mediate knowledge he has of the states of his own consciousness his immediate knowledge of the latter being the medium of his faith in the former. His system affording him a full, free, and perfect liberty of investigation, and furnishing him with the only means whereby he may boldly attack the delusions of mere appearances, the falsehood of the general belief of ignorant men based upon them, and the fallacious philosophical systems founded on this false general belief. STRICTURES ON "REID AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE," AN ARTICLE IN "BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE," AUGUST, 1847.1 REID maintains, that he has an intuitive perception of matter existing per se, or out of his mind or the sphere of his own consciousness; and he appeals to the general opinion of mankind as to the externality of objects, as a proof of the soundness of his theory. The author of this article, after having exposed the fallacy and absurdity of Reid's system, and overthrown it, builds up a system of his own upon the very principles of Reid. He concedes, that our belief in the existence of matter is not in its independent existence per se; but guards this concession against the imputation of subjective idealism, by asserting, that our belief is in the independent existence of the perception of matter. This perception of matter is not a state of our minds, or a modification of it, but is an objective reality, existing altogether apart from us. The two fundamental principles on which his theory rest are, therefore, first, The identity of perception with matter; and, secondly, The objectivity of the perception. In other 1 See The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D., edited by Sir W. Hamilton, Bart., Edinburgh, 1846. Q words, matter and the perception of matter are not two things, but one; and this perception of matter has a permanent existence independent of our minds. To use his own words, "our apprehension of the perception of matter" is the whole given fact with which metaphysics has to deal,-"the apprehension" being the subjective factor, "the perception of matter" being the objective part.And the part which alone belongs to the human mind he resolves into a "participation in a perception of matter" which inheres in the Divine intellect. "The perception of matter," though independent of our minds, is not independent of all mind; and thus furnishes a demonstration of an eternal intelligence. I make the following observations on this theory : 1. The writer maintains, that he has an intuitive "apprehension of the perception of matter," (pp. 254-7,) which perceptions of matter, he affirms, exist out of our minds, (pp. 256-7,) or out of the sphere of our individual consciousness; and that they have so existed from everlasting, (p. 256,) and would so exist eternally if all intelligent creatures were annihilated, (p. 257;) because, he says, they are ideas everlastingly existing in the mind of God, (p. 257;) whilst he does not attempt to explain, how perceptions of matter -evidently, the perceptions of our minds-can exist out of our minds, and be ideas in the mind of God. 2. If the perceptions of matter are, as the critic asserts, (p. 257,) states or modifications of the Divine mind, then, I maintain, it is impossible that they can be apprehended by any finite being, seeing that it is impossible, in the very nature of things, for any intelligent creature to apprehend the states or operations even of a fellow-creature's mind. 3. The phrase itself, to "apprehend a perception," is not only illogical, but tautological; for, "to apprehend a perception" is the same as "to have a perception," or "to perceive;" but then, as the critic's argument is against the possibility of perceiving matter per se, and as his own theory depends upon his apprehending something, he has endeavoured to make "the perception of matter," which is an act of his own mind, the objective, and "the apprehending the perception" the subjective, (p. 254.) The fact is, he is guilty of the very error he condemns in Reid, making a distinction or analysis where none exists; so that, to use his own simile, whenever you ring for No. 1, "apprehending," No. 2, "perceiving," always answers the bell, (p. 251.) 4. After censuring Reid for appealing to the general belief of mankind in support of his theory, he is actually guilty of making the same appeal himself in confirmation of his own incomprehensible, paradoxical, and illogical system of intellectual intuition, (pp. 256-7,) or "intuitionism." 5. He is totally mistaken when he says, that anticipations of his doctrine are to be found in "Berkeley's Works," (p. 257;) for Berkeley everywhere maintains, that what is called the external or material universe is ideal, though real, and exists in our minds either as ideas, operations, or conditions; so that if all intelligent creatures were annihilated, the external universe, with which they had been conversant, would be annihilated also, although the archetypal universe would still exist, ideally and really, in the mind of God. 6. The critic maintains the following fallacy or illogical absurdity :-viz., that the human mind is not the seat of, nor distinct from, its own operations, but that "the mind only is what the mind does," (p. 248,)-thus confounding the percipient mind with its own perceptions ;-but afterwards contradicts himself, affirming, that perceptions "must belong to some mind, for perceptions without an intelligence in which they inhere are inconceivable and contradictory," (p. 257.) CRITIQUE ON "BERKELEY AND IDEALISM," AN ARTICLE IN "BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE," THE author agrees with Berkeley in his premises, namely, that matter has no existence independent of mind; that it depends entirely for existence on mind; consequently, that if mind were removed or annihilated, matter would be annihilated also. Again, that the thing or object is the appearance, and that the appearance is the thing; that the object is our perception of it, and that our perception of it is the object. Berkeley, therefore, very logically concludes from these premises, founded on the evidence of our senses, that, as the material and external creation consists of the perceptions of the mind, if the mind were annihilated, its perceptions or operations would cease or be annihilated; ergo, the external universe would be annihilated. I agree with the critic in all that he has said, "in the first place," (p. 817,) when answering this question in the affirmative, being admirably argued, and truly logical; but all his reasoning, "in the second place," (p. 818,) when answering this question in the negative, appears to me to be based upon a downright piece of fallacy, quite unworthy of so great a mind, and otherwise so able a champion of the Berkeleyan theory. |