tion is what is taken to be the home of the manifestation of the active forces. Soul then is the original and fundamental ground of all our life, of our sensation and of our reasoning. It follows therefore that the soul must be regarded as a sort of form and idea, rather than as matter and as underlying subject. For the term real substance is, as we have before remarked, employed in three senses: it may denote either the specific form, or the material substratum, or thirdly the combination of the two: and of these different aspects of reality the matter or substratum is but the potential ground, whereas the form is the perfect realization. Since then it is the product of the two that is animate, it cannot be that the body is the full realization or expression of the soul; rather on the contrary it is the soul which is the full realization of some body. This fact fully supports the view of those who hold that the soul is not independent of some sort of body and yet not to be identified with a body of any sort whatever. The truth is that soul is not body but it is something which belongs to body. And hence further it exists in a body and in a body of such and such a nature, not left undetermined in the way that earlier thinkers introduced it into the body without determining besides what and what sort of body it was, although it does not even look as though any casual thing admitted any other casual thing. This same conclusion may be reached also on a priori grounds. The full realization of each object is naturally reached only within that which is potentially existent and within that material substratum which is appropriate to it. It is clear then from these considerations that soul is a kind of full realization or expression of the idea of that which has potentially the power to be of such a character. δι ΙΙΙ. Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, 30 ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. δυνάμεις δ ̓ εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν, αἰσθη§ 2 τικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. ὑπ άρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ 414 ὀρεκτικόν· ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντ ̓ ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἀφήν· ᾧ δ' αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ 5 § 3 γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αύτη. ἔτι δὲ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν· ἡ γὰρ ἁφὴ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησις· ξηροῖς γὰρ καὶ ὑγροῖς καὶ θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς τρέφεται τὰ ζῷα πάντα, τούτων δ' αἴσθησις ἀφή· τοῖς δ ̓ ἄλλοις αἰσθητοῖς κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐθὲν γὰρ εἰς τροφὴν συμβάλλεται ψόφος οὐδὲ χρῶμα οὐδὲ ὀσμή. ὁ δὲ χυμὸς ἕν τι τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστίν. πεῖνα δὲ καὶ δίψα ἐπιθυμία, καὶ ἡ μὲν πεῖνα ξηροῦ καὶ θερμοῦ, ἡ δὲ δίψα ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ· ὁ δὲ χυμὸς οἷον ἥδυσμά τι τούτων ἐστίν. διασαφητέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ὕστερον, νῦν δ ̓ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω, ὅτι τῶν ζῴων τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἁφὴν καὶ ὄρεξις υπάρ- 15 § 4 χει. περὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον, ὕστερον δ ̓ ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐνί οις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ 31. αἰσθ. ὀρεκ.] ορεκτικὸν αἰσθητικόν ELSTW Tor. αὕτη STUX. 9. τῶν δ ̓ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν vulg. 15. διωρίσθω SUVX. 4145 6. ὄρεξίς ἐστιν 13. τι om. SUVX. 10 CHAPTER III. Of the powers of soul which have been mentioned, some organisms, as has been said, possess all, others again a few, while a third class possesses one only. The powers in question are those of nutrition, of sensation, of desire, of local movement and of reasoning. Plants possess the function of nutrition only: other creatures have this and also the faculty of sensation; and if this latter, then they must also have the faculty of desire: for desire includes appetite and passion and wish. Animals however without exception possess one at least among the senses-viz. touch: and wherever a faculty of sense is present it is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure and pain, and an object which is pleasant or painful. But where these are present, there appetite is also: for appetite is the desire of what is pleasant. Besides, all animals have a sense for nourishment-viz. touch -for it is by means of things dry and moist, hot and cold, that all animals are fed and touch is the sense which directly perceives these. As for the objects of other senses, on the contrary, it is only incidentally that they are fed by them; for neither sound nor colour nor smell directly contribute to food. Flavour again is included under the class of things that are tangible. Now hunger and thirst, which attach to taste, are forms of appetite, hunger being concerned with what is hot and dry, thirst with what is cold and moist, while flavour is as it were their seasoning. These subjects we must afterwards discuss with more detail. Meanwhile it need only be asserted that those animals which possess the sense of touch have also the attribute of desire. Whether in addition they possess imagination is an obscure subject which must be investigated afterwards. Some animals possess, beside such faculties, the power of local movement also: others, as for instance men or other beings similar or superior to them, if there be any such, possess also understanding and reason. 20 § 5 εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ καὶ τιμιώτερον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἷς ἂν εἴη λόγος ψυχῆς τε καὶ σχήματος. οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ τὸ τρίγωνόν ἐστι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς, οὔτ ̓ ἐνταῦθα ψυχὴ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. γένοιτο δ ̓ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει μὲν πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ ̓ οὐδενὸς ἔσται σχήματος. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ψυχαῖς. διὸ γελοῖον ζητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ 25 ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐφ' ἑτέρων, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος λόγος, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἄτομον εἶδος, ἀφέντας τὸν § 6 τοιοῦτον. παραπλησίως δ ̓ ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν σχημάτων καὶ τὰ κατὰ ψυχήν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, 30 οἷον ἐν τετραγώνῳ μὲν τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικόν. ὥστε καθ ̓ ἕκαστον ζητητέον, τίς ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον τίς § 7 φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου. διὰ τίνα δ ̓ αἰτίαν τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι, σκεπτέον. ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ 415* αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦ δ ̓ αἰσθητικοῦ χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ ̓ ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἀφὴ δ ̓ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζῴων οὔτ ̓ ὄψιν οὔτ ̓ ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν ; οὔτ ̓ ὀσμῆς αἴσθησιν. καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὰ δ ̓ οὐκ ἔχει. τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ άρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ ̓ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν το 19. και om. ESTWW. κ.τ.λ. Tor. ὥστε καὶ καθ' 6. όσμης 41 2. θρεπτικόν, οἷον ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. Tor. ex ed. pr. ὅλως αἴσθ. STUWX, όλως om. Ey. 8. ἐλάχιστον SUVWX. It is clear then that there is one general definition of soul neither more nor less than there is one definition of figure. Just as in the latter case there is no figure other than the triangle and the figures which follow on it, so neither in the case of soul is there any form of it beyond those which we have enumerated. No doubt it is possible to have in reference to figures a common definition which will suit all figures and yet be peculiarly characteristic of no one figure in particular, and a like general definition is possible also with respect to the forms of soul which we have named. [But such common definitions are mere abstractions.] And hence it it absurd both in this case and in others to seek for a universal definition which shall be peculiar to no one form of existence nor framed with reference to the particular and individual species, if such common definition makes us neglect particular analysis. The different forms of soul in fact stand to one another in the same way as do the several species of figure: both in the case of figures and of animate beings, the earlier form always exists potentially in the later. Thus the triangle is contained within. the square and similarly in the faculty of sense the function of nutrition is implicitly contained. Thus we must push our inquiry into particulars and ask what is the soul of each form of existence; as for example what is that of a plant or of a man or of some brute beast. We must inquire also why they stand in such an order of succession. The sensitive nature, for instance, is not found without the nutritive: and yet the nutritive is found separated from the sensitive, as in the case of plants. Without the sense of touch, again, none of the other senses is present, while touch itself is found apart from the others: many animals possessing neither sight nor hearing nor the sense of smell. likewise animals possessed of the faculties of sense sometimes have, sometimes do not have, the faculty of local movement; while finally the smallest class possess also reflection and understanding. And all mortals that possess the faculty of reasoning possess also all the other powers, whereas those that possess each of those others do not in every case possess reflection; some in fact do not even possess imagination So |