the ground that prior to the time when the Secretary acted, one of the contracting parties had changed his mind and desired to withdraw therefrom and further that his right to deal with his land had been finally and completely vested in him, and hence the Secretary's power or authority to approve it had lapsed.

There is a paucity of authority upon the direct question involved but in principle the case of Pickering v. Lomax et al, 145 U. S. 310, 36 Law ed. 716, and the cases which have since followed it, to-wit, Taylor et al v. Brown et al, 147 U. S. 640, 37 Law ed. 313; Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, 44 Law ed. 49; Lykins v. McGrath, 184 U. S. 169, 46 Law ed. 485, and Ingraham et al v. Ward et al, 56 Kan. 530, are sufficiently akin to render them very persuasive if not ocmplete authority for holding that the Secretary of the Interior did not exceed his authority under the circumstances in giving to the lease his sanction and approval.

It is to be noted that the statute above quoted provides that allotments may be rented for mineral purposes with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and not otherwise. The act does not provide within what time the Secretary of the Interior shall be required to make the approval and except for the fact that plaintiff in this case had notice of the lease when he purchased he would not be bound by it.

The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Pickering v. Lomax et al, supra, which related to the leasing and conveyance of lands owned by certain Indians under the treaty of Prairie du Chien, which provided that the same should never be leased or conveyed to any persons whatever without the permission of the President of the United States, discussing the same said:

"The treaty does not provide how or when the permission of the President shall be obtained, and there is certainly nothing which requires that it shall be obtained,. and there is certainly nothing which requires that it shall be given before the deed is delivered. Doe v. Beardsley,

2 McLean, 412. It is doubtless, as was said by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Doe v. Partier, 12 Smedes & M. 425, 427, 'a condition precedent to a perfect title' in the grantee; but the neglect in this case to obtain the approval of the President for thirteen years, only shows that for that length of time the title was imperfect, and hat no action of ejectment would have lain until the condition was performed. Had the grantee the day after the deed was delivered sent it to Washington and obtained the approval of the President, it would be sticking in the bark to say that the deed was not thereby validated. A delay of thirteen years is immaterial, provided, of course, that no third parties have in the meantime legally acquired an interest in the lands. If, after executing this deed, Robinson had given another to another person, with the permission of the President, a wholly different question would have arisen. But, so far as Robinson and his grantees are concerned, the approval of the President related back to the execution of the deed and validated it from that, time. As was said by this court by Cook v. Tullis, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 332, 338, 21 Law Ed. 933, 936: 'the ratification operates upon the act ratified precisely as though authority to do the act had been previously given, except where the rights of third parties have jintervened between the act and the ratification. The retroactive efficacy of the ratification is subject to this qualification. The intervening rights of third persons cannot be defeated by the ratification.""

From the record is appears that the defendant has complied with its part of the contract in all particulars. The approval of the lease by the Secretary of the Interior related back to the date of its execution between the parties and rendered it valid from that time... It occurs to us that if the reomval of restrictions on allottee's complete right to lease ould have any effect whatever it would be to render the contract of the parties complete, to be annulled only on or for some of the grounds under which equity gives relief. This conclusion on our part relieves us

of a consideration of the character or the case filed, and we have determined the issues between the parties on the record presented as they are argued in the briefs.

Under these circumstances the judgment of the trial court should be reversed which is accordingly done, and the accused remanded with instructions to set the same aside and enter one in accordance with this opinion.

Hayes, C. J. and Turner, J., concur; Williams, J., concurs in the conclusion; Kane, J., dissents.

(For the rest of the Supreme Court Cases in this number pass to page 351.)

A 'PERSUADED' PRISONER.-The resourceful man is the one who succeeds. There is a deputy mar shal in Alabama who does not let any such trifles as extradition laws stop him. A writer in the Washington Post tells a story of one of his achievements. When the the term of court was about to begin one time one was out on bail was reported to be enjoying himself over in Georgia.

Deputy Jim went after him. The next day he telegraphed the judge:

"I have persuaded him to come."

A few days later he rode into town on a mule, leading his prisoner tied up snugly with a clothesline The prisoner looked as if he had seen hard service.

"Why, Jim!" exclaimed the judge. "You didn't make him walk all the way from Georgia, did you?" "No, sir,” replied Jim.

"I thought not," said the judge.

"No," responded Jim. "Part of the way I drug him, and when we come to the Tallapoosa River he swum.'

Youth's Companion.

Appeal From the District Court of Wagoner County. R. C. Allen, Judge.

Reversed.

1. (a) It is a fundamental right of a person accused of a crime to be represented by counsel, and in order the accused may have the full benefit of this right, it is provided that when he appears for arraignment without counsel, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have counsel before being arraigned, and he must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires, and is unable to employ counsel, the court must assign counsel to defend him.

(Bill of Rights see. 20; Crim. Procedure sec. 6731.) (b) This right may be waived by the defendant, but it cannot be denied by the courts.

2. The term "counsel" as used in sec, 6731 Proc. Crim. providing that the court must assign counsel to defend indigent defendants, means one who has been admitted as an attorney and counsellor at law in this State.

3. Under the law (Sec. 250 Snyder's Stat.) no person resident of the state shall be permitted to practice as an attorney in any action or proceeding in which he is not a party concerned unless he has been previously admitted to the bar by order of the Supreme Court, and the courts will take judicial notice of the fact that a person appearing and acting as an attorney and counsellor at law is or is not duly authorized.

4. In a prosecution for a felony it having been made to appear that the defendant was destitute of means to em

ploy counsel, the court appointed a person to defend him who was not authorized to appear as an attorney at law in the courts of this state: HELD, That this was in effect, the denial of a fundamental right, and constitutes reversible error,

(Syllabus by the court.)

Kistler & Haskel, and C. J. Nelson, for plaintiff in error C. J. Davenport, for the State.

Opinion of the Court by• Doyle, J.

Plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, was tried in the District Court of Wagoner County on an information, charging him with the crime of Larceny of Live Stock, and was convicted and sentenced. to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of ten years. The judgment and sentence was entered April 17th, 1911, and on the same day the defendant was delivered to the Warden of the State penitentiary at McAlester.

To reverse the judgment an appeal was taken by petition in error with a certified transcript of the record.

It is assigned as error that the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel.

It appears from the record that the court prior to entering upon the trial, it having been made to appear that the defendant was destitute of means to employ counsel, appointed one P. E. Reed to defend him.

No brief was filed. Norman R. Haskell, Esq., appeared and argued the case orally.

counsel upon

The proposition of the defendant's counsel which he bases his demand for a reversal of this judgment is as follows: That the trial court and this court will take judicial notice of the fact that P. E. Reed was not authorized to appear as an attorney in the courts of this state. Therefore the defendant was denied the benefit of counsel.