opinion that such frauds are iniquitous, but from a certain eminent loftiness of mind, and sometimes from a confidence in the strength of the speaker. In Elian we have a saying of Pythagoras, that men approach to the gods principally by two things; by always speaking the truth, and by doing good to others; and in Jamblichus veracity is called the leader to all divine and human good things. So Aristotle says that the magnanimous man loves to speak truly and freely; Plutarch, that to lie is slavish. So Arrian of Ptolemy and of Alexander; Mamertinus of Julian; so Plutarch of Aristides, and Probus of Epaminondas, that they would not lie even in jest.

2 And this is still more to be observed by Christians, to whom not only simplicity is commanded, Matt. x. 16, but also vain speaking interdicted, Matt. xii. 36; and He proposed as an example, in whose mouth was found no guile. So Lactantius says that we must not be content with telling truth to our friends, but also to strangers and enemies. So Neoptolemus is described in Sophocles, excellent in simplicity and noblemindedness; as Dio Prusmensis notes. See his answer to Ulysses in the Philoctetes, and see Euripides in the Rhesus.

3 So Alexander said that he would not steal a victory. And Polybius relates that the Achæans abhorred all fraud towards enemies; thinking victory then only firm when, as Claudian says, it subjugates the minds of the enemy. Such were the Romans till the end of the second Punic war. It is their virtue, Elian says, not to seek victory by art and cunning. And accordingly when Perseus was deceived with the hope of peace, the older senators said that they did not recognize the arts of Rome; that their ancestors had never in war boasted of cunning instead of courage; not of the tricks of the Carthaginians, not of the subtlety of the Greeks, among whom it was more glorious to deceive an enemy than to overcome him by force. And then they added that sometimes, for the present moment, success might be obtained by deceit more than by valour; but that his mind only was thoroughly conquered, who was compelled to confess that he was subdued, not by art or by chance, but in a close trial of strength in just and pious war. So even later in Tacitus. Such too were the Tibarenians, who announced beforehand the time and place of battle. And Mardonius in Herodotus says that the Greeks of his time did the same.

XXI. As to what concerns the mode of acting, this is to be noted; that what it is not lawful for another to do, it is not lawful for us to impel or solicit him to do. We may take such examples as these: it is not lawful for a subject to kill his king, nor to give up towns without public authority, nor to despoil his fellowcitizens. Therefore it is not lawful to move a citizen, continuing in that character, to do such things. For in all cases, he who gives another cause to sin, does himself sin. Nor is it enough to reply

that to him who impels such a man to such a deed, say to kill an enemy, the deed is lawful. It is lawful, but not in that manner. Augustine says well, It makes no difference whether you yourself commit a wickedness, or make another man commit it for you.

XXII. The case is different, if any one use the help of a person who does wrong of his own accord, and not at his impulse; which we have proved elsewhere, by the example of God himself, not to be unjust. We receive a deserter by the laws of war, says Celsus; that is, it is not against the laws of war to receive him who leaves the enemy and comes over to us.

CHAPTER II.

How far by the Law of Nations the goods of Subjects are liable for the debt of the Rulers; and herein, of Reprisals.

I.

1

L

ET us come to the results which in war flow from the Law of Nations. These belong partly to any war, partly, to certain kinds of war. We begin with the general case.

By the mere Law of Nature, no one is bound by the act of another, except he who is the successor to his property: for the rule that property passes with its burthens, was introduced when property was introduced. The emperor Zeno says that it is contrary to natural equity that one person should be molested for the debts of another. Hence the Roman Law provides that the wife is not responsible for the husband, the husband for the wife, the son for the father, the father or mother for the son.

2 Nor do individuals owe what the general body owes, as Ulpian plainly says: that is, if the general body have property; for otherwise, they are bound, not as individuals, but as parts of the general body. Seneca says, If any one lends money to my country, the debt is not mine: but I will give my share towards the payment. He had before said, Individuals will owe, not as a part of their own debt, but a part of the public. Hence it was specially provided by the Roman Law that the members of a village should not be responsible for the debts of others of the same village; and elsewhere, no possession can be made responsible for other persons' debts, not even public debts. And in a law of Justinian, securities for others are forbidden; it being stated as the reason, that the debtor is one person, and the person distrained, another, which is stated to be unreasonable and odious. And so king Theodoric calls this liberty of suretyship disgraceful.

II. 1 But though this is so, a rule may be introduced by the instituted Law of Nations, and it appears, has been introduced, that for a debt due from any civil society or its head, either on his own account or as bound for another, all the goods, corporeal and incorporeal, of the members of the society, are bound and liable. And this rule has been established by a certain necessity, in that otherwise

there would be great licence for the commission of injury, since the goods of the rulers often cannot so easily be got at, as those of private persons, who are more numerous. And therefore this is one of the rights which, Justinian says, were instituted by nations on the exigency of usage and to meet human necessities.

2 And this is not in any way so repugnant to nature that it may not be introduced by usage and tacit consent, since sureties become bound for debts without any cause, by consent alone. And it was to be hoped that the members of the same society would be able to exact rights from one another, and to consult their own indemnity, more easily than strangers, who in many cases are little attended to: and moreover there was, by such an obligation, an advantage to be gained by all peoples, so that they upon whom in one case it presses heavily, in another would find their relief in it.

3 That this usage is received, appears not only from the wars on a large scale which one people carries on against another: for in these the rule that is followed appears in the formula by which war is declared; as in Livy, I declare war against the people of the Latins and against the Latian men: and in the proposal, Whether they wished that war should be declared against Philip of Macedon and those who are under his rule: and in the decree itself, The Roman people order that war should be with the Hermundulan people, and with the Hermundulan men; in Cincius on military affairs, and elsewhere, Let him be an enemy and those who are under his protection: but also, when war on this full scale has not yet taken place, but where some violent exaction of rights, that is, an imperfect war, has been found necessary, we see the same usage prevail. Agesilaus said to Pharnabazus, When we were friends to the king we behaved in a friendly manner to his people: and now that we are enemies, we shall behave hostilely to the same: and therefore as you choose to belong to the king, we shall attack him through you.

III. 1 A kind of the exaction of rights of which we speak was what the Athenians called androlepsy, or man-taking; and the Attic law was, that if any one was violently killed, his neighbours and relatives had the right of taking men till either the murderer was punished, or the murderers given up; but three men only may be taken, and not more. Here we see that for a debt of the city which is under an obligation to punish those of its subjects who have injured others, a certain incorporeal right of the subjects is held bound, namely, their personal liberty; so that they are enslaved till the city punishes the guilty. The Egyptians, as we learn from Diodorus, held that a man's body or liberty were not to be bound for a debt: but yet there is nothing in such a usage repugnant to nature: and the contrary practice has prevailed not only among the Greeks, but also other nations.

2 Aristocrates, a contemporary of Demosthenes, had proposed a decree that if any one slew Charidemus, he might be taken wherever ho was, and if any one resisted he should be held as an enemy. In this, Demosthenes finds much to reprehend; first, that Aristocrates had

not distinguished between killing justly and unjustly, though it might happen that he was killed justly: and next, that he does not require that first a trial should be demanded: and thirdly, that he requires those to be bound who have received the homicide, and not those among whom the act was committed. And he then refers to the androlepsy just mentioned, saying that The law made them responsible among whom the homicide took place; but that Andronicus left these untouched, and punished those who received the homicide; though the usage of all nations was to protect refugees. The fourth objection is, that Aristocrates makes the matter forthwith a case of public war, the law being content with the man-taking.

3 Of these, the first, second, and fourth arguments are not without weight. But as to the third, except it be restricted to the case of slaying by accident or in self-defense, is said rather oratorically than according to truth and justice: for the law of nations that suppliants are to be received and defended, applies to those, as we have said, who have been unfortunate, not criminal.

4 Moreover the case is the same as to those among whom the crime was committed, and those who refuse to punish or to give up the guilty person. And therefore the law which Demosthenes quotes either receives from usage that interpretation which I have given, or was afterwards expressly made valid against such evasions. That one of these two was the case will not be denied by any one who attends to what is said by Julius Pollux of this androlepsy, referring it to those who receive the homicide. So Harpocration on androlepsy.

5 A like practice it is, when, to recover a citizen made captive by manifest wrong, citizens of the state by which this has been done are detained. Thus at Carthage some interfered to prevent Aristo of Tyre being taken, saying that if this was done, the same would be done to Carthaginians at Tyre, and in other mercantile cities whither they went in numbers.

IV. Another kind of the violent exaction of rights is taking security of the people of the offender; which the more recent jurists call the Right of Reprisals; the Saxons and Angles, Withernamium; and the French, among whom it is granted by the king, Letters of Marque. And this has place, as the jurists say, when Rights are denied.

V. 1 This is understood to be permitted by custom, not only if judgment against a criminal or a debtor cannot be obtained within a reasonable time; but also in a very clear case, (for in a doubtful case the presumption is for the established judges,) if judgment be given plainly against right. Even among subjects, a wrong sentence does not abolish a true debt. A true debtor though absolved remains a debtor, says Paulus. And when by the wrong doing of the judge the creditor takes a thing which was not the property of the debtor, as being liable; and when it was inquired if when the debt was paid this ought to be restored to the debtor, Scævola decided that it was. There is this difference [between a question among subjects of the same state