It had only been however in connection with other problems that the phenomena of mind had been discussed: and in Plato particularly the treatment of the question had been obscured by semi-mythical and mystical reflections which detracted from the value of his observations. It is different when we come to Aristotle. Not indeed that Aristotle views the subject in the abstract manner which would be expected from a modern inquirer. But, at the same time, as contrasted with the form of earlier theories, the psychological writings of Aristotle display a surprising power of isolating various phases of life and mind, without at the same time losing sight of their connection with allied phenomena. The same combination of analysis and synthesis which enabled him in dealing with moral facts to draw a line between Ethics and Politics' and yet recognise their essential unity, allowed him to study psychology in the abstract manner which the idea of a science renders necessary and at the same time give full weight to all those cognate circumstances which form as it were the setting of the conceptions of the special science.

These psychological writings comprehend a considerable number of distinct treatises. But there is one among them which may be regarded as the parent of the others. The Psychology proper (De Anima, as we generally call it), contains within the compass of some eighty or ninety pages the chief points in the psychological doctrine of Aristotle. It consists, as usually divided, of three books; of which the first is in the main a historical retrospect of pre-Aristotelian psychology, the second lays down the famous definition of the Soul and analyses at some length the faculties of sense-perception, while the third, if we regard the first and second chapters as belonging to the second rather than to the third book, is chiefly occupied

1 Eth. dic. vi. 8. 1. 1141523, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ πολιτικὴ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἕξις, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν αὐταῖς—i.e. the moral ideal for the individual and for the state is one and the same, but its manner of realization (rò eiva) is different. Cp. x. 9. 118115, where the whole science is named ʼn wepi rà ȧvēpúómiva piλoσοφία.

with the phenomena of thought and will. Comprehensive however as is Aristotle's main work on Psychology, it leaves almost untouched a number of subsidiary but important questions which require to be discussed in various supplementary treatises. These supplementary writings constitute the opuscules commonly grouped together as the Parva Naturalia. Prominent among them is the little work on Sense-Perception, a tract which deals particularly with the phenomena of sight, taste and smell, and expands the somewhat meagre analysis of these senses given in the Psychology itself. Following this comes the little work on Memory and Reminiscence, a very golden tract as Titze calls it, in which the laws of association are laid down with a clearness scarcely to be looked for outside modern philosophy. Next we meet with a trio of treatises connected with the phenomena of sleep and dreams, and which are severally entitled 'on Sleep and Waking,' 'on Dreams' and 'on Divination through Dreams.' The quasi-physiological character of the last-named treatises is continued in the works which follow and which deal with the phenomena of growth and life, of breath and death. The works in question are more accurately known as those on 'Longevity and Short Life,' on 'Life and Death,' and cognate subjects, and lastly that on 'Respiration".

1 These minor psychological writings may be here briefly tabulated as follows:

a. περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν.

b. περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως.

C.

περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως. d. περὶ ἐνυπνίων.

e.

περὶ τῆς καθ ̓ ὕπνον μαντικῆς.

f. περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος.

g. περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου.

h. περὶ ἀναπνοῆς.

Το these is sometimes added another tractate under the title περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως, as corresponding with the first two chapters of the περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. But it would seem that we cannot in this way precisely distinguish between the separate portions of the Parva Naturalia: rather Aristotle intended the subjects of youth and age, life and death, to be discussed together in the sections which precede the work on

The genuineness of the works just mentioned has been seldom or never questioned. It is difficult, indeed, to find in the Catalogue of Aristotle's writings transmitted to us by Diogenes Laertius, a counterpart either to the Psychology itself or to the minor psychological treatises, but this is a difficulty which meets us in connection with all the writings of the Stagyrite, and is not peculiar to his compositions on Psychology1. Nor, it need scarcely be added, are the psychological writings without the distinctive characteristics which are wont everywhere to disturb the Aristotelian student. We are met by the same abruptness, the same incompleteness on the one hand, redundancy on the other, as present themselves in the Metaphysics or the Ethics. Torstrik particularly has sought to make out the existence of a double version, a twofold recension in the Psychology: but this subject is too closely bound up with the general question of the composition of Aristotle's writings to be summarily settled in a general discussion such as this is meant to be. A still more sweeping charge was made by Weisse in questioning altogether the genuineness and authenticity of the third Book. But his view has never been accepted by Aristotelian scholars: and though few would refuse to acknowledge that the book in question is full of peculiar

respiration, which itself is regarded as a direct continuation of the foregoing discussion. Thus the treatise on life and death, after noting the influence of cold on animals and plants, ends by saying that this subject must be discussed at greater length; and we are thereupon introduced to the tract on respiration with the words: περὶ γὰρ ἀναπνοῆς ὀλίγοι μέν τινες τῶν πρότερον φυσικῶν εἰρήκασιν. So also Aristotle closes the Parta Naturalia at 48021 by saying: περὶ μὲν οὖν ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου καὶ τῶν συγγενῶν ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ πάντων.

1 To the Tepi yuxs possibly correspond in the Catalogue of Diogenes No. 13, περὶ ψυχῆς ἀ: 73, θέσεις περὶ ψυχῆς ά. Το the Parta Naturalia would seem to correspond 120, φυσικῶν κατὰ στοιχεῖον λή: while further in 117 μνημονικὸν ἁ we may perhaps recognise our Tepi μvnuns. With respect to the general discrepancy between the works of Aristotle as named by us and catalogued by Diogenes Laertius, it may be some slight solution to remember that Aristotle himself frequently alludes to his writings, or rather parts of them, under very different designations from those which we employ. So, for instance, various portions of the Physics are cited as év Toîs Teρì κινήσεως—ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀρχῶν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ χρόνον.

2 See the Appendix.

difficulties, there seem to be no good grounds for doubting its Aristotelian origin'.

There are however other psychological writings commonly included in the works of Aristotle whose authenticity is much more open to dispute. Such for example is the work on Physiognomics, a tractate specially connected with the relation between the internal feelings and their outward expression. To the same class of spurious or semi-spurious writings belong the treatises on Colours and on Sounds, and lastly the little work on Animal Movement'. This last-mentioned dissertation is of particular importance for Aristotelian psychology: and M. Barthélemy St Hilaire has not hesitated to include it in his translation of the Parva Naturalia. But though the work just mentioned throws no inconsiderable light upon Aristotle's theory of will and his general conception of the relation between motives and action, it is yet, almost without doubt, not even Aristotelian in the sense in which other works commonly ascribed to Aristotle are said to be so.

Thus far we have confined ourselves to Aristotle's actually extant works. But there is another work of which some fragments have been handed down which cannot be left altogether out of sight. This is the Dialogue Eudemus—a dialogue, which, as its second title indicates, was devoted to questions of psychology. Into the nature of these dialogues, and particularly their identification with the so-called exoteric writings, this is not perhaps the place to enter. But it seems difficult in the face

1 For Weisse's argument see his translation p. 278, and for an answer Schmidt in Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, Aug. 1831.

2 Þvoloyvwμiká: printed in Bekker's Berlin Aris. p. 805. Such a work is catalogued by Diogenes No. 109: but the existing compilation is almost unanimously judged spurious. See Rose, De A. Libr. Ordine, pp. 221-225.

3 περὶ χρωμάτων: περὶ ἀκουστῶν ἢ περὶ φωνῆς.

1 πeρi Šwwv KIVŃoews. See Rose (De Aris. Libr. Ord. 163). The work wepi wv Topelas (De Animalium Incessu) is on the other hand generally regarded as authentic. 3 Εὔδημος ἢ περὶ ψυχῆς.

6 See Bernays, Dialoge d. Aris. pp. 14-42, Heitz, Verlor. Schriften, pp. 199— 201, and cp. De Anima 1. 4, 407°30 and 111. 9, 432 26. The fragments are printed in the Appendix.

b

W. AR.

of almost continuous tradition to set aside the Aristotelian character of this and other dialogues ascribed to Aristotle. Rose (Aris. Pseudepigraphus, p. 58) has indeed maintained that no dialogue whatever, least of all 'the puerile argument of Eudemus,' is worthy of Aristotle either in his earlier or his later years, and has regarded the ascription of such writings to the Stagyrite himself as due simply to the capricious judgment of Aristotelian Librarians. But though the fragments of the Eudemus which have been preserved for us contain little but what is more or less fantastic or commonplace, it must be remembered that we have but little of the main argument of the Dialogue itself, and that it is the introduction and setting of the discussion which has been particularly handed down. A dialogue on immortality would naturally touch upon the supernatural and mythical: but it would probably also supply a real psychological foundation for the belief. And in one passage to which Bernays, as might be expected, attaches considerable importance, the dialogue (whoever was its author) follows the same line of argument as that of the main treatise on psychology, and seeks to shew that the explanation of the soul as 'harmony' cannot hold out on examination. But, as will be shewn in the note upon the passage, the similarity thus presented by no means necessitates a conclusion such as that which Bernays would extract.

There are, it need scarcely be said, a great many other works of Aristotle which the student of Aristotelian psychology will find it necessary to consult. The part always implies the whole; and no section of Aristotelian thought can be understood without reference to the whole of which it is a fragment. The Metaphysics must be repeatedly consulted in order to elucidate the formulæ through which Aristotle explains the relations which subsist between the body and the mind. The Organon, as a system of logical analysis, often helps by the account it gives of the origin of knowledge to explain the work of reason in the formation of an intelligible world. Logic and Psychology, in short, interpenetrate one another in Aristotle just as they have always done

1