RECENT WORKS RELATING TO THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE. BÄUMKER (C.): Des Aristoteles Lehre von den äussern und innern Sinnesvermögen. Pp. 91, Leipzig, 1877. BECK (H.): Aristoteles de Sensuum Actione. Pp. 55, Berol., 1860. BONITZ (H.): Aristotelische Studien. Wien, 1863-67. BRENTANO (F.): Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous TоTIKÓS. Pp. 250, Mainz, 1867. EBERHARD (E.): Die Aristotelische Definition der Seele und ihr Werth für die Gegenwart. Pp. 62, Berlin, 1868. FREUDENTHAL (J.): Ueber den Begriff des Wortes parraría bei Aristoteles. Pp. 59, Göttingen, 1863. GRATACAP (A.): Quae fuerit Aristotelis de Sensibus Doctrina. Pp. 110, Monspelii, 1866. GROTE (G.): Aristotle (especially Chapter XII.) 2 vols. London, 1872. HERTLING (G. F. v.): Materie und Form und die Definition der Seele bei Aristoteles. Pp. 178, Bonn, 1871. HEYDER (C. L.): Kritische Darstellung der Aristotelischen Dialektik. Pp. 352, Erlangen, 1845. KAMPE (F. F.): Die Erkenntnisstheorie des Aristoteles. Leipzig, 1870. Pp. 334, LEWES (G. H.): Aristotle: A Chapter from the History of Science. London. Pp. 404, 1864. MEYER (J. BONA): Aristoteles' Thierkunde. Pp. 520, Berlin, 1855. NEUHÄUSER (J.): Aristoteles' Lehre von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermögen und seinen Organen. Pp. 132, Leipzig, 1878. X RECENT WORKS ON ARISTOTLE. PHILIPPSON (L.): "Yλŋ ȧv0pwñívn. Pars I. De internarum humani corporis Partium Cognitione Aristotelis cum Platonis sententiis comparata: Pars II. Philosophorum veterum usque ad Theophrastum Doctrina de Sensu. Pp. 252, Berol., 1831. SCHLOTTMANN (K.): Das Vergängliche und Unvergängliche in der menschlichen Seele nach Aristoteles. Pp. 57, Halle, 1873. SCHNEIDER (L.): Unsterblichkeitslehre des Aristoteles. Pp. 141, Passau, 1867. SCHRADER (W.): Arist. de Voluntate Doctrina. Pp. 23, Brandenburg, 1847. SIEBECK (H.): Aristotelis et Herbarti Doctrinae Psychologicae quibus rebus inter se congruant. Pp. 23, Halis Sax., 1873. Geschichte der Psychologie. Theil 1. Die Psychologie vor Aristoteles. Pp. 284, Gotha, 1880. TEICHMÜLLER (G.): Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe. Pp. 667, Berlin, 1874. Die practische Vernunft bei Aristoteles. Pp. 453, Gotha, 1879. WADDINGTON-KASTUS (C.): De la Psychologie d'Aristote. Pp. 384, Paris, 1848. WEISSENFELS (O.): Quae partes ab Aristotele r@ v tribuantur. Pp. 30. Translations by C. COLLIER (Cambridge, 1855), M. W. VOIGT (Prag, 1794), C. H. WEISSE (Leipzig, 1829), J. H. v. KIRCHMANN (Berlin, 1871), BARTHÉLEMY SAINT-HILAIRE (Paris, 1847). CONTENTS. INTRODUCTION. I. The Psychological Treatises of Aristotle and their Relation I. The Problem and its Difficulties Pre-Aristotelian Accounts of Soul III. Movement as an attribute of Soul THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ATTEMPTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE TO SOLVE IT. ceptions as given by Sense III. Imagination as separating Sense from Thought VI. The Unifying Work of Thought Reason as related to its Sensuous Materials VIII. Ideas as embodied in Things IX. Erroneous explanations of Man's Active Powers Notes Appendix A. The Additional Version of MS. E Index to Text Index to Introduction PAGE THE INTELLECTUAL AND ACTIVE POWERS. I. The Adequacy of the Senses for knowing all Sensible Qualities. 128 II. The Consciousness of Sensation and the Discrimination of Per- XI. The Comparison of Mental Images in Will XII. How the Different Faculties are adapted to the Conditions of I. INTRODUCTION. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATISES OF ARISTOTLE AND PSYCHOLOGY is not the science which the name of Aristotle most immediately suggests. We think of him as the author of that exhaustive analysis of thought and reasoning which we know as Logic, as the encyclopædic worker who first mapped out with any definiteness the limits of first philosophy or metaphysic, or as the writer of that most suggestive text-book of the moralist-the Nicomachean Ethics. But, if psychology be not so directly associated with the name of Aristotle, there can be no doubt but his labours first gave a satisfactory basis for a science dealing with the problems which we now describe as psychological. He is, in short, the founder of Psychology just as surely as he is the founder of Logic: or, at any rate, it is to Aristotle that we owe the first clear conception of a science which should confine itself to the phenomena connected with what we may for the moment call the mind. There had, it is true, been scattered remarks upon psychology spread throughout the observations of the pre-Socratic thinkers: and Plato had not only discussed such questions generally in his writings, but had devoted great part of several dialogues-especially the Phædrus, Phado and Timæus, to this subject. |