one of their number; and he may have found himself listening to an harangue of Gorgias, or to a fragment of the unsparing dialectic of Socrates. What could books do more for a man who was receiving such an education as this? It was what the student gazed on, what he heard, what he caught by the magic of sympathy, not what he read, which was the education furnished by Athens. Not by her discipline, like Sparta and Rome, but by the unfailing charm of her gracious influence, did Athens train her children.

8. The Instruction of the Sophists

(Isocrates, Against the Sophists; selected)

Isocrates (436-338 B.C.), was an Athenian orator and rhetorician, who was educated in the schools of the Sophists Prodicus, Protagoras, and Gorgias. In 390 B.C.,

after a period as an advocate, he opened a school of his own, and organized the work of the preceding Sophists into what were afterwards known as the schools of Rhetoric. In his speech, Against the Sophists, written in this same year, he attacks those who attract pupils by low fees and big promises, and sets forth the principles underlying what he proposed to do in his school a school which soon became famous throughout the Greek-speaking world.

If all those who undertake instruction, would speak the truth, nor make greater promises than they can perform, they would not be accused by the illiterate. Now, those who inconsiderately have dared to boast, have been the cause that those men seem to have reasoned better, who indulge their indolence, than such as study philosophy: for, first, who would not detest and despise those who pass their time in sophistic chicanery? who pretend, indeed, that they seek truth, but, from the beginning of their premises, labour to speak falsities; for I think it manifest to all, that the faculty of foreknowing future things is above our nature: nay, we are so far from such prudence, that Homer, who, for his wisdom, has acquired the highest fame, has sometimes introduced gods in his poem, consulting about futurity; not that he knew the nature of their minds, but that he would show to us, that this was one of those things which are impossible for man. These men are arrived at that pitch of insolence, that they endeavour to persuade the

younger, that, if they will be their disciples, they shall know what is best to be done, and thereby be made happy; and, after they have erected themselves into teachers of such sublime things, they are not ashamed to ask of them four or five minæ;1 though did they sell any other possession for much less than its value, they would not hesitate to grant themselves mad. But now exposing to sale all virtue and happiness (if we will believe them), they dare argue, that, as being wise men, they ought to be the preceptors of others; yet they say, indeed, that they are not indigent of money, while, to diminish its idea, they call it pitiful gold and silver; though they require a trifling gain, and only promise to make those next to immortal, who will commence their disciples. . .

...

When therefore some of the unlearned, considering all these things, see those who profess teaching wisdom and happiness, indigent themselves of many things, requiring a small sum of their scholars, and observing contradictions in silly sentences, though they see them not in actions; professing likewise, that they know futurity, yet not capable of speaking or deliberating properly of things present; and that those are more consistent with themselves, and do more things right who follow common opinions, than those who say they are possessed of wisdom: when they see this, I say, they think such disputations mere trifles, a loss of time in idle things, and not a real improvement of the human mind.

Nor is it just to blame these men only, but those likewise who profess to teach civil science to the citizens; for they also disregard truth; and think it artful, if they draw as many as possible, by the smallness of the recompense, and the greatness of their promises, and so receive something of them: and they are so stupid, and imagine others so, that though they write orations more inaccurate than some who are unlearned speak extempore, yet they promise they will make their disciples such orators, that they shall omit nothing in the nature of things; nay, that they will teach them eloquence, like grammar; not considering the nature of each, but thinking, that on account of the excellence of their promises, they will be admired, and the study of eloquence seem of higher value; not knowing, that arts render not those famous who insolently boast of them, but those who can find out and express whatever is in them. . . . Since I am advanced so far, I will speak more clearly of this topic; I say, then, it is no difficult matter to learn those forms or orders of things, by which we know how to compose orations, if any one puts himself under the care not of such as easily vaunt themselves, but such as have the real science; but, in regard of what relates to particular things, which we must first see, and mix together, and dispose in order, and, besides, 1 About $80 to $100 in our money. Isocrates charged his pupils ten mina for the course, extending over three or four years.

not lose opportunities, but vary the whole discourse with arguments, and conclude it in a harmonious and musical manner: these things, I say, require great care, and are the province of a manly and wise mind; and the scholar must, besides his having necessary ingenuity, perfectly instruct himself in the different kinds of orations, and be exercised in the practice: but it becomes the master to explain all these as accurately as possible, so as to omit nothing which may be taught. As for the rest, show himself such an example, that they who can imitate and express it, may be able to speak in a more beautiful and elegant manner than others. In whatever regard any thing of what I have mentioned is wanting, it must follow, that his disciples will be less perfect.

9. An Example of Socrates' Teaching

(Xenophon, Memorabilia, book IV, chap. II)

The following selection offers a good example of the work of Socrates (470-399 B.C.) in counteracting the teaching of his time, and in showing to those about him that there is a common morality and intelligence which guides the right acts of men, and that the reason that all do not see and follow the right is that they do not think carefully. The youth, Euthydemus, aspired to become a statesman and a ruler. Socrates, after first winning his confidence, finally sought him out one day and engaged him in conversation, as follows:

"Tell me, Euthydemus, have you really, as

FIG. 2

I hear, collected many of the writings of the SOCRATES (470-399 B.C.) men who are said to have been wise?" "I have indeed, Socrates," replied he, "and I am still collecting, intending to persevere until I get as many as I possibly can." "By Juno," rejoined Socrates, "I feel admiration for you, because you have not preferred acquiring treasures of silver and gold rather than of wisdom; for it is plain that you consider that silver and gold are unable to make men better, but that the thoughts of wise men enrich their possessors with virtue." Euthydemus was delighted to hear this commendation, believing that he was thought by Socrates to have sought wisdom in the right course. Socrates, observing that he was gratified with the praise, said, "And in what particular art do you wish to become skilful, that you collect these writings?"

As Euthydemus continued silent, considering what reply he should make, Socrates again asked, "Do you wish to become a physician? for there are many writings of physicians." "Not I, by Jupiter," replied Euthydemus. "Do you wish to become an architect, then? for a man of knowledge is needed in that art also." "No, indeed," answered he. "Do you wish to become a good geometrician, like Theodorus?" "Nor a geometrician either," said he. "Do you wish, then, to become an astronomer?" said Socrates. As Euthydemus said "No" to this, "Do you wish, then," added Socrates, "to become a rhapsodist, for they say that you are in possession of all the poems of Homer?" "No, indeed," said he, "for I know that the rhapsodists, though eminently knowing in all the poems of Homer, are, as men, extremely foolish." "You are perhaps desirous, then," proceeded Socrates, "of attaining that talent by which men become skilled in governing states, in managing households, able to command, and qualified to benefit other men as well as themselves." "I indeed greatly desire," said he, "Socrates, to acquire that talent." "By Jupiter," returned Socrates, "you aspire to a most honorable accomplishment, and a most exalted art, for it is the art of kings, and is called the royal art. But," added he, "have you ever considered whether it is possible for a man who is not just to be eminent in that art?" "I have certainly," replied he; "and it is not possible for a man to be even a good citizen without justice." "Have you yourself, then, made yourself master of that virtue?" "I think," said he, "Socrates, that I shall be found not less just than any other man." "Are there, then, works of just men, as there are works of artisans?" "There are, doubtless," replied he. "Then," said Socrates, "as artisans are able to show their works, would not just men be able also to tell their works?" "And why should not I," asked Euthydemus, "be able to tell the works of justice; as also, indeed, those of injustice; for we may see and hear of no small number of them every day?"

"Are you willing, then," said Socrates, "that we should make a delta on this side, and an alpha on that, and then that we should put whatever seems to us to be a work of justice under the delta, and whatever seems to be a work of injustice under the alpha?" "If you think that we need those letters," said Euthydemus, "make them." Socrates, having made the letters as he proposed, asked, "Does falsehood then exist among mankind?" "It does, assuredly," replied he. "Under which head shall we place it?" "Under injustice, certainly." "Does deceit also exist?" "Unquestionably." "Under which head shall we place that?" "Evidently under injustice." "Does mischievousness exist?" "Undoubtedly." "And the enslaving of men?" "That, too, prevails." "And shall neither of these things be placed by us under justice, Euthydemus?" "It would be strange if they should be," said he. "But," said Socrates, "if a man being chosen to lead an

army, should reduce to slavery an unjust and hostile people, should we say that he committed an injustice?" "No, certainly," replied he. "Should we not rather say that he acted justly?" "Indisputably.' "And if in the course of the war with them he should practice deceit?" "That also would be just," said he. And if he should steal and carry off their property, would he not do what was just?" "Certainly," said Euthydemus; "but I thought at first that you asked these questions only with reference to our friends." "Then," said Socrates, "ail that we have placed under the head of injustice, we must also place under that of justice?" "It seems so," replied Euthydemus. "Do you agree, then," continued Socrates, "that, having so placed them, we should make a new distinction, that it is just to do such things with regard to enemies, but unjust to do them with regard to friends, and that toward his friends our general should be as guileless as possible?” "By all means," replied Euthydemus. "Well, then," said Socrates, "if a general, seeing his army dispirited, should tell them, inventing a falsehood, that auxiliaries were coming, and should, by that invention, check the despondency of his troops, under which head should we place such an act of deceit?" "It appears to me," said Euthydemus, "that we must place it under justice." "And if a father, when his son requires medicine, and refuses to take it, should deceive him, and give him the medicine as ordinary food, and, by adopting such deception, should restore him to health, under which head must we place such an act of deceit?" "It appears to me that we must put it under the same head." "And if a person, when his friend was in despondency, should, through fear that he might kill himself, steal or take away his sword, or any other weapon, under which head must we place that act?" "That, assuredly, we must place under justice." "You say, then," said Socrates, "that not even toward our friends must we act on all occasions without deceit?" "We must not, indeed," said he, "for I retract what I said before, if I may be permitted to do so." "It is indeed much better that you should be permitted," said Socrates, "than that you should not place actions on the right side. But of those who deceive their friends in order to injure them (that we may not leave even this point unconsidered) which of the two is the more unjust, he who does so intentionally or he who does so involuntarily?" "Indeed, Socrates," said Euthydemus, "I no longer put confidence in the answers which I give; for all that I said before appears to me now to be quite different from what I then thought; however, let me venture to say that he who deceives intentionally is more unjust than he who deceives involuntarily." . . .

"Do you know any persons called slave-like?" "I do." "Whether for their knowledge or their ignorance?" "For their ignorance, certainly." "Is it, then, for their ignorance of working in brass that they receive this appellation?" "Not at all." "Is it for their ignorance