the falsehood and folly of it, we would not affirm. We are bound in charity to suppose that, in many cases, their conduct is to be ascribed not so much to dishonesty of purpose, as to a defect in the reasoning faculty, which renders them objects rather of compassion than of stern censure. The process by which believers in the Christian revelation do arrive at their convictions may be stated in this way:

In the first place, they believe Jesus of Nazareth to be a teacher of superhuman authority, because he did such mighty works as exceed the power of man. Secondly, finding neither in his own life and precepts, nor in the pretensions of other teachers, any thing to limit their reliance on that authority, they hesitate not to confide in it as absolutely conclusive and divine.

Thirdly, on the strength of his divine commission they receive all his sayings, and believe him to be the Christ the son of the living God.

Fourthly, perceiving the truths revealed by him to be capable of a highly moral and beneficial application, they feel strongly confirmed in the justness of their conclusion.

Lastly, being thus assured of his plenary authority, they rest on it, not only as proving his own peculiar doctrines, but as furnishing an additional and independent sanction to all the moral principles involved in his teaching. So that morality, which before may have appealed only to reason, now appeals to revelation also.

Now where, it may confidently be asked, is the illogical assumption in this proceeding? We have assumed, as an ultimate truth, what we suppose no one will deny, that man only obeys a natural impulse when he suffers himself to be powerfully influenced by great authority. We have also assumed, that the inquirer is in a tolerable state of moral sanity; that he has in him the elements of morality; for, otherwise, the second step in the above process, if taken at all, would be taken in pure ignorance and blindness. Without such assumption, how could we maintain that man is qualified for any inquiry relating to morals or religion? And what sceptic is there so besotted as to maintain, that, before we can become impartial judges in such questions, we must get rid of all our moral preferences and antipathies? No: the argument, as we have put it above, does not circulate. It does not merely bring us back to the point where we began. It sets off on the firm ground of instinctive moral perception; but it pursues a path which rises at every step, till it leads us round to a position infinitely more elevated and coinmanding than that from which we started; a position which enables us to survey, more clearly than before, all the grand truths of natural religion, while at the same time it opens a prospect of still greater magnificence, even the kingdom of the Redeemer, with "the glory thereof."-Pp. 42—44.

Should it be alleged that, by allowing an examination of the doctrine to precede our full submission to the force of the miracle, we reduce a miracle to something very inconclusive, since there are disputants who reject the doctrines even of the Trinity and the Atonement, the reply is, that we are not bound to dispose of this class of difficulties. All that can be expected of the advocates of miracles is, to suggest a criterion which will satisfy the generality of sound understandings.

He is not obliged to concede that a doctrine is inadmissible, merely because certain strange and incredulous mortals refuse their assent to it. A position is not to be rejected as incredible, unless the common sense and feeling of mankind revolt against it. Thus, if a person claiming the authority of a prophet, were to assure us, that murder and fraud are allowable and even meritorious, we might justly dispute his pretensions, though supported by the most overpowering apparent display of signs and wonders. But it certainly does not follow that we

should be justified in rejecting him and his miracles, if he were to tell us of the incarnation of the Son of God; although many persons may be found, who profess themselves incapable of embracing any such incomprehensible and mysterious article of faith.-P. 50.

It would be well if individuals of a sceptical turn of mind would examine into the grounds of their scepticism. In many instances, it is to be feared, that, as in old times, there existed persons who loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil; so, likewise, at this day, the resistance to divine truth arises but too often from selfish interests, strong prejudices, and unruly passions.

It has been suggested by Cudworth, that even geometrical theorems, if connected with offensive moral truths, might, possibly, become the subject of eternal doubt and controversy:* and, if so, we ought not to be surprised at the existence of understandings upon which the evidence of miracles might be absolutely thrown away. They whose intellects are thus perversely fortified, must be left to higher influence. The only miracle that could succeed with them must be wrought upon their own mind.-Pp. 53, 54.

Of possible objections arising from extreme cases, there is no end: and to those who imagine or invent miracles, the purpose of which is to establish monstrous and atrocious principles, it is sufficient to reply that we cannot, unless dreadfully depraved, acquiesce in such principles; the moral constitution of our nature forbids it. “As little,” the objector may perhaps rejoin, "can I admit the doctrine of eternal punishments." Be it so to his own Maker he must stand or fall.

But, nevertheless, we should by no means be compelled to admit this sweeping conclusion, that, by pausing to weigh the doctrine, we render the evidence of miracles altogether nugatory. It may still be safely held, as a general rule, that superhuman acts indicate to human beings an authority, not only superhuman, but divine; and that, accordingly, they demand our entire submission. And the force of this general rule cannot be destroyed by the failure of its application, in certain extreme or imaginary cases, connected, perhaps, with some peculiar habit of thought, or some anomalous structure of mind.-P. 57.

The difficulties really incident to our inquiries on this subject are only such as may be expected by responsible beings in a state of moral probation.

To confirm and illustrate his argument on the admissibility of a doctrine as an element in our estimate of the force and value of miraculous testimony, Mr. Le Bas introduces some very judicious and important remarks from Mr. Penrose; and subjoins the following passage from Tucker, which we cite here, partly because it is of an original cast, and partly because it may easily be remembered.

*If the Pythagorean proposition, for instance, (Eucl. i. 47,) were to impose on mathematicians the Pythagorean maxim of a strict vegetable diet, what carnivorous student of geometry would ever get to the end of the first book of Euclid? Or if we could conceive the doctrine of Fluxions had, some how or other, been combined with an obligation to abstain from the use of wine, does any one believe that it would have gained its present undisputed establishment throughout the scientific world? Should we not, at this very day, have many a thirsty analist protesting that he was under an absolute inability to comprehend, or to credit, the system?

"If (says he) a man of honest, judicious character, but a little straitened in present cash, should receive a strong impression in a dream, that his deceased friend had bid him look under a particular bush, where he should find a purse of money; though he had no faith in dreams, it is very likely he might have the curiosity to poke about a little under the bush. If the direction had been, to lay five guineas there, which, on his returning the day after, he should find grown to an hundred, he would hardly care to run the risk: yet, upon the advice being repeated four or five successive nights, with pressing entreaties and expostulations, he might be tempted to try the experiment. But, if he were commanded to break open a neighbour's house for the money, with an assurance of the deed being lawful and safe, I imagine he would require a better warrant than even twenty dreams, before he would proceed to execution. In like manner, if other persons had told him of having had such dreams, and found them accomplished in all points, upon following their directions, he would want different degrees of evidence to convince him of their being true.

66

Therefore, where the facts reported are frivolous, unbecoming, or repugnant to our ideas of justice and mercy, they carry a higher degree of improbability on that very account: for though we have not so perfect a knowledge of what is agreeable to wisdom and goodness, as to render every thing appearing foolishness and evil, incredible, yet we must and ought to give their due weight to the judgments of our understanding, that salutary guide given us from God, for our general direction."-Pp. 64—66.

And to this it may be added, (observes Mr. Le Bas,) that the same considerations by which we pronounce on the credibility of a miracle, may fairly be resorted to for the purpose of judging whether it came from God, should we feel ourselves unable to question its actual performance.

Such are the dictates of sound reason; and a reference to the Scriptures will prove that such likewise is their testimony. This is shewn here, from Mr. Penrose, by the admonition of Moses to the Israelites, against a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, who should, by the aid of signs and wonders, attempt to lead the people into idolatry; it being the purpose of the Almighty thus to prove his people :-by the reply of our Lord, when charged with doing mighty works through the assistance of Beelzebub; and by the solemn anathema of St. Paul against even an angel from heaven who should preach any other gospel than that preached by the Apostles: all these passages tending to establish the same conclusion to which sound reason would conduct us.

But suppose that we are in dispute with a person

Who did not believe, or who did not concede, the existence and moral character of God. How should we deal with such an adversary, in our endeavour to work his conviction by an appeal to Revelation?

We should begin, I apprehend, by producing the Book itself; but considering the Volume as sealed up. We should say nothing to him of its contents, except merely in general terms, that it related to the moral government of the world. We should then tell him, that the volume had been received under circumstances which leave no doubt of its superhuman origin; that we have ample proof of its being the work of no mortal power or understanding.

Suppose, then, by the usual course of external and historical evidence, this point established to the satisfaction of the gainsayer; he will, of course, concede that much more attention is due to such a record than to any collection of merely human compositions; that is, he will not hesitate in ascribing to it more than human authority.

We should next ask him, "Can you, yourself, be satisfied to stop here? Are you not secretly and powerfully impelled to go further? You profess yourself

convinced, that we are indebted for this communication to some unknown power, or agent, or principle, superior to humanity. Can you, then, endure to limit your reliance on that Power, unless you see some cogent and irresistible reason for so doing?" We do not mean, in this argument, to insist on any instinctive persuasion that there certainly exists a Sovereign of the Universe; but we ask, is there not within us a sort of oracle, which declares, at least, thus much :-that "if there's a Power above us... he must delight in virtue," and in benevolence, and in truth? And if so, can we, without positive violence to our nature, cherish the apprehension, that a communication, confessedly superhuman, may either be frivolous and nugatory, or else a mere instrument of impenetrable delusion?

If our antagonist should reply, that he is conscious of no impulse which urges him to this extent of confidence; that he cannot deny the Book in question to be derived from some superior power unknown to him; but that he is without light enough to stir a step beyond this point, let the subject or the contents of the Book be what they may;-if such should be his reply, it would seem that the discussion must instantly break off. We could have no means of forcing our opponent beyond his present position; and there he must be left, until more potent influences could be brought to bear upon him.

But what, (on the other hand,) if he should answer thus:-" The tendency of my mind certainly is, fully to confide in the Volume which you have produced, and which you have shown to originate in no human intellect. But before my faith in it is complete, I must be satisfied that the Volume itself contains nothing to impair this confidence. It is not absolutely impossible, though it may be very highly improbable, that this Book may have come from an evil and deceitful, though superhuman, power. Before my acquiescence in it, therefore, is free from all reserve, I must be permitted to examine its contents, and to decide for myself accordingly." If his reply should be of this nature, I apprehend we should allow it to be perfectly reasonable. We should then unfold to him the Sacred Volume, and if he should discover there nothing but what is suitable to the wants and principles of human nature-if he should find in it distinct assertions of the existence of a Supreme Moral Governor, with attributes fitted to win his veneration and attachment-might he not fairly rest, with final and plenary confidence, on these assertions and representations as true and faithful, and worthy of all men to be received? And if so, might it not be truly said, that he had been brought to a belief in Revelation without being first compelled to grant, categorically, the existence and attributes of the Deity?

They who contend that this chain breaks at the link, which connects with our belief in the superhuman power, a strong presumption of the divine authorityare, in reality, contending, that all human reasonings on this subject must be utterly vain and inconclusive. If the above process be vicious and circulating, so must all others resorted to for the confutation of Atheism. For let the Works of God be substituted in the argument, for the Word of God, and precisely the same objection may be started. If we are without a natural and ultimate reliance on the hypothetical maxim, that if God exists he must be righteous and benevolent, the Religion of Nature seems to be quite as much in jeopardy as that of Revelation. Our reasonings respecting either must be impeded almost at their very outset. The objector may declare that he sees in the wonders of Creation only the result of some unknown agency more than human; but beyond that, no argument can ever compel him to advance, if he professes himself wholly destitute of the moral sentiment or principle of faith! If his mind does not sink under the hypothesis of a Supreme Power, capable of abandoning His creatures to uncontrolled deception and falsehood, he will be able to resist all evidence, either of nature or of revelation. Nothing will ever extort from him an acknowledgment, that, "by the things that are made, may be clearly seen and understood the eternal power and Godhead of the Invisible Creator."-Pp. 74-80.

Discussions of this nature, as it is observed, (p. 87,) are not to be considered as superfluous; it can never be unimportant to place this

subject in a right point of view: and although in our own country few persons are disposed to question the authority, where the miraculous fact is established, there are portions of the world, not unvisited by the Christian Missionary, where, with regard to these matters, the habits of thinking are very different from ours. The allusion is to the Mahometans of the East; and the authority to which Mr. Le Bas refers, is Professor Lee's very striking publication, entitled "Controversial Tracts on Christianity and Mahommedanism, between the late Henry Martyn, and certain Persian Doctors of Islamism." The leading principles of these learned Divines, is that we can pronounce nothing to be miraculous, until we are in full possession of all that can be accomplished by human ingenuity and science and as the world is in a state of improvement, they assert that it cannot be known till the day of judgment, whether extraordinary arts are miraculous or not: a belief in magic, which the Mahometan regards as an accomplishment purely human, comes powerfully in aid of his scepticism, founded upon the possible achievements of more extensive knowledge. In addition to this hopeful creed, he is intrenched in the belief, that the Koran is the greatest of all miracles, and that while the evidence for those facts, which Jews and Christians call miraculous, is becoming feebler by lapse of time, and, in the course of centuries, must waste away into insignificance, the evidence for the Koran is, from the continued impossibility of producing any thing like it, daily becoming stronger.

The case is certainly a difficult one. What are we to say to a man who, when water is turned into wine, will escape from the miracle, by taking refuge with the alchymist? who has witnessed the recovery from pains and fevers, effected by mere incantation? who has known the spleen removed by driving a nail into the middle of a cube? who holds firmly by the magician famous for keeping seven camels in a string, and of such proficiency in his art, that entering in at the mouth of the first, and passing out at his tail, he could with the greatest ease pass through them all? who is persuaded finally that a man well skilled in magic, may restore to life one who has been dead, not three days only, but a much longer time!

But suppose the Mussulman professors to be driven from this argument, how are they to be dislodged from that other refuge of lies, their belief that, whatever miraculous works may have been done in former times the Koran is in itself of all miracles the most irrefragable; and that it exalts their prophet far above all other prophets, Moses and Jesus not excepted. Professor Lee seems to regard the case as for the present well nigh hopeless; and recommends that the ground of miracles be abandoned, and that of prophecy taken, as affording much more safe and advantageous positions with a Mahometan disputant.