once all the shrubs and young shoots, that gave promise of bringing in a glorious vintage.'*

Divine Sovereignty.

'For the preventing of mistakes which men are apt to fall into about the sovereignty of God, I will shew-wherein it doth not consist.

'1. Not in a right to gratify and delight himself in the extreme misery of innocent and undeserving creatures; I say, not in a right; for the right that God hath in his creatures is founded in the benefits he hath conferred upon them, and the obligation they have to him upon that account. Now there is none, who, because he hath done a benefit, can have, by virtue of that, a right to do a greater evil than the good which he hath done amounts to; and I think it next to madness, to doubt, whether extreme and eternal misery be not a greater evil, than simple being is a good. I know they call it physical goodness; but I do not understand how any thing is the better for being called by a hard name. For what can there be that is good or desirable in being, when it only serves to be a foundation of the greatest and most lasting misery? And we may safely say, that the just God will never challenge more than an equitable right. God doth not claim any such sovereignty to himself, as to crush and oppress innocent creatures without a cause, and to make them miserable without a provocation. And because it seems some have been very apt to entertain such groundless jealousies and unworthy thoughts of God, he hath given us his oath to assure us of the contrary. As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of a sinner, but rather that he should turn and live. So far is he from taking pleasure in the misery and ruin of innocent creatures, that in case of sin and provocation, he would be much rather pleased, if sinners would, by repentance, avoid and escape his justice, than that they should fall under it. The good God cannot be glorified or pleased in doing evil to any, where justice doth not require it; nothing is further from infinite goodness than to rejoice in evil. We

*N. T. Tom. II. pp. 882, 883. Ed. Semler, pp. 158, 159.

account him a tyrant and a monster of men, and of a devilish temper, that can do so; and we cannot do a greater injury to the good God, than to paint him out after such a horrid and deformed manner.

2. The sovereignty of God doth not consist in imposing laws upon his creatures, which are impossible either to be understood or observed by them. For this would not only be contrary to the dignity of the divine nature, but contradict the nature of a reasonable creature, which, in reason, cannot be obliged by any power to impossibilities.

3. The sovereignty of God doth not consist in a liberty to tempt men to evil, or by any inevitable decree to necessitate them to sin, or effectually to procure the sins of men, and to punish them for them. For as this would be contrary to the holiness, and justice, and goodness of God; so to the nature of a reasonable creature, who cannot be guilty or deserve punishment for what it cannot help. And men cannot easily have a blacker thought of God, than to imagine that he hath, from all eternity, carried on a secret design to circumvent the greatest part of men into destruction, and underhand to draw men into a plot against Heaven, that by this unworthy practice he may raise a revenue of glory to his justice. There is no generous and good man, but would spit in that man's face that should charge him with such a design; and if they who are but very drops of goodness, in comparison of God, the infinite ocean of goodness, would take it for such a reproach; shall we attribute that to the best being in the world, which we would detest and abominate in ourselves?'Tillotson, Vol. VI. Ser. 7.

Human Inability.

"The idle reasoning of the Stoicks was a thing contemned by the wiser philosophers, as a vain and useless subtilty. Zeno pretends to demonstrate there is no motion; and what is the consequence of this speculation, but that men must stand still? But so long as a man finds he can walk, all the sophistry in the world will not persuade him, that motion is impossible. In like manner, they that would persuade us, that men can do nothing, nor contribute any more to their own sanctification, than stocks or stones, and upon scripture metaphors misunderstood, (as our being dead in trespasses and

sins, and created to good works,) graft notions which are impossible and absurd in practice, do not consider that the natural consequence of this is, that men must do nothing at all in religion, never think of God, nor pray to him, nor read his word, nor go to church; but sit still, and be wholly passive to the operations of God's grace; but however this may seem plausible, and men may think they add much to the glory of God's grace, while they deny any power in the creature ; yet every considerate man will presently apprehend, that this is by no means to be admitted, because it contradicts practice, and makes all the commands and exhortations of God's word vain, and to no purpose; because it destroys religion, and discourages the endeavours of men; makes them slothful and careless of working out their own salvation; than which nothing can set a man farther from God's grace and assistance, and more immediately dispose him for ruin; and upon some such false reasoning as this, the slothful servant in the parable hid his talent in a napkin, and buried it in the earth; but when he was called to account, his excuse was not admitted, but he was cast into utter darkness.'-Ibid. Vol. VI. Ser. 1.

Bigotry.

That there is but one true way is agreed upon; and therefore almost every church of one denomination, that lives under government, propounds to you a system or collective body of articles, and tells you that is the true religion, and they are the church, and the peculiar people of God; like Brutus and Cassius, of whom one says, "ubicunque ipsi essent, prætexebant esse rempublicam," they supposed themselves were the commonwealth; and these are the church, and out of this church, they will hardly allow salvation; but of this there can be no end; for divide the church into twenty parts, and in what part soever your lot falls, you and your party are damned by the other nineteen; and men on all hands almost, keep their own proselytes, by affrighting them with the fearful sermons of damnation; but in the mean time here is no security to them that are not able to judge for themselves, and no peace for them that are.'-Taylor's Sermon, Via Intelligentiæ' from John, vii. 17.

Materialism.

'To think a gross body may be ground and pounded into rationality, a slow body may be thumped and driven into passion, a rough body may be filed and polished into a faculty of discerning and resenting things; that a cluster of pretty, thin, round atoms, (as Democritus forsooth conceited,) that a well mixed combination of elements, (as Empedocles fancied,) that a harmonious contemperation (or crasis) of humours, (as Galen, dreaming it seems upon his drugs and his potions, would persuade us,) that an implement made up of I know not what fine springs, and wheels, and such mechanick knacks (as some of our modern wizards have been busied in divining) should, without more to do, become the subject of so rare capacities and endowments, the author of actions so worthy, and works so wonderful; capable of wisdom and virtue, of knowledge so vast, and of desires so lofty; apt to contemplate truth, and effect good; able to recollect things past, and to foresee things future; to search so deep into the causes of things, and disclose so many mysteries of nature; to invent so many arts and sciences, to contrive such projects of policy, and achieve such feats of prowess; briefly, should become capable to design, undertake, and perform all those admirable effects of human wit and industry, which we daily see and hear of; how senseless and absurd conceits are these; how can we, without great indignation and regret, entertain such suppositions? No, no; 'tis both ridiculous fondness, and monstrous baseness for us to own any parentage from, or any alliance to things so mean, so very much below us.'-Barrow, Vol. II. Ser. 7.

Human Depravity.

'The wisest observers of man's nature have pronounced him to be a creature gentle and sociable, inclinable to and fit. for conversation, apt to keep good order, to observe rules of justice, to embrace any sort of virtue, if well managed, if instructed by good discipline, if guided by good example, if living under the influence of wise laws and virtuous governours. Fierceness, rudeness, craft, malice, all perverse and intractable, all mischievous and vicious dispositions, to grow among men, (like weeds in any, even the best soil,) and overspread the earth from neglect of good education; from

ill conduct, ill custom, ill example. ('Tis the comparison of Saint Chrysostom, and of Plutarch.) "Tis favor therefore, I conceive, to their own habitual depravations of nature, (or perhaps to some prejudicate opinions,) which hath induced some men to make so disadvantageous a portraiture of human nature, in which nothing lightsome or handsome, no lines of candour or rectitude do appear, but all seems black and crooked; all is drawn over with dusky shades, and irregular features of base designfulness, and malicious cunning; of suspicion, malignity, rapacity; which character, were it true, (in that general extent, and not proper only to some monsters among men,) we need not further seek for hell, since as many men, so many fiends appear unto us. But so commodious living here, so many offices daily performed among men of courtesie, mercy and pity; so many constant observances of friendship and amity, so many instances of fidelity and gratitude, so much credit always (even among pagans and barbarians) preserved to justice and humanity, (humanity, that very name doth fairly argue for us) do sufficiently confute those defamers, and slanderers of mankind; do competently evidence, that all good inclinations are not quite banished the world, nor quite razed out of man's soul; but that even herein human nature doth somewhat resemble its excellent original, the nature divine.'-Ibid.

Heresy.

'What men call heresy, is often a local and a secular crime; for what is heresy in one century, and in one country, is sound doctrine in another; and in some disputes, as in the Nestorian and the Pelagian controversies, to mention none besides, it is a nice thing to settle the boundaries between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, and the only way to be safe is to have recourse to implicit faith, and to imitate the prudent monk, who when Satan would have drawn him into heresy, by asking him what he believed of a certain point, answered, "Id credo quod credit ecclesia." But, "Quid credit ecclesia?" said Satan. "Id quod ego credo," replied the other; and Nestorius, if he would have slept in his own bed, should have said, "Id credo quod credit Sanctissimus Cyrillus."— Jortin's Discourses and Remarks on Ecclesiastical History, Vol. I. pp. 178, 179.