if no tree spread its shade there, and no vine ascend its trellice there, and no flower shed its odor there, and no sensitive nature enjoy life there.

Foreseeing that a part of his creatures would sin and suffer, under a free, moral system, did wisdom and benevolence demand that God should stay his hand from creative energy, and leave his universe and eternity a solitude? No one is foolish enough to say that he ought not to have created.

2. God might have prevented sin among angels and men, by refusing to endow any of his creatures with the attributes of moral agency. Rivers, mountains, lakes, trees, grass and flowers never sin, and God, by limiting his creation to mere matter, would have made sin an impossibility. But who would arrest creation at such a point? Again, beasts, birds and fishes never sin, and the universe might have been left to teem with such alone. But would it have been perfect? Would it have reached the highest good which God was able to plan, and which his creatures might be made capable of enjoying? Who would desire to see the holy law of God in its action over free minds, give place to the universal and eternal rigor of a low, fixed, irresponsible animal instinct-too low for either vice or virtue, praise or blame? Who would desire to surrender the noble exercise of reason, conscience, and the affections, for the low pleasure of animal gratification?

3. Ought God to have prevented sin, by placing his creatures out of the reach of external temptation? What place could have been designated more pure than the celestial abode assigned to angels, and in which Lucifer, son of the morning, sinned and fell? And where on earth was a spot brighter and purer than the garden of Eden, where our first parents held intercourse, personal, frequent and joyous, with their Creator, and from which they exiled themselves and their race by sin?

And in respect of the world as it now is, would it minister to the probability of less sin, were any essential change effected in God's providential legislation? Should constant miracles occur to sever men from outward temptation, a depraved heart would still find occasion for transgression.

Man sins by indulgence of appetite and passion. Would it, hence, be proper to remove from his reach every blessing which he ought moderately to enjoy? Man idolizes the world. Would he be any more likely to love his Creator, if the world were made more dark and dreary?

In prosperity, man worships the creature; in adversity, he complains of his Maker, and starts doubts as to the divine goodness; and in both is like those addressed by the children sitting in the market and crying unto their fellows, "We have piped unto you and ye have not danced, we have mourned unto you and ye have not lamented."

If we see angels sinning in heaven, and man sinning in all outward circumstances on earth, how can we infer that any outward circumstances will secure holiness against the influence of the heart? While the suspension of the general laws of God's providence to interfere by miracles to remove man's outward temptations, would annihilate all human experience, forecast, responsibility and enterprise, it cannot be shown that such changes would lessen the sin of a human being. They might change the form but not the reality of transgression. In other words, it cannot be shown that God could providentially do more than he actually does, to prevent the sins of man, without effecting evils greater than those he cured. He could prevent sin providentially by annihilating the being of every sinner, by transforming men to trees, beasts, and insects; but that he could leave man to ex

ist on earth with all the powers of a moral agency, and in the appropriate circumstances of his being, and yet secure his holiness by any providential legislation, is yet to be shown. We have no doubt that God does, by his providence, all that he can wisely and justly do, to prevent sin, so that he is, in no proper sense, the author of the moral evils of earth.

But once more, the objector asks, Why does not God exert such an irresistible internal influence on the heart of his creatures, as to prevent the possibility of sin?

This question has been already, in part, answered. When it was determined to make man in God's image, intelligent, free, self-controlled by reason, conscious, and responsible to praise or blame for his acts, the very nature of such a being forbids that he should be controlled by direct influence on his heart. Were such a being, to be so governed by direct, almighty power, that it would be a natural impossibility for him to sin, then all the virtue of self-government, all ground of moral approbation, would be taken away. A being so governed by direct outward influence, would be an instrument, passive and imbecile, without virtue or vice.

But God made man in his own image; and this implies that, like God, he is made to act without physical constraint, by his own volition, under the teaching of truth, and the influence of motives.

No one will deny that such a nature, rational, free, responsible, immortal, is a noble endowment, worthy of the Being who formed us. We take it for granted, that with all the perils of a free agency, no one is sorry that he is a man and not a brute. We take it for granted that all will admit that in creating immortals for his own glory, God had a right to demand, that with a free will, they should freely cherish holiness instead of sin. And once more, we take it as self-evident, that

when God had originated a moral system, which assumed the voluntary obedience of his creatures to clear truth, plain duty, and high obligation, he could not be expected so to interfere with this system, by direct power, as to lessen the motives to obedience, or annihilate the very existence of personal virtue in his creatures. If we may so express it, God seems to cherish a profound reverence for the laws of that moral government which he has established. He proclaims his laws with clearness and solemnity. If he dispense with the infliction of a penalty, it is because an adequate substitute has been provided in the cross. If he interfere directly to change the heart, it is by a special agent, and by truth. If he forgive the sinner, it is the penitent sinner that comes in the name of Christ and by humble prayer.

All this shows that there is a difficulty in the direct interference by Almighty power to prevent sin. He can only wisely, justly, and benevolently prevent sin, by the moral means which he has adopted, in the hands of the Spirit, and by the coöperation of his providence.

But, says the objector, in spite of all God does, in his wisdom, goodness and power, some sin on, and are lost. This is true, and it is a sad and awful truth, that under the best plan of government which God could devise for his universe, some will sin and perish forever. But it does not follow from this, that God is either unjust or unkind. We are bound to believe that the present system has the fewest evils, and the largest benefits; that though some sin and will perish, yet that, on the whole, the present system is the best that could be devised. No one can prove that God could have devised a system of moral government which would have excluded sin, and yet produce as much happiness as will result from the present system in spite of sin. Under the best eco

nomy possible, some will sin and perish; but as they sin freely, and without compulsion, and are punished no more than they deserve, their guilt and misery cannot be urged as evidence that God is not perfectly holy and benevolent. As no one sins but by choice, and no one suffers but by real ill desert, as the general results of a free moral system of government, the most glorious in the universe, the existence of evil is to be regarded but as the friction in a machinery of infinite love.

And as God makes the wrath of man to praise him; as the sins of the world have illustrated the goodness and justice of God in the cross of Christ, and furnished occasion for the development of the Almighty to his universe, we may cease to wonder why moral evil has been allowed to exist under the government of a benevolent and holy being.

ARTICLE III.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S PLAN FOR INCREASING THE MINISTRY.*

Our Lord's parting command to his followers required them to preach the Gospel to every creature. Through his mediation the divine provision of redemption was complete; and all that was further necessary,

*We requested the Rev. Thornton A. Mills, D. D., the General Secretary of the Assembly's Committee on Education for the Ministry, to prepare an Article on that subject for our pages. Meanwhile, we made some remarks in the Review, No. XXIX, p. 117, which the Secretary did not suppose to be entirely just to him and the Committee. Not being able to modify those remarks, we have supposed it to be the best plan to throw open our pages to the Secretary, to state the whole matter as he deems best, he taking the sole responsibility of the Article.

EDITORS.