Sotus

what they are thus bound to do, they can be compelled to do. denies this, adducing the example of a rich man who is bound to give alms to a needy man by the rule of mercy, but cannot be compelled to do so. But it is to be remarked that the relation of such parties is different from that of superiors compared with subjects. For an equal cannot compel an equal, except to that which he has a right to, speaking strictly. But a superior can compel him to other things also which any virtue prescribes; because in the peculiar right of a superior as superior, this is comprehended. Thus in a great scarcity of corn, the citizens may be compelled to contribute to the common stock what each one has; and thus, in this question before us, it seems to be sound doctrine that the citizen may be compelled to do that which charity requires*. And thus Phocion, whom I have already mentioned, pointed out a very intimate friend of his, Nicocles by name, and said that matters were come to such a miserable condition that if Alexander demanded him, he would be of opinion that he ought to be given up.

IV. As parties whom we are bound to defend, next to our subjects, come our allies. This is comprehended in our engagement with them, whether they have put themselves under the authority and protection of others, or have contracted for mutual aid. He who does not repel an injury for an ally, if he can, is in the wrong as much as he who does the injury, says Ambrose. That such contracts are not to be extended to wars, where there is no just cause for the war, we have elsewhere said. And this is the reason why the Lacedæmonians, before they began their war with the Athenians, put the matter to the judgment of all their allies; as also the Romans did with regard to the Greeks, respecting the war with Nabis. We will further add, that even in such a case, the ally is not bound, if there be no hope of a good result. For such alliances are contracted, not for the sake of evil results, but of good. An ally however is to be defended even against another confederate, except there be some special stipulation to the contrary in some previous convention. Thus the Corcyreans, if their cause was good, might have received defensive aid from the Athenians, even against the Corinthians, who were their old allies.

V. The third cause [in which we may undertake war on account of others, subjects and allies being the first two cases,] is the cause of friends, to whom we have not promised aid, but to whom it is in a manner due on the ground of friendship, if it can be given easily and without inconvenience. Thus Abraham took arms for Lot, his relative; the Romans commanded the Antiates not to exercise piracy against

It is quite extravagant to place the sacrifice of one's own life on a level with other offices of charity. As Grotius himself has just said, (chap. XXIV. 6,) life is the foundation of all enjoyment in this world, and the occasion of all the happiness of another: and it must be only under peculiar circumstances that a man can dispose of these possessions, as if they resembled other possessions. W.

the Greeks, as being related to the Italians. The Romans too, often took up arms for their allies, not only when they were bound to do so by treaty, but also for their friends; or threatened to take up arms in such cases.

VI. The last and widest reason for taking up arms, is the connexion of men with men as such, which alone is often sufficient to induce them to give their aid. Men are made for mutual help, says Seneca, and the like; so Euripides and Ambrose.

VII. 1 Here the question is raised, whether man be bound to defend man, and people to defend people, from wrong. Plato thinks that he ought to be punished who does not repel force offered to another; and this was also provided by the laws of the Egyptians. But, in the first place, if the danger be manifest, it is certain that he is not so bound; for he may reasonably prefer his own life and possessions to those of others. And in this sense, as I conceive, we are to interpret what Cicero says, that he who does not repel and resist an injury when he can, is as much in fault as if he were to desert his parents, or his country, or his allies: when he can, we are to understand, with convenience to himself: for the same writer elsewhere says, Perhaps we cannot defend men without incurring blame. So Sallust says that when we are asked to assist allies, it is to be considered whether we may abstain from war; and then, whether what is required is sufficiently pious, safe, glorious; or on the other hand, unbecoming.

2 And the warning of Seneca is not to be despised: I am willing to help a man who is perishing, but so that I myself do not perish; except I am to be the ransom of a great man or a great cause. And even then, he will not be bound, if the person oppressed cannot be extricated without the death of the assailant. For if he may in some cases prefer the life of the assailant to his own, when he is attacked, as we have elsewhere said, he will not be wrong who either thinks or desires that another person so attacked has the same preference: especially when there is a greater danger of irreparable and eternal loss on the part of the invader.

VIII. 1 There is also another question, Whether a war for the subjects of another be just, for the purpose of defending them from injuries inflicted by their ruler. Certainly it is undoubted that ever since civil societies were formed, the rulers of each claimed some especial right over his own subjects. Euripides makes his characters say that they are sufficient to right wrongs in their own city. And Thucydides puts among the marks of empire, the supreme authority in judicial proceedings. And so Virgil, Ovid, and Euripides in the Hippolytus. This is, as Ambrose says, that peoples may not run into wars by usurping the care for those who do not belong to them. The Corinthians in Thucydides say that it is right that each state should punish its own subjects. And Perseus says that he will not plead in defense of what he did against the Dolopians, since they were under his authority and he had acted upon his right. But all this applies when

the subjects have really violated their duty; and we may add, when the case is doubtful. For that distribution of power was introduced for that case.

2 But the case is different if the wrong be manifest. If a tyrant like Busiris, Phalaris, Diomede of Thrace, practises atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of human social connexion is not cut off in such a case. So Constantine took arms against Maxentius and Licinius; and several of the Roman emperors took or threatened to take arms against the Persians, except they prevented the Christians being persecuted on account of their religion.

3 But if we should grant that subjects cannot rightly take up arms even in extreme necessity, (which, we have seen, has been doubted even by those whose purpose was to defend the royal power,) it would not follow that others may not take up arms for them. For when the impediment which exists to an action is in the person, not in the thing itself; in such cases, what is not lawful to one person may be lawful to another for him, if it be a case in which one can help another. Thus for a ward or minor, who is not capable of legal acts, the guardian or trustee sustains the suit; and for an absent person, an agent even without a special commission. Now the impediment which forbids the subject to resist, does not arise from the cause, which is the same in the subject and the non-subject; but from the quality of the person, which does not pass over to others.

4 Thus Seneca thinks that I may attack in war him who, though he is a stranger to my nation, persecutes his own; as we said when we spoke of exacting punishment: and this is often joined with the defense of innocent subjects. We know indeed, both from ancient and from modern histories, that the desire to appropriate another's possessions often uses such a pretext as this: but that which is used by bad men does not necessarily therefore cease to be right. Pirates use navigation, but navigation is not therefore unlawful. Robbers use weapons, but weapons are not therefore unlawful*.

IX. 1 But, as we have said, that leagues made with a view to mutual help in all wars alike, without distinction of the cause, are unlawful; so no kind of life is more disreputable than that of those who act as soldiers for pay merely, without regard to the cause; whose motto is, the right is where the best pay is: as Plato proves from Tyrtæus. This is the reproach which Philip cast upon the Etolians, and Dionysius of Miletus upon the Arcadians; saying, that there was a market where the Arcadians made a profit of the misfortunes of the Greeks. As Antiphanes says, It is a wretched life to be ready to die in order to live. So Dio Prusæensis.

2 But that they sell their own lives is little, if it were not that they sell too the lives of other innocent men: and in this way they are worse than the hangman, in proportion as it is worse to kill men without a cause than for a cause: as Antisthenes says that executioners * See Barbeyrac's happy verification of these and the following quotations.

are more respectable than tyrants, for they kill guilty, these, innocent men. Philip of Macedon (the greater) said that for those whose gain was in a soldier's life, peace was war, and war, peace.

3 War is not one of the arts of life. On the contrary, it is a thing so horrible, that nothing but the highest necessity or the deepest charity can make it be right: as may be understood from what we have said in the last chapter but one. Augustine says, to be a soldier is not a sin, but to be a soldier for plunder, is.

X. And not for plunder only, but for pay, if that be regarded solely or principally; though in the other case, it is allowable to receive pay. St Paul says, Who goeth to warfare at his own charge?

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CHAPTER XXVI.

Of just Causes for War in those who are under another's

I.

WE

E have treated of those who are their own masters. There are others who by their condition are under authority, as sons of families, servants, subjects, even individual citizens, as compared with the whole body of their city.

II. These, if they are either called to counsel, or if a free option is given them of war or peace, ought to follow the same rules as they who by their own decision undertake wars for themselves or others.

III. 1 But if they are commanded to join in a war, as often happens, if they are quite clear that the war is unlawful, they ought to abstain. That God is to be obeyed rather than men, not only the Apostles have said, but Socrates also: and the masters among the Hebrews have a saying indicating that even the king, if he command anything against the law of God, is not to be obeyed. That our obedience is to be limited by our duty to God, is declared by Polycarp at the point of death; Jerome on St Paul, Eph. vi. 1; Tertullian; Sylvanus the martyr; Antigone in Euripides; Musonius.

2 That a father or master is not to be obeyed if he command a crime, as treason, the murder of his mother, false sentence, and the like, is asserted by Gellius, Quintilian, Seneca, Sopater. Stratocles was laughed at in Athens for proposing a law that whatever was thought good by Demetrius, should be reckoned right and pious. Pliny somewhere says that he had laboured to prove that to be ministerial in a crime was a crime.

3 Even the Civil Law, which is facile in giving pardon to excusable offenses, is favourable to those who are under the necessity of obeying,

but not to all. It excepts cases of great atrocity, crimes which are naturally abominable, not condemned by the opinion of lawyers only, but by natural feeling.

4 Josephus relates that the Jews, under Alexander the Great, would perform other military works, but could not be compelled to pile up earth to restore the temple of Belus. But we have a closer exception