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him, so as artfully to conceal his deception, or that he had almost un→ willingly admitted these urgent reminiscences. Still, it may be supposed that the Apostle himself, while he was treating kindred subjects, might use similar expressions, when, on the whole, his diction had a coloring different from what was earlier peculiar to him. Besides, instances of agreement of the same kind are found in other epistles of Paul, without invalidating the genuineness of any of them. That these passages cannot be understood without reference to similar expressions in other epistles, is decidedly incorrect.

But how do we explain the often observed difference between the diction of these epistles and that of the other Pauline epistles? The opposers of the genuineness hold, that the author was an impostor of the post-Apostolic age, who had indeed imbibed not a little of the Pauline mode of conception and expression, but who could not conceal his own peculiar manner. Baur has pointed out some postApostolic phrases, which are used in attacking the heretics. But these prove nothing, since the position that the heresy here attacked originated after the apostolic age, has no sure support. The influence of these attacks on heresy, is not to be confined merely to the proper polemic passages, for not only did the Jews and heathen, but also the heretical Christians furnish material for the expression of Christian ideas; this "polemic" gave occasion to ideas and phrases which could not otherwise have been formed in this peculiar manner, out of the simple Christian consciousness. This holds not merely of the later church teachers, but of the apostles. As instances, we refer to John's idea of the Logos, and Paul's of dixalooúry. Let it be granted, that at the time of the apostles, there was a heresy akin to Gnosticism, which our epistles presuppose, still there is nothing unapostolic in the fact that the mode of describing the heresy, revealed an effect of that heresy, as is the case in the words φανεροῦν, ἐπιφάνεια, φῶς ἀπρόσιτον, etc.


man of

Besides these, there are expressions which, it is urged, belong to the church language of the second and third centuries, e. g. God," "husband of one wife," evoéßsia, Baoilɛis (the last to be explained from a custom introduced by Hadrian.) But it may be replied, that the later writers may have borrowed them from the apostolic -especially as some are found in the writings of the so-called apostolic fathers.

These epistles differ from the other Pauline epistles, not only in single expressions, but in the mode in which the thoughts are developed, though there are points of agreement. Is this peculiarity un


Result of the Inquiry.


worthy of Paul? The answer will vary according to the subjective feelings. Schleiermacher finds no fault with the second Epistle to Timothy and the Epistle to Titus. De Wette denies to the second epistle all good grammatical and logical connection, as well as a true tact for what is befitting, while he thinks that Schleiermacher exaggerates what is objectionable in the first epistle, and did not penetrate sufficiently into the spirit of the author, and saw want of sense and connection where a fundamental interpreter must have judged otherwise. Baur even thinks that the first epistle is not wanting in unity and the carrying through of a definite idea. De Wette objects to the transition of the thoughts; "but prejudice was so strong in him," "that where all is in the most perfect order, he would find some things unworthy of the Apostle."

If these epistles bear a stamp different from that of the Galatians, Romans and Corinthians, it is to be considered that Paul would not resort to a dialectic development in pastoral letters,― private epistles to his assistants. Where this peculiarity does not prevail, the course of thought is not so different as some have maintained. Even the peculiarity in respect to general truths, urged by De Wette, is seen in the other Pauline epistles; comp. Rom. 13: 10. 14: 9, 17. 1 Cor. 4:20. 6: 7. 7: 19. The reason urged against the genuineness from the prevailing view of practical morality will not hold. The same view is by no means less prominent in the other Pauline epistles. A perfect agreement exists in all, in the fact that faith is the deepest ground of a moral life, and faith also in the atoning death of Christ. The morality taught in 1 Tim. 2: 15. 3: 13. 4: 8. 6: 18, 19, is not in opposition to Paul's doctrine of grace. It is, also, urged that the contents of the epistles are not so rich and weighty as those of the other Pauline epistles; the thoughts are too general, are feeble, etc. But it is to be considered, that Timothy and Titus needed only general precepts; such discussions as those in the Galatians were not demanded.

As the result of a careful examination, we find: 1. That the external evidence furnishes no ground to doubt the genuineness of the epistles; 2. That the difficulty of bringing the authorship of the epistles within the period of Paul's life, disappears on the theory of his second imprisonment in Rome; there is no adequate reason for not admitting this imprisonment; 3. That the internal peculiarities of the epistles, in regard to the subjects handled, the development of thought and mode of expression, show indeed some things of an unusual character, but still not of a kind to have any decided weight against the

genuineness; and 4. That it would be far more difficult to show, both in general and in particulars, how an impostor could have prepared three such epistles as these are, both in contents and in form, and foisted in the name of the Apostle Paul, than it is to prove their genuineness. No evidences for their post-apostolic origin exist; they accordingly hold their place in the Canon as Pauline epistles.



By Tayler Lewis, LL. D., Prof. of Greek, Union College, Schenectady, N. Y. [Concluded from p. 217.]

THE rapid sketch we proposed to make of this work was brought down, in the previous number, to the Second Division of the Second Part, or the Understanding in its Objective Law. The survey then taken of the first portion will give the reader a fair view of the writer's method. It may, therefore, be sufficient here to state in the most cursory manner, that the general plan is carried out, in all the mental departments, with the same rigid intellectual symmetry. The investigation of the understanding in its idea is concluded by two chapters of the highest interest-"The à priori Principles in a Nature of Things," and an "Exposition of False Systems of a Universal Nature." We have then, as in the sense, The Understanding in its Objective Law, followed by an ontological demonstration of the valid being of the notional and its objects.

The same method again meets us in the study of the Reason. We have, first, the idea, secondly, the law, and thirdly, the ontological demonstration of the absolute verity of those objects of which reason takes direct and exclusive cognizance, or, in other words, of the supernatural. The sense envisages, or distinguishes quality and conjoins quantity in space into phenomena; the understanding substantiates, by connecting phenomena into a nature of things; the reason gives meaning to, and comprehends, the whole operation of both, and the objects of both.

To comprehend nature, we must obtain for nature an origin and an


Elements of Comprehension.


end, and thus some existence, not only before nature, and above nature, but reaching beyond it. In the sense we had the pure intuition, in the understanding, the pure notional, and here we must attain the pure idea, or the ideal. This must rise above space and time, and because it would comprehend the natural must be supernatural (ch. II.). Again, in the sense we found our first à priori position in the primitive intuition of space and time remaining indestructible for the intellect after the abstraction of all that has come into consciousness through sensation; in the understanding we took our second à priori position on the notion of the space-filling force, remaining indestructible for the intellect after a like abstraction of everything involved in the conceptions of substance and causality that had come to us through experience; and here, in the reason, we obtain our third and highest à priori position in an idea which resolves into its own simplicity the duality of the space-filling force, and gives origin to the substance of This is the idea of The Absolute.


Next for the elements of comprehension. Here the trine method again presents itself. In the sense operation of conjunction, the three à priori elements were unity, plurality, and totality. In the operation of connection in the understanding they were found to be, 1st, substance in space or source and event in time, 2nd, cause and effect, and, 3rd, reciprocity in action and reäction. In like manner the elements of this higher operation of comprehension are found to be, pure spontaneity, pure autonomy, and pure liberty. Pure spontaneity is simple act standing above all conditions of force, and thus not under a necessity as nature; although essential to personality it is not of itself sufficient for it. Pure autonomy is end above nature, a law to its own action found in the behest of its own intrinsic worthiness. In the syntheses of these three is found something distinct from both, making the third element, or pure liberty. In these we have a completed personality determined à priori to the Absolute (Sec. II.); and in this pure personality of the Absolute we have the à priori comprehension of nature. This pure personality, we may remark, altogether transcends the first cause of the naturalist, and this comprehension of nature is a distinct thing altogether transcending all natural science. It is a comprehension of nature, not only in its beginning, but in its continuance and its consummation. It is the highest rationality that the Absolute Reason be himself the end of all ends. This is, too, the opposite of pantheism. It is pure holiness, or perfect separation from nature, not only as originating power, but also in the finalities, whether moral or artistic, for which it acts. It is,

in other words, in the language of the Bible, the catechisms, and the old theology, the glory of God.

To sum up then briefly the substance of several sections - Sense conjoins into phenomena, but cannot tell whence they came, nor whither they go,-in other words what they are. The understanding connects phenomena in their substances and causes, but cannot tell what they mean. Something within us affirms that they have a meaning, and that this meaning and the elements of its comprehension, may be thus found in the ideal of an Absolute Personality and finite personalities, and the relations existing between them,- in other words, in God, the soul, and immortality.

Thus we have the reason in its idea. We have, or may have, this ideal comprehension of nature and the universe. It is a glorious idea. Without it existence is an enigma, nature thick darkness, and man a dream. To some minds there would be, in this thought alone, proof abundant of its objective realization. But in the consummation of his admirably sustained scheme, the author next proceeds to an examination of the facts which go to verify this idea in its objective law. These are traced, 1st, in respect to a finite, and, 2nd, The Absolute Personality. Under both of these, without noticing the divisions and subdivisions in which they are arranged, we have aesthetic facts, mathematical facts, philosophical facts, psychological facts, and higher than all, ethical facts. There are, moreover, the ready assent to the fact of final causes in nature as a reaching forth to something beyond nature, although it may not carry us out of nature, - the easy recognition, in all ages of miraculous interpositions, the order of nature's formation by a combining of natural development with the addition, from time to time, of new forces from the supernatural, as evinced in geological facts, the recognition of a free personality in humanity the comprehending facts of an ethical system. In these we have the reason in its law.1

To the whole is appended an ontological demonstration of the solid being of the supernatural as deduced from the harmony of such a law of facts with such an idea. It is briefly presented under three heads, the valid existence of God, the valid being of the soul, and the validity of the soul's immortality. For the valid being of the soul, there are two sources of argumentation. 1. The fact of a comprehending agency. 2. The facts as given in an ethical experience. For the

1 In this, which is one of the most interesting sections of the work, the author has anticipated some of the most striking arguments of a late remarkable volume entitled "The Footprints of the Creator."

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