XII. But when the right is ambiguous, and neither is in possession, or each is equally so, then if one of the parties refuse to divide the matter in question, he is to be reckoned unjust.

XIII. 1 From what we have said, we may decide the question moved by many writers, whether a war, regarded in reference to those who are the principal movers of it, can be just on both sides. We must distinguish various acceptations of the word just. A thing is called just from its cause, or from its effect. And again, from its cause, either in the special acceptation of justice, or in that general acceptation in which all rectitude or rightness comes under that name. Again, the special acceptation is divided into that which belongs to the act itself, and that which belongs to the agent; of which the former may be called positive, the latter negative. For the agent is sometimes said to act justly, when he does not act unjustly, although what he does be not just; as Aristotle rightly distinguishes, to act unjustly, and to do an unjust thing.

2 In the special acceptance of justice, as bearing upon the thing itself, a war cannot be just on both sides, as a lawsuit cannot. Because a moral claim to two contrary things, to act and to prevent the action, by the nature of the subject, cannot exist. But it may be that neither of the belligerent parties act unjustly: for no one acts unjustly except he who knows that he is doing an unjust thing: and many persons do not know this when it is so. Thus persons may carry on a lawsuit justly, that is, bona fide on both sides. For many points both of law, and of the facts from which the law arise, escape the notice of the parties concerned.

3 In a general acceptation, that is called just which is free from all fault of the agent. Many things are done without right, or done without fault, on account of inevitable ignorance; of which we have an example in those who do not observe the law, being ignorant of it without any fault of theirs, though it has been promulgated, and a sufficent time for their becoming acquainted with it has elapsed. So in litigation it may happen that both parties are free not only from injustice, but from all other vices; especially when both parties, or at least one, litigates not on his own account, but on that of another; as for instance, in consequence of the office of guardian or trustee, whose business it is not to desert a right which is only doubtful. So Aristotle says that in a doubtful question of law, neither side is bad; and Quintilian, that there are cases in which a good man may speak as an advocate on either side. Aristotle says too, that there are two senses in which we may say the judge judges rightly; the one, in which he judges as he ought according to the case, not making allowance for ignorance; the other, in which he judges sincerely as he thinks. To do this, as he says in another place, is not to judge unjustly.

4 But in war it cannot easily happen that there is not, on one side

at least temerity and a lack of charity, the matter being so grave, that we ought not to be content with probabilities, but should require evident causes.

5 If we take just as to some legal effects, it is certain that in this sense a war may be just on both sides; as will appear by what we shall have to say hereafter of a penal public war. So a sentence of a judge, though given not according to law, and possession without right, have certain legal effects.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Warnings not to go to War rashly, even for just causes.

I. 1

A

LTHOUGH it might seem that we who profess to write about the Rights of War, that is, its justice, have nothing to do with the consideration of what other virtues besides justice commend or recommend; yet we must try to obviate the error which would be committed if any one were to think that when the right was once established, it is forthwith either proper that war should be undertaken, or even that it is always lawful to undertake it. For on the contrary, it is mostly more right and more pious to give up one's rights. For as we have already said, we may even sacrifice our life in order to further, as much as is in us, the life and eternal salvation of another. And this is especially suitable to a Christian's character; who in doing this, imitates the perfect example of Christ, who was willing to die for us when we were yet ungodly and hostile. Which is a reason why we should not prosecute our rights or our dues to the inconvenience of others, to so great an extent as war occasions.

2 That war is not to be undertaken for every such cause, both Aristotle and Polybius teach us. Hercules is not praised by the ancients for that he took away the arms of Laomedon and Augias, because they did not pay him for his labour. Dio Prusæensis says that the question is to be asked, not only whether an injury has been received from those with whom we think of going to war, but also at what amount it is to be estimated.

II. 1 To pass over offenses without punishment, is a course to which many reasons exhort us. See how many things parents overlook in children: on which Cicero in Dio Cassius treats; so Seneca; and Phineus in Diodorus; and Andronicus Rhodius.

2 Now whoever undertakes to punish another, assumes in a certain degree the character of a governor, that is, of a parent; as Augustine says to Count Marcellinus, Christian judge, fulfil the office of a pious parent. The Emperor Julian praises a speech of Pittacus; who * But neither is he blamed, at least in the passage of Pausanias quoted. J. B.

prefers pardon to punishment. So Libanius says, that he who wishes to be like God, rejoices more in forgiveness than in punishing.

3 Sometimes the circumstances of the case are such, that to abstain from exercising one's right is not only laudable, but a duty; taking account of the kindness which we owe even to enemies, either considered in itself, or in the way in which the holy law of the Gospel requires it of us. And thus, we have said that there are some cases in which, even when we are attacked, we ought to prefer the salvation of the assailant, even to our own life, because we know him to be either necessary or extremely useful to the general interests of humanity. If Christ enjoins that some things are to be given up only to avoid strife, we must still more believe that he would have us give up greater things rather than go to war, since war is so much more hurtful than mere strife.

4 So Ambrose says, that for a good man to relax somewhat of his rights, is not only a point of liberality, but often of convenience. So Aristides persuades cities to pardon and concede, if it be any moderate matter; adding the reason, that even in private persons this is laudable. So Xenophon, and Apollonius in Philostratus.

III. 1 With regard to punishments, it is, in the first place, our duty, if not as men, at least as Christians, to forgive willingly and freely offenses against us, as God in Christ forgives our offenses. Eph. iv. 32. So Josephus.

2 So Seneca characterizes a prince, that he forgives his own injuries more easily than those of others; so Quintilian; and Cicero of Cæsar, that he forgot nothing but injuries. So Livia in her address to Augustus in Dio: Antoninus the philosopher: Ambrose to Theodo. sius; Themistius in praise of the same Theodosius.

3 Aristotle makes it a character of the magnanimous man, not to remember evil done to him; which Cicero copies. The Scripture gives us great examples of this virtue in Moses and David. [See.] This holds especially when we are ourselves conscious of some wrong; or when the wrong done us proceeds from some human and excusable infirmity; or when it is evident that he who has done the wrong is penitent. So Cicero, and Seneca. And so far, of the causes of abstaining from war, which arise from the kindness which we either owe to enemies, or rightly bestow upon them.

IV. 1 Often also it is a duty which we owe to ourselves, and those who depend upon us, not to recur to arms. Plutarch, in the life of Numa, says that when the Feciales had decided that war might be undertaken justly, he consulted the Senate whether it was advantageous to enter upon it. In one of Christ's parables, we are told that when a king, going to make war, finds that his forces are inferior to those of his enemy, he desires conditions of peace. Luke xiv. 31.

2 So the Tusculans, bearing everything and refusing nothing, obtained, by their merit, peace from the Romans. So Tacitus says of the Eduans, that a cause of war against them was sought in vain, for

they did more than was demanded of them.

So queen Amalasuntha told the ambassadors of Justinian that she would not contend with him in arms.

3 There may be also a moderation exercised in such cases, as Strabo relates of Syrmus king of the Triballi, who forbad Alexander of Macedon to enter the island of Peuce, and at the same time sent presents to him; shewing that what he did was done from a reasonable fear of the consequences, not from dislike or contempt of him. What Euripides said of the Greek cities, you may apply to any other parties; that if men could foresee the evils which war produces to themselves, they would avoid such a course. So Livy, and Thucydides.

V. 1 Those who deliberate in such cases, deliberate partly concerning the ends, not the ultimate, but the intermediate ones, and partly, concerning the means which lead to the ends. The end is always some good, or at least the avoidance of evil, which may stand in the place of good. The means which lead to ends are not sought on their own account, but as they lead to the end. Therefore in our deliberations we must compare ends with one another, and the efficacy of the means to produce the end: as Aristotle says of the motions of animals.

There are three rules for such comparisons.

2 The first rule is, if the thing in question seems, in moral estimation, to have an efficacy both for good and for evil; it is to be chosen only if there is more of good in the good consequences than of evil in the evil. So Aristides and Andronicus Rhodius.

3 The second rule is, if the good and the evil which may proceed from the thing be equal; it is to be chosen if the efficacy be greater for the good than for the evil.

The third rule is, if the good and the evil be unequal, and the efficacy to the one and the other also unequal; the thing is to be chosen, if the efficacy to good compared with the efficacy to evil be greater than the evil is compared with the good; or if the good compared with the evil be greater than the efficacy of the means for evil compared with its efficacy for good.

4 We have stated this somewhat formally. Cicero comes to the same result by a plainer way, when he says, that we are to avoid incurring danger without cause, than which nothing can be more foolish; wherefore, in incurring dangers, we are to imitate the practice of physicians, who, when men have a slight disease, cure them by slight means; but in more grave diseases, are compelled to apply dangerous and doubtful remedies. Whence, he says, the wise man must watch the occasion, and the more so, if you gain more good by the plain way than you can avoid evil by the doubtful way. 5 So Cicero in an Epistle to Atticus, Dio Prusæensis, Aristides. VI. 1 Let us take an example from a deliberation which, as Tacitus relates, was held among the cities of Gaul, whether they would