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CHAP. the entering into such alliances as might attain that LXVI. great end: And in case war with the French King should be the result of his measures, they promised to grant him all the aids and supplies which would enable him to support the honour and interest of the nation. The King was also more explicit in his reply. He told them, that the only way to prevent danger, was to put him in a condition to make preparations for their seçurity. This message was understood to be a demand of money. The parliament accordingly empowered the King to borrow on the additional excise 200,000 pounds at seven per cent: A very small sum indeed; but which they deemed sufficient, with the ordinary revenue, to equip a good squadron, and thereby put the nation in security, till farther resolutions should be taken.

BUT this concession fell far short of the King's expectations. He therefore informed them, that, unless they granted him the sum of 600,000 pounds upon new funds, it would not be possible for him, without exposing the nation to manifest danger, to speak or act those things, which would answer the end of their several addresses. The house took this message into consideration: But before they came to any resolution, the King sent for them to Whitehall, where he told them, upon the word of a King, that they should not repent any trust which they would repose in him for the safety of his kingdom; that he would not for any consideration break credit with them, or employ their money to other uses than those for which they intended it; but that he would not hazard, either his own safety or theirs, by taking any vigorous measures, or forming new alliances, till he were in a better condition both to defend his subjects and offend his enemies. This speech brought affairs to a short issue. The King required them to trust him with a large sum: He pawned his royal word for their security: They must either run the risque of losing their money, or fail of those alliances which they had projected, and

at

29

at the same time declare to all the world the highest CHAP. distrust of their sovereign.

LXVI.

of the

BUT there were many reasons which determined 1677. the house of commons to put no trust in the King. Parlia They considered, that the pretence of danger was ment's obviously groundless, while the French were opposed distrust by such powerful alliances on the continent, while King. the King was master of a good fleet at sea, and while all his subjects were so heartily united in opposition to foreign enemies. That the only justifiable reason, therefore, of Charles's backwardness, was not the apprehension of danger from aboad, but a diffidence, which he might perhaps have entertained of his parliament; lest, after engaging him in foreign alliances for carrying on war, they should take advantage of his necessities, and extort from him concessions dangerous to his royal dignity. That this parliament, by their past conduct, had given no foundation for such suspicions, and were so far from pursuing any sinister ends, that they had granted supplies for the first Dutch war; for maintaining the triple league, though concluded without their advice; even for carrying on the second Dutch war, which was entered into contrary to their opinion, and contrary to the manifest interests of the nation, That, on the other hand, the King had, by former measures, excited very reasonable jealousies in his people, and did with a bad grace, require at present their trust and confidence. That he had not scrupled to demand supplies for maintaining the triple league, at the very moment he was concerting measures for breaking it, and had accordingly employed to that purpose the supplies which he had obtained by those delusive pretences. That his union with France, during the war against Holland, must have been founded on projects the most dangerous to his people; and as the same union was still secretly maintained, it might justly be feared that the same projects

1677.

CHAP. projects were not yet entirely abandoned. That he LXVI. could not seriously intend to prosecute vigorous measures against France; since he had so long remained entirely unconcerned during such obvious dangers; and, till prompted by his parliament, whose proper business it was, not to take the lead in those parts of administration, had suspended all his activity. That if he really meant to enter into a cordial union with his people, he would have taken the first step, and have endeavoured, by putting trust in them, to restore that confidence, which he himself, by his rash conduct, had first violated. That it was in vain to ask so small a sum as 6000,000 pounds, in order to secure him against the future attempts of the parliament; since that sum must soon be exhausted by a war with France, and he must again fall into that dependence, which was become, in some degree, essential to the constitution. That if he would form the necessary alliances, that sum or a greater, would instantly be voted; nor could there be any reason to dread, that the parliament would immediately desert measures, in which they were engaged by their honour, their inclination, and the public interest. That the real ground, therefore, of the King's refusal, was neither apprehension of danger from foreign enemies, nor jealousy of parliamentary encroachments; but a desire of obtaining the money which he intended, notwithstanding his royal word, to employ to other purposes. And that, by using such dishonourable means to so ignoble an end, he rendered himself still more unworthy the confidence of his people.

THE house of commons was now regularly divided into two parties, the court and the country. Some were enlisted in the court-party by offices, nay, a few by bribes secretly given them; a practice first begun by Clifford, a dangerous minister: But great numbers were attached merely by inclination; so

far

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far as they esteemed the measures of the court CHAP agreeable to the interests of the nation. Private views LXVI. and faction had likewise drawn several into the country-party: But there were also But there were also many of that party, who had no other object than the public good. These disinterested members on both sides fluctuated between the factions; and gave the superiority sometimes to the court, sometimes to the opposition. In the present emergence, a general distrust of the King prevailed; and the parliament resolved not to hazard their money, in expectation of alliances, which, they believed, were never intended to be formed. Instead of granting the supply, they voted an address, wherein they "besought His Majesty "to enter into a league, offensive and defensive, "with the States General of the United Provinces, "against the growth and power of the French King, "and for the preservation of the Spanish Nether"lands; and to make such other alliances with the "confederates as should appear fit and useful to "that end." They supported their advice with reasons; and promised speedy and effectual supplies, for preserving His Majesty's honour, and ensuring the safety of the public. The King pretended the highest anger at this address, which he represented as a dangerous encroachment upon his prerogative. He reproved the commons in severe terms; and ordered them immediately to be adjourned.

It is certain, that this was the critical moment 8th May. when the King both might with ease have preserved the balance of power in Europe, which it has since cost this island a great expence of blood and treasure to restore, and might by perseverance have at last regained, in some tolerable measure, after all past errors, the confidence of his people. This opportunity being neglected, the wound became incurable; and

Temple's Memoirs, vol, i. p. 458.

not

CHAP. notwithstanding his momentary appearances of vigour LXVI. against France and popery, and their momentary inclinations to rely on his faith; he was still believed 7677. to be at bottom engaged in the same interest, and they soon relapsed into distrust and jealousy. The secret memoirs of this reign, which have since been published, prove, beyond a doubt, that the King had, at this time, concerted measures with France, and had no intention to enter into a war in favour of the allies. He had entertained no view, therefore, even when he pawned his ROYAL WORD to his people, than to procure a grant of money; and he trusted, that while he eluded their expectations, he could not afterwards want pretences for palliating his conduct.

NEGOTIATIONS meanwhile were carried on between France and Holland, and an eventual treaty was concluded; that is, all their differences were adjusted, provided they could afterwards satisfy their allies on both sides. This work, though in appearance difficult, seemed to he extremely forwarded by farther bad successes on the part of the confederates, and by the great impatience of the Hollanders; when a new event happened, which promised a more prosperous issue to the quarrel with France, and revived the hopes of all the English who understood the interests. of their country.

Such as the letters, which passed betwixt Danby and Montague, the King's ambassador at Paris; Temple's Memoirs, and his Letters. In these last, we see that the King never made any proposals of terms but what were advantageous to France, and the Prince of Orange believed them to have always been concerted with the French ambassador. Vol. i. p. 439.

i:

In Sir John Dalrymple's Appendix, p. 103, it appears that the King had signed himself, without the participation of his ministers, a secret treaty with France, and had obtained a pension on the promise of his neutrality: A fact, which renders his royal word, solemnly given to his subjects, one of the most disho nourable and most scandalous acts that ever proceeded from a throne

THE