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the évépyeta which is still a dúvaμis, the developed state which is the condition of perfect action.
There are other expressions by which Aristotle enables us to grasp still further his conception of the soul'. Soul for instance he asserts is the rí v eivaι of the body, the manifestation or expression of the being of the body. This strange-looking term is one possessed of much significance. It would seem to have arisen from the combination of the phrase Tí èor with the words τὸ εἶναι. The τί ἐστι of an object is the statement of its general leading nature. By rò eiva: on the other hand we must understand simply the definite existence, the particular manifestation of any object to which the term is applied. If then we combine the two formulæ together-the change from Tí ÈOTI to Ti would seem intended to remove the notion outside the limits of present time and so give the phrase a wider and more abstract character than it would otherwise possess-we arrive at that same notion of concrete reality, of individualized universality which we found before to be the sense of substance (ovoía). The substance or reality however with which we are now dealing is 'without matter' (ävev üλns)—it is, that is to say, fully determined and realized and therefore free from all those associations of something not yet fully formed which are inherent in Aristotle's theory of matter".
Soul is accordingly, as the Tí v elvaι of the body, the realization of its general character-the manifestation of its a priori meaning-the exposition of what body was and is. Thus further soul is the λóryos, the idea of body. It is so because
1 De An. II. 1, 412. Cp. Meta. Z. 10, 1035b14, émel dè ǹ tŵv júwv Yuxi (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι.
2 Meta. Z. 7, 1032b14, λέγω δ' οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. It is frequently identified with the use of eival with a dative, as denoting the essential character of some object. So Meta. Z. 4, 1029b14, discussing the conception λoyikŵs, says čσTɩ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἕκαστον ὃ λέγεται καθ ̓ αὑτό. οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σοὶ εἶναι τὸ μουσικῷ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν εἶ μουσικός. Cp. also Meta. H. 3, τὸ γὰρ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ εἴδει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπάρχει. ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταὐτόν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐ ταὐτόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄνθρωπος λεχθήσεται.
it expresses the true significance of the body and so contains its definition. It is in short, Aristotle implies, only through the soul that we can understand, explain or comprehend the body. And so far as modern physiological psychology asserts that mind is to be known only through a study of the material processes which are its concomitants, it reverses altogether the standpoint of Aristotle's psychology.
This relation of the body to the soul has been however strangely misunderstood by most commentators on the Aristotelian psychology. So deep rooted is the conviction that mind and body are two entirely different forces that few thinkers have been able to grasp the Aristotelian conception of their mutually complementary character. Even a writer who has devoted so much of a lifetime to the work of expounding Aristotle to his countrymen as M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire finds the secret of all the aberrations of Aristotle in his failure to distinguish between the body and the soul. "He has confounded them," he writes, "by ascribing to the one functions which belong exclusively to the other." But the truth is that Aristotle has neither confounded them nor misappropriated their functions. He has simply risen above the ordinary popular standpoint which views them as two mutually exclusive forms, and regarded them as moments in one great idea-as factors which require the support of one another-and in which nevertheless mind or soul is the real truth of the union. He does not for one moment deny, as we shall find when we consider his theory of reason, that there may be activities of thought independent of material organization. What he does maintain is that soul represents the true meaning of the body, so that body cannot be rightly said to exist apart from soul—and that it is through soul that the bodily processes attain their true significance.
Regarding soul in this way as the truth of body, Aristotle will not accept such phrases as harmony or adjustment (ovvBeais) as expressions of the relations which subsist between the body and the soul. In many ways indeed the conception of
harmony would seem to be not unlike the manner in which Aristotle conceives the soul in its connection with the physical organism. But the fourth chapter of the first book of the Psychology shews how far he is from accepting such an explanation of the soul. Not indeed that Aristotle rejects this conception of the mental functions with the same decisiveness as that with which he sets aside various other theories advanced upon the subject. He sees that the view which regards the living being as compounded of contraries (συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων) agrees in some respects with his own theory of the relations which subsist between the body and the mind: and with genuine dialectical subtlety, after he has enumerated the different arguments which seem to shew that the soul cannot be regarded as a harmony of different elements in proper ratio, he proceeds to state the difficulties which meet his own conclusion, from the fact that the destruction of the body ends in the destruction of the soul just as conversely the destruction of the soul coalesces. with the annihilation of the body'. Yet none the less Aristotle holds to his own conclusion, which maintains that soul and body are not simply a harmony or proportionate ratio of opposing elements, but rather an inner unity in which the bodily functions find their truth and real meaning in the soul. Body, in fact, exists for the sake of soul and while the mental functions are dependent for their exercise upon the body, it is equally true that body is devoid of meaning when apart from soul.
'We must then,' says Aristotle, 'no more ask whether the soul and the body are one, than ask whether the wax and the figure impressed upon it are one, or generally inquire whether the material and that of which it is the material, are one'.' The two, he means, are only complementary sides of one and the same
1 De An. 1. 4, 407b30, ἁρμονίαν γάρ τινα αὐτὴν (i.e. ψυχὴν) λέγουσι· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐναντίων εἶναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων· καίτοι γε η μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν μιχθέντων ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἷον τ' εἶναι τούτων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τοιαύτας ἀπορίας· εἰ δ ̓ ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς μίξεως, τί δή ποτε ἅμα τῷ σαρκὶ εἶναι ἀναιρεῖται;
2 Id. 11. 1, 4126.
state or object. Not that Aristotle anticipates the monistic standpoint of Spinoza and regards thought and extension, mind and body, as only different aspects of one and the same substance, viewed now under one attribute, now under another, or that he holds with George Henry Lewes that "a mental process is only another aspect of a physical process." Aristotle does not leave the mind in a position of simple equilibrium against the body. To him body only attains reality in soul: and the mental functions, while the outcome of the physical, are yet also in a way the presupposition on which they rest. Soul, in fact, is what gives meaning and reality to body just as it is vision which gives meaning and reality to the eye: or as it is axehood which, were we to conceive an axe as a natural body, would be the soul and truth of an axe. Just, in short, as the eye is only properly an eye when it sees, the axe only properly an axe when it is used as such, so the body is only rightly called body when it is realized in soul'.
Such an explanation of the relation between mind and body is not perhaps altogether flawless, but it goes a long way to a solution of a problem which has often met with very insufficient answers. It involves no such deus ex machina as is involved in the Occasionalism of Geulinx or the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz. It holds, it will be seen, that mind and body are not to be viewed as entities entirely separated from one another, but as correlatives which mutually imply each other as terms in fact which stand as right and left or as the outward and the inward. It maintains, to use the words of Prof. Erdmann's Leib und Seele-a book which is in many ways the best commentary to be had on Aristotle's general psychological position-that as body cannot be imagined without mind, so mind cannot be conceived without body-that the two in fact presuppose one another. Body and soul thus stand in the closest relation to one another. The soul is the immanent end or
1 De An. 412b12 and 413a1.
determination of the body, the body nothing but the expression or realization of the soul: the soul is the idealization of the bodily organs, while they are the actualization of the mental powers. Or if soul be viewed as the perfection and completion of that for which the body is adapted, body on the other hand is the explication or development of the nature of the soul.
Phrases like these, it should however be remembered, only apply to Aristotle's psychological conceptions so far as we can venture to render the Aristotelian terminology by modern equivalents. It may be said at once that no English word can fully represent what Aristotle meant by yuxn. The word was one which had gradually acquired a special connotation to which its usage, say in the Homeric poems, gives us but little clue. And when we ask what English term would best translate the word as used by Aristotle it is difficult to arrive at any precise decision. 'Mind' might well be said to occupy the same place in the psychology of our day which yux did in that of Aristotle's times: and it might be plausibly regarded as the true equivalent for Aristotle's word. But on the other hand it is to be remembered that the 'mind' means less than Aristotle's expression meant in Greece. We talk about the 'mind' of animals but scarcely of the 'mind' of plants: and yet it is to plants as well as to animals that the Aristotelian term has to be applied. Vital principle' (the phrase by which Collier sought to represent the term) means at once less and more than Aristotle's word: and it seems desirable to find a single term which shall be as concise as the original word itself. 'Psychic force' is therefore equally objectionable, not to take account of the further fact that it merely repeats in English characters the Greek original. 'Soul' on the other hand would seem to be free from some of these defects. It is no doubt coloured for us by religious and moral considerations which are foreign to the psychological inquiries of the Stagyrite: but in some respects it may claim to recall some part at least of Aristotle's meaning. The 'soul' of a plant and the 'soul' of a man are