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of pointing out the correspondence between the practical and the speculative side of human nature. What is in the speculative intellectual sphere truth and error, is in the moral and practical good and evil: what is in the one affirmation and negation is in the other pursuit and avoidance'. Pleasure and pain in fact form distinctively the field of Ethics: and the especial weakness in Socrates' intellectual apprehension of Ethics is just the fact that he left no room for the effect of the Táon in influencing conduct.
But while our feelings of pleasure and pain are thus the phenomena on which our moral and active life reposes, they do not enter into our life as mere feelings, as mere natural tendencies or unformed susceptibilities. The same constructive work, as intellectually translates a mere sensitive impression into a real object of cognition, displays itself also in building up the motives which ultimately constitute our wills, and the practical reason is shortly nothing but the intellectual reason applied to explain and create action. The sensuous images of pavraoia which suggest our action are really little else than mere sensations; it is only when the mind proceeds to view them as good or evil that it pursues or avoids them. Thus the sensitive or emotional capacities of our nature are but the material substratum, the Aŋ of our moral experience. To construct a moral world we must translate the sensitive into the rational, the phenomenal into the real, just as we require to do in order to build up an intelligible world; we must think the materials which sense supplies and discover in them the general forms or ideal truths which underlie them*. And though the practical reason never carries on its work without the help of images of sense, these images themselves are no
1 Eth. vi. 2, 113921, ἔστι δ ̓ ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δίωξις καὶ φυγή.
3 Mag. Mor. 1182822, συμβαίνει οὖν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμας ποιοῦντι τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀναιρεῖν τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ἀναιρεῖ καὶ πάθος καὶ ἦθος.
3 III. 7, 431*14, τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει· ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ φεύγει ή διώκει.
43152, τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ.
more the practical reason itself than the air which forms the medium and condition of eyesight constitutes the pupil'.
The motive or conative aspect of the soul thus includes two main factors which require to act in unison in order that action may result. And thus a dúvaμis like this conative power just shews the weakness of a system of mental faculties. One element which enters into it belongs to the sphere of the rational, another falls within the limits of the irrational. The real truth is that desire and reason must co-operate in order that a moral conclusion may be carried into effect: in the language of the Ethics, moral choice or πpoaípeois may be described as either νοῦς ὀρεκτικὸς reason stimulated by desire, or ὄρεξις διανοητικὴ desire guided by understanding.
This conception of the will, or (if the term be disapproved) the origin of moral decision is explained for us by what Aristotle tells us in the Psychology itself about the springs of action. The spring of action cannot, he there shews at length, be found either in mere animal processes of vegetation and nutrition which contain no conception of an end at which they aim, or in the faculties of sense which often exist without the concomitant of any tendency to spontaneous action, or even in the purely cognitive reason which is as such impotent to produce any effect upon the feelings or even to counteract their influence'. And here the Ethics itself comes in in turn to expand and interpret these remarks. The merely logical understanding, says the writer in the sixth book, never leads to action. But if reason as reasoning be thus powerless to influence and shape the will, as little can mere animal appetite produce this end. For appetite is merely affected by what is pleasant and painful—and
1 431*17, ὥσπερ ὁ ἀὴρ τὴν κόρην τοιανδὶ ἐποίησεν, αὐτὴ δ ̓ ἕτερον.
III. 9, 4325.
3 Eth. Nic. VI. 2.
4 De An. III. 9, +31°26, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κινῶν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν νοεῖ πρακτόν...ἀλλ ̓ οὐδ ̓ ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον, ἤδη κελεύει φεύγειν ἡ διώκειν, οἷον πολλάκις διανοεῖται φοβερόν τι ἢ ἡδύ, οὐ κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι.
5 Eth. Nis. VI. 2, 1139*35.
before pleasure and pain have come to be elements in moral action they must have been translated into good and evil'. But to be so translated, the promptings of appetite must have been determined by an object and end which thought alone can contribute. The faculty of desire does not and cannot operate without the presentation of a mental image to consciousness (ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας 433°28): it is only by being made an object of thought or by being presented by imagination before the mind that the object of desire comes to determine conduct (τὸ ὀρεκτὸν κινεῖ οὐ κινούμενον τῷ νοηθῆναι ἢ φαντασθῆval 433°12). And in the language of the exoteric psychology of the Ethics, it is only in so far as appetite is participant in reason (λoyov μÉTEXOV) that it provides a basis for the exercise of virtue.
What however neither reason alone nor desire alone can effect is produced by the two when acting in cooperation. But Aristotle as usual perplexes us by one of those provoking contradictions which seem at first at variance with the rest of his system. Not only, we are told, is it thought or reason acting with desire that can stimulate to action-imagination sometimes takes the place of thought. Yet the difficulty so caused is removed when we remember that Aristotle is speaking here of the forces which lead to action generally: he simply means that in the animal world as such the pictures of sense take the place of reason, and man, when he subsides into his purely animal nature, similarly follows the lead of his senses. But the difference is that the animal is restricted to these pictures of a purely sensuous experience and is unconscious of any higher ideal: man on the other hand cannot be merely
1 Eth. Nic. 111. 3, 1111817, ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ ̓ οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ ̓ ἡδέος.
2 III. 10, 433*9, φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα. Cp. De Motu Animal. poorr: ὁρῶμεν· δὲ τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ νῷ χώραν ἔχουσιν.
an animal, and even in following the lead of sense is conscious of a superior faculty-a faculty which necessarily thinks the sensuous image and brings it into connection with his past experience1. For deliberation, the weighing of different and divergent courses of conduct, is only possible on the assumption that we can measure the competing motives and form one conception out of several pictures of sensuous experience'.
The doctrine of the practical syllogism illustrates still further Aristotle's conception of the relation of reason to desire in determining conduct. Action, according to such logical analysis, resolves itself into a universal major and a particular minor, out of which some action or other follows as conclusion. In such a syllogism, the major is of course the general moral imperativethe conception of some end or other as the thing it is desirable to do; the minor, on the other hand, applies this general conception of what is good to some particular person or some individual object. According to one of the examples given in the Ethics, the major says everything sweet should be tasted, the minor this particular thing is sweet; and, if there be no antagonistic syllogism, the sweet thing in question must be tasted. But there is no disjunction between the elements which thus enter into our moral determinations. It is reason-practical reason-which has to do with the constitution both of the major and of the
1 Eth. Nic. VII. 3, 124783, διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῇ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει τῶν καθόλου ὑπόληψιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ ̓ ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην.
2 III. 11, 4349, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει, ὥστε δύναται ἐν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν.
3 De in. III. 11, 43+16, ἐπεὶ δ ̓ ἡ μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ καθ' ἕκαστα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ τοιόνδε πράττειν ἡ δὲ ὅτι τόδε τὸ νῦν τοιόνδε, κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε) ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ καθόλου, ἢ ἄμφω ἀλλ ̓ ἡ μὲν ἠρε μovσa μâ\\ov, d'o. Thus, it should be noticed, both the major and the minor premiss may have either an objective or a subjective reference. Cp. Eth. Nic. VII. 3, 6, 1147a, diapépei dè kai tò kadóλou. The practical syllogism is also explained VI. 12, 10, 1144231: VII. 3, 9, and De Motu Animal. 701832, woréov μoi, ǹ émiðvuía Nézer τοδὶ δὲ ποτὸν ἡ αἴσθησις εἶπεν ἡ ἡ φαντασία ἢ ὁ νοῦς. εὐθὺς πίνει. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν τὰ ζῷα όρμωσι, τῆς μὲν ἐσχάτης αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι ὀρέξεως οὔσης, ταύτης δὲ γινομένης ἢ δι ̓ αἰσθήσεως ἡ διὰ φαντασίας καὶ νοήσεως. The way in which here iuuia is made the source of a general imperative evidences the spurious character of the treatise.
minor premiss: it is an intuition of reason, acting as directly as the perceptive act, which interprets the particular instance, and which combines these instances into a universal law. Reason deals at once with the ultimates of universality and the ultimates of particularity; it is at once the beginning and the end of our moral reasoning'. And thus there comes to be a real unity. between reason and desire in determining conduct. The universal law of what is desirable and good is, in a sense, fixed and stationary, while the minor premiss-the particular application of this maxim-is subject to movement, and passes under the influence of desire from one universal to another: the particular proposition 'this thing is sweet' may attach itself either to the major—‘everything sweet should be tasted,' or its contrary'nothing sweet should be tasted.' But the actual moral act displays to us nothing of this difference. The stationary universal of reason and the particular direction of desire are merely different aspects of one and the same process-a process which Aristotle effectively compares to the action of a ball-and-socket joint (vμós). In such a joint one part seems to be reaching forward, while another remains immovable in its position: (is) attraction and impulsion (was) combine to produce the action which results. But just as in such a case the distinction between the two sides of the movement is one only of aspect, so that we can hardly say where the joint ceases to attract and begins to propel, so similarly in moral active reason and desire, the stationary and the impulsive factors unite in one common aim determined by an ideal of reason.
Reason thus appears as the ultimate basis of our moral, just as we saw it was also of our intellectual, life. For the true object of consciousness in this union of desire and reason is not two objects—one of desire, another of reason-it is one 1 Eth. Nic. VI. 11, 4, καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπ ̓ ἀμφότερα...διὰ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ
2 De An. III. 10, 433521, τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς, ὅπου ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ αὐτὸ οἷον ὁ γιγγλυμός· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ ̓ ἀρχὴ κ.τ.λ. Readers of Teichmüller's highly suggestive volume (Praktische Vernunft) will see how much I am indebted to him in this interpretation. See p. 210.