animal existence. The object of our enquiry is to observe and to discover both the historical development and the essential nature of the soul, and further to find out the phenomena occurring in connection with it-phenomena of which some are thought to be affections peculiar to the soul itself, others, while owing their existence to the soul, are thought to belong to the animal nature taken as a whole. By far in every way the greatest difficulty connected with it is that of reaching some certainty about it. The object of investigation is, it is true, the same here as it is in many other subjects—it is, that is, the question of the essential notion and of the generic character. It might therefore be supposed that there is some one mon method applicable to all objects of which we wish to οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, 15 ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν εἴη τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι μία τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι· δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τίς ὁ τρόπος. ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ᾖ, πότερον ἀπόδειξίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις ἢ καί τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι πολλὰς 20 ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ πλάνας ἐκ τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν· ἄλλαι γὰρ § 3 ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἐπιπέδων. πρῶτον δ ̓ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστι, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ καί τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶν· ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν 15 δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις διαφέρει γὰρ οὔ τι § 4 σμικρόν. σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον 4020 ὁμοειδής ἅπασα ψυχὴ ἢ οὔ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδής, πότερον εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης ἐοίκασιν ἐπι§ 5 σκοπεῖν. εὐλαβητέον δ ̓ ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὁ λόγος 5 αὐτῆς ἐστί, καθάπερ ζώου, ἢ καθ ̓ ἕκαστον ἕτερος, οἷον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ, τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον· ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο κατηγοροῖτο. § 6 ἔτι δ ̓ εἰ μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀλλὰ μόρια, πότερον δεῖ ζη 15. ἀπόδειξιν Bekk. SUWΧ. 17. περὶ τὸ] περὶ τοῦ STUWX. 8. κατηγορεῖται Tor. 19. ὅταν τις om. TUWX E. 26. μᾶλλον] μόνον Ε. (Buss.). 4020 4. μόνον 6. ἑκάστην pr. E Tor. discover the essential nature, just as deductive argument traces out the properties dependent on the genus: and in this case we should have to seek the method in question. But if there be no one common method for finding out the generic character, our procedure becomes still more difficult, as it will then be necessary to settle with regard to each subject of investigation what is the method of enquiry which is appropriate to it. And even if it were clear whether some deductive argument or Platonic division or some other method were the right one to apply, yet even so the question from what points we should begin our enquiry is one which offers many difficulties and leaves much room for divergent views, because different conceptions have different fundamental principles, as we see in the difference between the elementary ideas of arithmetic and those of geometry. The first point however which demands our attention is to determine in which of the higher classes soul is included and what is its generic character-whether, in other words, it is an individual thing and real substance or a quality or quantity or any other of the categories as they have been distinguished. We must further ask whether it belongs to the class of potentialities or is rather a completed actualitytwo conceptions between which there is no small difference. Another question, we shall have to ask, is whether it is divisible or free from parts, and whether again all souls are homogeneous or not; and if not homogeneous, whether it is specifically or generically that they differ: for at present writers who investigate the soul seem to confine their observations to the soul of man alone. Special care must be taken to discover whether there is one definition comprehending all the different forms of soul just as the definition of animal applies to all particular animals, or whether the definition is different in respect of each individual species: just as if for example we were to allow a definition of horse, dog, man and God, but should assert that the universal 'animal' either signifies no actually existing thing or is posterior to the particular species, this also holding good of any other common term. Should it however be ascertained that there are not |