to the transaction. The ability of each to fulfil his stipulated part, and the unity of design subsisting between them, afford ground of perfect confidence that the covenant engagements will be performed. The same Being, who, in plurality, said, "let us make man," was equally able to say, let us redeem man.

But if there be no ground of distinction in the divine Nature; if the Son of God be merely a created being; if the Holy Spirit be only the operations of the Father, the covenant of redemption appears to lose its peculiar excellencies. The parties concerned are entirely disproportionate. There is no comparison between the Creator and a creature. It appears to be a manifest incongruity, that God should enter into compact with a created being respecting any matter, in which the latter was not personally concerned. To treat with him by an interchange of correspondent obligations seems to imply an exaltation of the creature to an equality with himself; or an abasement of himself to a level with the creature. In forming the covenant of redemption, did infinite Wisdom need the assistance of any created intelligence? In carrying it into operation did the Almighty need the dependent power of any created being? It is not doubted that the Supreme Being employs ministering servants as agents in the administration of his government. But which of his agents stipulates with the divine Sovereign, and produces claims upon him correspondent to his own obligations? The claims of the Son upon the Father to fulfil his part of the contract are not less valid and important than the claims of the Father upon the Son. What makes this case different from all other cases is this, what the Son did in redemption he did not for himself, but for others. He has, therefore, not only a claim upon the Father arising from promise, but he has a meritorious claim upon him to fulfil his part of the covenant. What created being can, after he has discharged his own personal obligations, produce a surplus of righteousness, which may

be accounted for the benefit of others; and then produce a claim upon heaven for remuneration for extra services? Were this the case, were this the ground of salvation, then a created being would be the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth He would be made unto us wisdom, sanctification and redemption.

The disparity between the Creator and a creature seems to preclude the possibility of their being contracting parties respecting the redemption of man. The disparity is infinitely greater than that existing between the highest sovereign on earth and his lowest subject. If the Son of God be merely a created being, he does not possess one quality in his nature, which renders him competent to contract with the Father, or to fulfil covenant engagements respecting the salvation of man. His wisdom would not be sufficient to devise concerning those things, which the angels desire to look into. His own power would not be competent to the performance of his part of the compact. Every thing pertaining to him and to his work would be limited; and he would be entirely incompetent to be a party in the covenant.

If the Holy Spirit be not a party in the covenant; if he be only divine operation or influence, there appears to be an incongruity and deficiency in the scheme of redemption. It is the office of the Father to send the Son to fulfil his part of the covenant; to answer his requests; to accept what he does; and give him, as a recompense, what he had promised. It is part of the office of the Son to send the Holy Spirit to convince and convert sinners; to comfort believers and seal them to the day of redemption. If the Son be sent by the Father, if he be subordinate to him in his official work, it is incredible that he should have authority over the Father to control his operations and send them when and where he pleases. This would reverse the order of offices; and produce confusion in the economy of redemption. But if the Son

and Holy Spirit be divine, as well as the Father, they are on equality; and they are suitable parties to enter into reciprocal compact. They are adequate to the performance of their respective parts. The covenant of redemption is an instrument, formed and confirmed in all its articles by Divinity; and carries evidence with itself that it will be fulfilled.

Let the doctrine of the Trinity be next viewed in relation to the atonement. If the Son of God be divine, it was infinite condescension for him to take upon him the form of a servant. He subjected himself to the lowest degree of humiliation, when he veiled his divine glories with humanity in its lowest condition; when he suffered the scoffs and reproaches of his enemies; when he endured all the ignominy, which could be cast upon a crucified malefactor. The whole term of his abode on earth was a continued series of deep humiliation. The union of divinity with humanity gave the latter an extraordinary dignity and excellence. So intimate was the connexion of divinity and humanity that the second man is called the Lord from heaven; and the blood of the Son of man is called the blood of God. By the union of the Son of God with the Son of man, the sufferings of the humanity of Christ acquired an unspeakable importance; and in conjunction with the abasement of the divine Son, they constituted a sacrifice, which was a propitiation for the sins of the world. Look at the cross and behold divinity and innocent humanity engaged in making an expiation for sin; the one enduring a concealment of his glories, and all the ignominy, which his enemies could cast upon him; and the other suffering the tortures of the cross. In this view the atonement appears to be of infinite importance.

By the worth of the sacrifice, which was made, the guilt of sin may be accurately estimated. There was no suffering needlessly expended. If the victim, which was offered upon the cross was of infinite

dignity and excellence, it follows that sin, which required such a sacrifice, was of infinite guilt.

Admit the divinity of Christ and the consequent value of the atonement; and God's law appears perfectly honorable. If the sacrifice be commensurate with the guilt of sin, the divine law suffers no diminution of its requirements, or of its validity. It exhibits proof that it requires perfect satisfaction for every violation, or that, which will equally preserve its authority and efficacy. It exhibits proof that not one jot or tittle of its requirements is abated; and that while mercy is exercised, justice is satisfied. If the sacrifice for sin be made by the Son of God in conjunction with the Son of man, the divine law appears to be as fully honored and magnified, and God expresses as great abhorrence of sin, as if the threatened penalty were inflicted upon transgressors.

But if the Son of God be merely a created being, there appears to be less condescension on the part of divinity. There appears to be less value in the atonement. Sin appears with less malignity; and the divine law appears with great abatement of its requirements. If Jesus Christ was merely human, it was no condescension in Deity that he came into the world, labored and suffered as he did; and it was no greater condescension and humiliation in himself than many others have endured. Thousands have appeared in the form of servants; and have innocently suffered the tortures and ignominy of execution as malefactors. If the Son of God was the highest of all created intelligences, his coming into the world, in the form of a servant, and suffering the disgrace and tortures of the cross would be no humiliation on the part of Deity; and his own humiliation appears infinitely less than if he were divine.

If the Son of God be only a created being, whether human, or human and superangelic, he does not appear to be capable of making a propitiation for the sins of the world. It is hard to conceive that any

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creature, however exalted, can perform more than his own duty; or that he should have a surplus of righteousness to appropriate for the benefit of others. If one should volunteer his services for the assistance of another, he would be either under obligation, or not under obligation to do it. If he were under obligation to tender the kind offices, he would do only what was his own duty. If he were not under obligation to offer his kindness, he would not do his own duty while he communicated assistance to others. Of course, there would be an interval, in which he was free from discharging his own personal obligations; and could perform duty in behalf of others. But not to insist on the inconsistency of such a method; the assistance, which one created being can bestow upon another, is limited in its very nature. Suppose one man dies for another. The sufferings of the former are only equivalent to the life of the latter. Suppose one should offer his life for the preservation of the lives of several of his equal fellow beings, the offering would be unequal to the object to be accomplished. If he should offer his life to save one soul from everlasting death, the sacrifice would be entirely inadequate for the purpose. Should he offer his life for the salvation of the whole human race from endless destruction, what numbers could give the disproportion between the sacrifice and the object to be obtained! A sacrifice made by any created being bears no comparison in its value with the sacrifice made by Divinity in conjunction with humanity.

If the atonement be of limited value and efficacy, sin appears to be of finite guilt. There is a just proportion, an exact correspondence between the virtue of the sacrifice and the malignity of sin, which is expiated by it. As much as any system reduces the excellence of the victim and the consequent value of his sacrifice, just so much it reduces the guilt and ill desert of sin. If a finite being can make atonement for sin, it follows that sin is but a finite evil.