Brown v. Sullivan. to say that the injury sustained by appellants in their property rights would be the same, but only greater in degree, as that sustained by the community in general. We have a class of cases which hold that when an obstruction does not exclude the abutter from ingress and egress, but only imposes upon him in common with other travelers that inconvenience which results from a more circuitous way, his injury is in common, for which there can be no recovery; as, for instance, if the obstruction in this case had been placed east of an intersecting cross street, then it could not be said that appellants were excluded from approaching or leaving their premises in any direction originally afforded by the street. That there may be others affected in a similar manner to appellants does not affect the question. Martin v. Marks, 154 Ind. 549, 560. In such cases an action for damages is maintainable by a person, or any number of persons, who are able to show that they have sustained special and peculiar damage different in kind from that sustained by the public in general. We think the complaint states a cause of action. Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the complaint. BROWN ET AL. v. SULLIVAN ET AL. [No. 19,343. Filed March 19, 1902.] APPEAL AND ERROR.-Vacation Appeal.-Parties.-Dismissal.-In order to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction of an appeal taken in vacation, all coparties to the judgment, with appellants, should be made co-appellants, or the appeal will be dismissed. From Madison Superior Court; H. C. Ryan, Judge. From a judgment in favor of Martha J. Sullivan and others establishing a drain the remonstrators, Levi P. Brown and others, appeal. Appeal dismissed. T. Bagot, A. Ellison and C. K. Bagot, for appellants. Brown v. Sullivan. W. A. Kittinger, E. D. Reardon and W. S. Diven, for appellees. MONKS, J.-This was a drainage proceeding commenced in the Madison Circuit Court by Martha J. Sullivan and others. After the report of the drainage commissioners was filed, an agreement was made between all the parties, which was approved and ratified by the court and adopted as its finding, and the report of the drainage commissioners set aside, and the matter referred to new commissioners for report. Afterwards, a report was filed by said commissioners, and notice to the new parties made by said report was ordered and given. A part of the new parties brought in by the said last report filed remonstrances. The venue of said cause was then changed to the court below. The cause was tried by the court, and judgment rendered establishing said proposed work, and approving the assessments, damages, and benefits stated in the report of the drainage commissioners as the same were modified by the court. From this judgment appellants, being only a part of the coparties thereto, appeal. Appellees move to dismiss the appeal for the reason that all the parties to the judgment appealed from, who are necessary parties appellant, have not been made appellants in this court. It is settled law in this State that, to give this court jurisdiction of this appeal, the same being a vacation and not a term appeal, appellants should have made all their coparties to the judgment appealed from co-appellants with them in this court, and served notice of the appeal upon such coparties, as required by §647 Burns 1901, §635 Horner 1901; Smith v. Fairfield, 157 Ind. 491, and cases cited; Owen v. Dresback, 154 Ind. 392, 394, and cases cited; McKee v. Root, 153 Ind. 314, and cases cited; Midland R. Co. v. St. Clair, 144 Ind. 363, 367, and cases cited. Elizabeth Sommerville, Job Dean, and the DePauw VOL. 158-15 158 226 163 382 Carnahan v. Campbell. Plate Glass Company were among those who filed remonstrances after the last report of the drainage commissioners. At the trial of said cause the court found in favor of the petitioners, and against the said Sommerville, Dean, and DePauw Plate Glass Company, as well as against Levi P. Brown and some other remonstrants, on their remonstrances, and rendered judgment accordingly. Under the well-settled rule, said Sommerville, Dean, DePauw Plate Glass Company, and all other coparties to the judgment with appellants, should have been made co-appellants in this court. This not having been done, this court has no jurisdiction to determine this appeal upon its merits. Smith v. Fairfield, 157 Ind. 491, and cases cited; DenkeWalter v. Loeper, 142 Ind. 657; North v. Davisson, 157 Ind. 610. Appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal is therefore sustained. Appeal dismissed. CARNAHAN ET AL. v. CAMPBELL, RECEIVER. [No. 19,281. Filed March 20, 1902.] CORPORATIONS.-Action on Stock Subscriptions.—Abatement.—A plea in SAME.-Subscription in Accordance with Separate Contract.-Action to Col- Carnahan v. Campbell. CORPORATIONS.-Stock Subscriptions.-Collateral Agreement.-Where a corporation purchased realty from a stockholder under an agreement between the latter and the other stockholders that they were not to be personally liable, such stockholder cannot assert, on the company's default, liability against the other stockholders, though the purchase-money notes contained an unqualified promise to pay. pp. 230–238. SAME.-Stock Subscriptions.-Collateral Agreement. -Bills and Notes.Where a corporation purchases realty from a stockholder under an agreement between such stockholder and the other stockholders that they are not to be personally liable, and the only indebtedness is for the purchase price, in an action by a receiver to recover against delinquent stockholders, it is immaterial that the purchase-money notes held by an assignee are not made payable at any bank. p. 236. From Madison Superior Court; H. C. Ryan, Judge. Action by Bartlett H. Campbell, receiver of the Union Land and Improvement Company, against James R. Carnahan and others, to recover on unpaid stock subscriptions. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed. R. W. McBride, C. S. Denny, J. W. Lovett and F. E. Holloway, for appellants. E. B. Goodykoonts, G. M. Ballard, B. H. Campbell and T. J. Study, for appellee. GILLETT, J.-The appellee commenced this suit as the receiver of an insolvent domestic corporation. The purpose of the action was to recover upon unpaid stock subscriptions. Certain of the appellants filed their respective pleas in abatement, alleging, in substance, that all of the defendants except one lived in counties of this State other than Madison, and that the corporation had its home office in another county. The court below sustained demurrers addressed to each of these pleas. This was proper. Herron v. Vance, 17 Ind. 595; Gainey v. Gilson, 149 Ind. 58. Subsequently the appellants addressed a demurrer to the complaint, but their demurrer was overruled, and they reserved an exception. Error is assigned upon this ruling. The complaint alleges the character of said corporation, Carnahan v. Campbell. and plaintiff's appointment as receiver thereof, by the order of said court; that in said order he was directed to collect and pay said corporation's debts; that he duly qualified as such receiver, and entered upon the discharge of his duties; that he has obtained leave of court to bring this action; that he has applied all of the corporate assets, except the portion of the obligations therein sued on remaining unpaid, in the extinguishment of the debts of said corporation, but that there still remains a large amount of its indebtedness unpaid, to wit, $10,000; that each defendant is a stockholder in said corporation to the extent of ten shares, which he subscribed for; that the contract of subscription executed by the defendants is as follows: "April 25, 1893. We, the undersigned, hereby subscribe for the number of shares of capital stock of the Union Land and Improvement Company set opposite our names, each of said shares calling for the sum of $100. We further agree to pay for the shares of stock as assessments are made and payments called for by the board of directors of said company, in accordance with a contract made and signed April 10, 1893, between Jesse C. Heller and the incorporators of said company"; that each defendant paid $105 upon his subscription, and no more; that there remains unpaid upon said subscriptions the sum of $8,950, which the defendants have failed and refused to pay, and that it will take all of said unpaid subscriptions and more to pay the debts of said corporation. The objection urged to this complaint is that the written contract of April 10, 1893, referred to in the stock subscription contract, is not set out in the body of the complaint or made an exhibit thereto. As we construe the complaint, the action is founded on this latter instrument. If the language of said contract of April 25, 1893, did not further limit the promise of appellants to pay their respective subscriptions than to make them payable in the proportions and at the times fixed by the board of directors, we should be of the opinion that it would not be necessary to set out |