1679.

hoped that he would soon acquire the entire ascend- CHAP. ant; and he constantly flattered them, that if they LXVII. persisted in their purpose, the King, from indolence, and necessity, and fondness for Monmouth, would at last be induced, even at the expence of his brother's right, to make them every concession.

BESIDES, the antipathy to popery, as well as jealousy of the King and Duke, had taken too fast possession of men's minds, to be removed by so feeble a remedy as this new council projected by Temple. The commons, soon after the establishment of that council, proceeded so far as to vote unanimously, "That the Duke of York's being a papist, " and the hopes of his coming to the crown, had "given the highest countenance to the present con❝spiracies and designs of the papists against the King " and the protestant religion." It was expected that a bill for excluding him the throne would soon be brought in. To prevent this bold measure, the King concerted some limitations, which he proposed to the parliament. He introduced his plan by the following gracious expressions: "And to shew you that, "while you are doing your parts, my thoughts "have not been misemployed, but that it is my constant care to do every thing that may preserve your religion, and secure it for the future in all " events, I have commanded my lord chancellor to " mention several particulars; which, I hope, will "be an evidence that, in all things which concern "the public security, I shall not follow your zeal, "but lead it."

THE limitations projected were of the utmost im- Limitaportance, and deprived the successor of the chief tions on branches of royalty. A method was there chalked a popish out, by which the nation, on every new reign, could successor. be ensured of having a parliament, which the King should not, for a certain time, have it in his power to dissolve. In case of a popish successor, the Prince

CHAP. was to forfeit the right of conferring any ecclesiastical LXVII. preferments: No member of the privy council, no

judge of the common law, or in chancery, was to 1679. be put in or displaced but by consent of parliament:

And the same precaution was extended to the military part of the government; to the lord lieutenants and deputy lieutenants of the counties, and to all officers of the navy. The chancellor, himself, added, "It is hard to invent another restraint; considering "how much the revenue will depend upon the "consent of parliament, and how impossible it is "to raise money without such consent. But yet, if any thing else can occur to the wisdom of parliament, which may farther secure religion and liberty "against a popish successor, without defeating the right of succession itself, His Majesty will readily "consent to it."

66

IT is remarkable that, when these limitations were first laid before the council, Shaftesbury and Temple were the only members who argued against them. The reasons which they employed were diametrically opposite. Shaftesbury's opinion was, that the restraints were insufficient; and that nothing but the total exclusion of the Duke could give a proper security to the kingdom. Temple, on the other hand, thought that the restraints were so rigorous as even to subvert the constitution; and that shackles, put upon a popish successor, would not afterwards be easily cast off by a protestant. It is certain that the Duke was extremely alarmed when he heard of this step taken by the King, and that he was better pleased even with the bill of exclusion itself, which he thought, by reason of its violence and injustice, could never possibly be carried into execution. There is also reason to believe that the King would not have gone so far, had he not expected, from the extreme fury of the commons, that his concessions would be rejected, and that the blame

of

of not forming a reasonable accommodation would CHAP. by that means lie entirely at their door.

LXVII.

1679.

IT soon appeared that Charles had entertained a just opinion of the dispositions of the house. So much were the commons actuated by the cabals of Shaftesbury and other malcontents; such violent antipathy prevailed against popery, that the King's concessions, though much more important than could reasonably have been expected, were not embraced. A bill was brought in for the total exclusion of the Bill of Duke from the crown of England and Ireland. It exclusion. was there declared that the sovereignty of these kingdoms, upon the King's death or resignation, should devolve to the person next in succession, after the Duke; that all acts of royalty which that Prince should afterwards perform, should not only be void, but be deemed treason; that if he so much as entered any of these dominions, he should be deemed guilty of the same offence; and that all who supported his title should be punished as rebels and traitors. This important bill, which implied banishment as well as exclusion, passed the lower house by a majority of seventy-nine.

THE Commons were not so wholly employed about the exclusion-bill as to overlook all other securities to liberty. The country party, during all the last parliament, had much exclaimed against the bribery and corruption of the members; and the same reproach had been renewed against the present parliament. An inquiry was made into a complaint which was so dangerous to the honour of that assembly, but very little foundation was found for it. Sir Stephen Fox, who was the pay-master, confessed to the house that nine members received pensions to the amount of three thousand four hundred pounds: And after a rigorous inquiry by a secret committee, eight more pensioners were discovered. A sum also, about twelve thousand pounds, had been occasionally given or lent

to

1679.

CHAP. to others. The writers of that age pretend that LXVII. Clifford and Danby had adopted opposite maxims with regard to pecuniary influence. The former endeavoured to gain the leaders and orators of the house, and deemed the others of no consequence. The latter thought it sufficient to gain a majority, however composed. It is likely that the means, rather than the intention, were wanting to both these ministers.

Habeas

corpus

bill.

PENSIONS and bribes, though it be difficult entirely to exclude them, are dangerous expedients for government; and cannot be too carefully guarded against, nor too vehemently decried, by every one who has a regard to the virtue and liberty of a nation. The influence, however, which the crown acquires from the disposal of places, honours, and preferments, is to be esteemed of a different nature. This engine of power may become too forcible, but it cannot altogether be abolished, without the total destruction of monarchy, and even of all regular authority. But the commons at this time were so jealous of the crown, that they brought in a bill, which was twice read, excluding from the lower house all who possessed any lucrative office.

THE standing army, and the King's guards, were by the commons voted to be illegal: A new pretension it must be confessed; but necessary for the full security of liberty and a limited constitution.

ARBITRARY imprisonment is a grievance, which, in some degree, has place almost in every government, except in that of Great Britain; and our absolute security from it we owe chiefly to the present parliament; a merit which makes some atonement for the faction and violence into which their prejudices had, in other particulars, betrayed them. The great charter had laid the foundation of this valuable part of liberty; the petition of right had renewed and extended it; but some provisions were still

wanting

1679.

wanting to render it complete, and prevent all CHAP. evasion or delay from ministers and judges. The LXVII. act of habeas corpus, which passed this session, served these purposes. By this act it was prohibited to send any one to a prison beyond sea. No judge, under severe penalties, must refuse to any prisoner a writ of habeas corpus, by which the gaoler was directed to produce in court the body of the prisoner, (whence the writ had its name) and to certify the cause of his detainer and imprisonment. If the gaol lie within twenty miles of the judge, the writ must be obeyed in three days; and so proportionably for greater distances: Every prisoner must be indicted the first term after his commitment, and brought to trial in the subsequent term. And no man, after being enlarged by order of court, can be recommitted for the same offence. This law seems necessary for the protection of liberty in a mixed monarchy; and as it has not place in any other form of government, this consideration alone may induce us to prefer our present constitution to all others. It must, however, be confessed, that there is some difficulty to reconcile with such extreme liberty the full security and the regular police of a state, especially the police of great cities. It may also be doubted whether the low state of the public revenue in this period, and of the military power, did not still render some discretionary authority in the crown, necessary to the support of government.

DURING these zealous efforts for the protection of liberty, no compliance for the crown was discovered by this parliament. The King's revenue lay under great debts and anticipations: Those branches granted in the year 1669 and 1670, were ready to expire: And the fleet was represented by the King as in great decay and disorder. But the commons, instead of being affected by these distresses of the crown, trusted chiefly to them for passing the exclusion-bill, and for punishing and displacing all the

ministers