Mellott v. Messmore. the overruling of their motion for a new trial as of right, and in answer to the brief of appellee on the motion to dismiss they contend that, as the legal title to the real estate rested in appellants immediately prior to the rendition of the decree, said Parsons was in no wise interested in that portion of the decree, and should not, therefore, in view of the status of the case, be brought before this court. It is required in vacation appeals that all parties against whom judgments are rendered shall be made appellants, and that proper steps shall be taken to bring them into court. Acts 1899, p. 5, §647 Burns 1901, §635 Horner 1901. The leading purpose of the statute in these requirements was to bring all the parties against whom the judgment is rendered before the court, so that they may assign error or waive their right of appeal; that the court, through the medium of one appeal, may make a final disposition of the rights of all such parties, so far as an appeal can settle their rights. As said by this court in Abshire v. Williamson, 149 Ind. 248, 252: "It is a fundamental rule in jurisprudence that before any court will proceed to adjudicate upon the subjectmatter, it must first acquire jurisdiction over all the parties whose rights or interests will be necessarily affected by its judgment. Not having the power, under the facts, to decide this cause as an entirety, unless all of the necessary parties are brought into court as required by law, therefore we will not violate the well settled rule which forbids the decision of a cause in fragments, by asserting authority to make a partial decision in this case, which must be regarded as an entire and indivisible cause, but may, and properly should, dismiss the appeal on our own motion." Late authorities upon this subject, with citations of the earlier authorities, are Michigan, etc., Ins. Co. v. Frankel, 151 Ind. 534; McKee v. Root, 153 Ind. 314. The fact that the assignments of error on which appellants seek a reversal are those in which Parsons is not interested is immaterial, because, as stated above, the leading Brems v. Sherman. purpose of the statute was to prevent the prosecution of separate appeals. It is conceived, however, that in most cases a coparty ought, in fairness, to be advised of the fact of an appeal, if the status of the judgment of the court below is to be in any wise disturbed. The motion of the appellee to dismiss the appeal must be sustained. Appeal dismissed. BREMS v. SHERMAN. [No. 19,813. Filed April 8, 1902.] BILLS AND NOTES.-Non est Factum.-Judgment Notwithstanding General Verdict.-A finding in an action on a note that defendant did not sign the note is not in irreconcilable conflict with a general verdict for plaintiff, where it was shown that defendant could not write, and there was evidence that defendant authorized another to sign it for him. From Starke Circuit Court; G. W. Beeman, Judge. Action by Adam G. W. Sherman against Herman Brems on a promissory note. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901. Affirmed. H. R. Robbins, for appellant. A. I. Gould and C. H. Peters, for appellee. HADLEY, J.-Appellee sued appellant upon a promissory note. Answer, non est factum. The jury returned a general verdict for the plaintiff, assessing his damages for the full amount of the note, principal and interest. They also returned their answer to an interrogatory as follows: "Ques. Did Herman Brems sign said note? Ans.-No." Appellant moved for judgment in his favor on this answer notwithstanding the general verdict. The motion was overruled, which ruling presents the chief question in the appeal. The controversy is not whether Brems had signed the note with his own hand, but whether he had authorized Brems v. Sherman. another to sign it for him. The plaintiff, on his part, submitted testimony tending to prove that the defendant, who was unable to write, requested another to write his name for him, which the other did. While on the other hand, the defendant submitted testimony tending to prove that he could not write, and did not write his name to the note, nor authorize any one else to write it for him. Under this state of the evidence, is the answer to the special interrogatory in irreconcilable conflict with the general verdict? If it is, the general verdict cannot stand. If it is not, the special answer will not affect the integrity of the general verdict. City of South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 54 L. R. A. 396; Consolidated Stone Co. v. Summit, 152 Ind. 297. The special finding is that Brems did not sign the note. To sign is "to subscribe in one's own hand writing." Webst. Int. Dict., 1339; 2 Bouviers L. Dict., p. 1001; 22 Am. & Eng. Ency, of Law, 781. To say that A "signed” a note, and that he "executed" a note, as usually understood, may mean very different things. The former conveys the meaning that the act of signing was performed personally by the maker, while the latter imports that the maker either signed it himself, or authorized another to sign it for him. The terms are by no means equivalent. Hence the finding that appellant did not sign the note is far short of a finding that he did not execute the note. Appellant's motion for judg ment in his favor was rightly overruled. It is conceded that there was evidence pro and con on the controverted question of authority. The sum of this evidence satisfied the jury that the instrument sued on was the note of appellant, and we cannot disturb the verdict. Judgment affirmed. 158 302 f164 377 Thompson v. Recht. THOMPSON v. RECHT ET AL. [No. 19,817. Filed April 8, 1902.] PLEADING.-Based on Written Instrument.-How Instrument Made Part of Pleading.-In order to make a written instrument on which a pleading is founded a part of the pleading, under $365 Burns 1901, it is not necessary that the instrument or a copy be actually attached to the pleading. From Lake Superior Court; H. B. Tuthill, Judge. Action by Tonnes M. Thompson against Solomon Recht and others on attachment bonds. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from the Appellate Court, under §1337u Burns 1901. Reversed. Peter Crumpacker, for appellant. MONKS, J.-This action was commenced by appellant against appellees before a justice of the peace on two bonds executed by the appellees in a proceeding in attachment brought by appellee Recht against appellant. Judgment was taken on said bonds before the justice of the peace, from which judgment appellees appealed to the court below, where the jury returned a verdict for appellees; and, over a motion for a new trial, the court rendered judgment against appellant. This appeal from said judgment was perfected before the taking effect of §§1337f, 1337h Burns 1901 (Acts 1901, §§6, 8, p. 566). During the progress of the trial, the attachment bonds sued upon were offered in evidence, and excluded by the court on the ground that they were not a part of the complaint, because not attached thereto; that a contract sued upon can not be made a part of a complaint by being filed with it, but such contract must be attached thereto before it becomes a part thereof. While it may be the better practice, in order to prevent the loss of exhibits, actually to Thompson v. Recht. fasten them to the pleading of which they are a part, we do not think the failure to do so renders the pleading insufficient on demurrer, or makes them any the less a part of the pleading with which they are filed. The words of the statute do not require the written instrument upon which a pleading is founded, or a copy thereof, to be attached to such pleading; the word used is "filed." "When any pleading is founded on a written instrument or on account, the original, or a copy thereof, must be filed with the pleading." §365 Burns 1901, §362 R. S. 1881, and Horner 1901. In Wilson v. Vance, 55 Ind. 584, the court after quoting said section, said on p. 588: "Thus, whenever a pleading is founded on a written instrument, the copy filed with the pleading, though not copied in the pleading, becomes a part of the pleading, because it becomes a part of the record." In Reed v. Broadbelt, 68 Ind. 91, 92, this court said: "When, as in this case, reference is made to the copy of the note sued on as 'filed herewith,' or in equivalent words, and a copy of a note similar to the one described in the complaint is actually filed with the complaint, the copy of the note thus filed is sufficiently identified, and in that respect the complaint is sufficient. Mercer v. Herbert, 41 Ind. 459; Friddle v. Crane, 68 Ind. 583, 584, and cases cited." See, also, Stafford v. Davidson, 47 Ind. 319, 320, 321, and cases cited; Brown v. State, ex rel., 44 Ind. 222; Hiatt v. Goblt, 18 Ind. 494; Whitworth v. Malcomb, 82 Ind. 454; Northwestern, etc., Co. v. Hazelett, 105 Ind. 212, 213, 214, 55 Am. Rep. 192; McCormick, etc., Co. v. Glidden, 94 Ind. 447, and cases cited; Carper v. Kitt, 71 Ind. 24, 26; Dunkle v. Nichols, 101 Ind. 473; Sidener v. Davis, 69 Ind. 336; 1 Works' Prac. (2nd ed.), §419. The transcript of the proceedings before the justice of the peace, which was filed in the court below, and is a part of the record on this appeal, shows that a copy of each of said bonds was filed with the complaint before the justice of the |