another, the surrender of the fortresses, which must compromise the independence of the kingdom.30 But although, for these reasons, the sovereigns of Navarre were warranted in refusing Ferdinand's request, they were not therefore authorized to declare war against him, which they virtually did by entering into a defensive alliance with his enemy Louis the Twelfth, and by pledging themselves to make war on the English and their confederates; an article pointedly directed at the Catholic king. True, indeed, the treaty of Blois had not received the ratification of the Navarrese sovereigns; but it was executed by their plenipotentiaries duly authorized, and, considering the intimate intercourse between the two nations, was undoubtedly made with their full knowledge and concurrence. Under these circumstances, it was scarcely to be expected that King Ferdinand, when an accident had put him in possession of the result of these negotiations, should wait for a formal declaration of hostilities, and thus deprive himself of the advantage of anticipating the blow of his enemy. The right of making war would seem to include that of disposing of its fruits; subject, however, to those principles of natural equity which should regulate 30 According to Galindez de Carbajal, only three fortresses were originally demanded by Ferdinand. (Anales, MS., año 1512.) He may have confounded the number with that said to have been finally conceded by the king of Navarre; a concession, however, which amounted to little, since it excluded by name two of the most important places required, and the sincerity of which may well be doubted, if, as it would seem, it was not made till after the negotiations with France had been adjusted. See Zurita, Anales, lib. 10, cap. 7. every action, whether of a public or private nature. No principle can be clearer, for example, than that the penalty should be proportioned to the offence. Now, that inflicted on the sovereigns of Navarre, which went so far as to dispossess them of their crown and annihilate the political existence of their kingdom, was such as nothing but extraordinary aggressions on the part of the conquered nation, or the self-preservation of the victors, could justify. As neither of these contingencies existed in the present case, Ferdinand's conduct must be regarded as a flagrant example of the abuse of the rights of conquest. We have been but too familiar, indeed, with similar acts of political injustice, and on a much larger scale, in the present civilized age. But, although the number and splendor of the precedents may blunt our sensibility to the atrocity of the act, they can never constitute a legitimate warrant for its perpetration. While thus freely condemning Ferdinand's conduct in this transaction, I cannot go along with those who, having inspected the subject less minutely, are disposed to regard it as the result of a cool, premeditated policy from the outset. The propositions originally made by him to Navarre appear to have been conceived in perfect good faith. The requisition of the fortresses, impudent as it may seem, was nothing more than had been before made in Isabella's time, when it had been granted, and the security subsequently restored, as soon as the emergency had passed away." The alternative proposed, of entering into the Holy League, presented Aleson, Annales de Navarra, tom. v. lib. 35, cap. 1, 3.-Garibay Compendio tom. iii. lib. 29, cap. 13. many points of view so favorable to Navarre, that Ferdinand, ignorant, as he then was, of the precise footing on which she stood with France, might have seen no improbability in her closing with it. Had either alternative been embraced, there would have been no pretext for the invasion. Even when hostilities had been precipitated by the impolitic conduct of Navarre, Ferdinand (to judge, not from his public manifestoes only, but from his private correspondence) would seem to have at first contemplated holding the country only till the close of his French expedition.32 But the facility of retaining these conquests, when once acquired, was too strong a temptation. It was easy to find some plausible pretext to justify it, and obtain such a sanction from the highest authority as should veil the injustice of the transaction from the world,— and from his own eyes. And that these were blinded is but too true, if, as an Aragonese historian declares, he could remark on his death-bed "that, independently of the conquest having been undertaken at the instance of the sovereign pontiff for the extirpation of the schism, he felt his conscience as easy in keeping it as in keeping his crown of Aragon." 3 See King Ferdinand's letter, July 20th, and his manifesto, July 30th, 1512, apud Bernaldez, Reyes Católicos, MS., cap. 235.—Lebrija, De Bello Navariensi, lib. 1, cap. 7. 33 Abarca, Reyes de Aragon, tom. ii. rey 30, cap. 21. I have made use of three authorities exclusively devoted to Navarre, in the present History. 1. "L'Histoire du Royaume de Navarre, par un des Secrétaires-Interprettes de sa Maiesté." Paris, 1596, 8vo. This anonymous work, from the pen of one of Henry IV.'s secretaries, is little else than a meagre compilation of facts, and these deeply colored by the national prejudices of the writer. It derives some value from this circumstance, however, in the contrast it affords to the Spanish version of the same transactions. 2. A tract entitled “Ælii Antonii Nebrissensis de Bello Navariensi Libri Duo." It covers less than thirty pages folio, and is chiefly occupied, as the title imports, with the military events of the conquest by the duke of Alva. It was originally incorporated in the volume containing its learned author's version, or rather paraphrase, of Pulgar's Chronicle, with some other matters; and first appeared from the press of the younger Lebrija, apud inclytam Granatam, 1545." 3. But the great work illustrating the history of Navarre is the "Annales del Reyno;" of which the best edition is that in seven volumes, folio, from the press of Ibañez, Pam plona, 1766. Its typographical execution would be creditable to any country. The three first volumes were written by Moret, whose profound acquaintance with the antiquities of his nation has made his book indispensable to the student of this portion of its history. The fourth and fifth are the continuation of his work by Francisco de Aleson, a Jesuit who succeeded Moret as historiographer of Navarre. The two last volumes are devoted to investigations illustrating the antiquities of Navarre, from the pen of Moret, and are usually published separately from his great historic work. Aleson's continuation, extending from 1350 to 1527, is a production of considerable merit. It shows extensive research on the part of its author, who, however, has uot always confined himself to the most authentic and accredited sources of information. His references exhibit a singular medley of original contemporary documents, and apocryphal authorities of a very recent date. Though a Navarrese, he has written with the impartiality of one in whom local prejudices were extinguished in the more comprehensive national feelings of a Spaniard. CHAPTER XXIV. DEATH OF GONSALVO DE CORDOVA.-ILLNESS AND DEATH OF FERDINAND.-HIS CHARACTER. 1513-1516. Gonsalvo ordered to Italy.-General Enthusiasm.-The King's Distrust.-Gonsalvo in Retirement. - Decline of his Health.-His Death, and noble Character.-Ferdinand's Illness.-It increases.He dies. His Character.-A Contrast to Isabella.-The Judgment of his Contemporaries. NOTWITHSTANDING the good order which King Ferdinand maintained in Castile by his energetic conduct, as well as by his policy of diverting the effervescing spirits of the nation to foreign enterprise, he still experienced annoyance from various causes. Among these were Maximilian's pretensions to the regency, as paternal grandfather of the heir apparent. The emperor, indeed, had more than once threatened to assert his preposterous claims to Castile in person; and, although this Quixotic monarch, who had been tilting against windmills all his life, failed to excite any powerful sensation, either by his threats or his promises, it furnished a plausible pretext for keeping alive a faction hostile to the interests of the Catholic king. In the winter of 1509 an arrangement was made with the emperor, through the mediation of Louis the Twelfth, by which he finally relinquished his preten. sions to the regency of Castile, in consideration of the VOL. III.-25 R (385) |