whose Isagoge Juris Naturalis, Gentium, et Civilis, was published at Cologne in 1539; Nicolaus Hemming, who wrote De Lege Naturæ Methodus Apodictica; Benedict Winkler, whose Principiorum Juris libri quinque appeared in 1615, ten years before the publication of the work of Grotius. But I see no reason to think that these works did more to anticipate the work of Grotius than the works which he himself enumerates and criticizes, as bearing upon the subject; especially the work of the Oxford Professor of Law, Albericus Gentilis, De Jure Belli, Hanoviæ, 1598. In this work, as Mr Hallam has observed, the titles of the chapters run almost parallel to those of the first and third Books of Grotius; and Grotius himself mentions him (along with Balthasar Ayala), as a writer who had been of great use to him: "Cujus diligentia sicut alios adjuvari posse scio, et me adjutum profiteor," (Prol. 38). Ayala, De Jure et Officiis Bellicis, published in 1582, is conceived by Mr Hallam to have been the first "that systematically reduced the practice of nations in the conduct of war to legitimate rules." But notwithstanding the labours of these authors, we may, I conceive, fully assent to Mr Hallam, when he says of Grotius's work: "The book may be considered as nearly original, in its general platform, as any work of man in an advanced stage of civilization and learning can be. It is more so, perhaps, than those of Montesquieu and [Adam] Smith."

The work of

Mr Dugald Stewart has, in his Dissertation on the Progress of Philosophy, spoken unfavourably, indeed contemptuously, of Grotius's great work. I am happily relieved from any necessity of replying to this criticism, by the admirable manner in which the task has already been performed by Mr Hallam. That judicious and temperate writer finds himself compelled to refer to Mr Stewart's attack in these terms: "That he should have spoken of a work so distinguished by fame, and so effective, as he

himself admits, over the public mind of Europe, in terms of unmingled depreciation, without having done more than glanced at some of its pages, is an extraordinary symptom of that tendency towards prejudices, hasty but inveterate, of which that eminent man seems to have been not a little susceptible. The attack made by Stewart on those who have taken the law of nature and nations for their theme, and especially on Grotius, who stands forwards in that list, is protracted for several pages, and it would be tedious to examine every sentence in succession. Were I to do so, it is not, in my opinion, an exaggeration to say that almost every successive sentence would lie open to criticism." He then goes on to take the chief heads of accusation; and to his instructive discussion of them, I refer my reader*.

Paley also, in the Preface to his Moral Philosophy, censures Grotius for the profusion of his classical quotations; an objection of which I have already spoken, and which I have here tried to remedy; and for the forensic cast of his writings. That in the work of Grotius we see everywhere traces of the juristical training of his mind, is not to be denied; but it may be much doubted whether this is a disadvantage ;—whether this legal discipline of the intellect have not given a precision to his divisions and reasonings which they would not have had without the habits so formed. Certainly a jurist would find, in Paley himself, great reason to complain that questions of morality and of law are mingled together in a very confused and arbitrary manner.

It was not the intention of Grotius to furnish a System of Ethics. But if we regard the work as to its bearing on ethical philosophy, it will, in many respects, sustain with advantage a comparison with the work of Paley. Grotius

* Literature of Europe, Part III. Chap. iv. § 83.

shews, satisfactorily as I conceive, that utility is a very narrow and perverse expression for the foundation of morality (Proleg. 16). And the foundation which he himself lays, is far broader and more philosophical (Proleg. 6). Man, he says, is an excellent animal, differing from other animals, not in degree only but in nature; and among his peculiar excellencies is a desire for society, a desire for a life spent in community with his fellow-men; and not merely spent somehow, but spent tranquilly and as a reasonable being; communitatis non qualiscunque, sed tranquillæ, et pro sui intellectus modo ordinatæ. This desire, or impulse, the Stoics called oikeiwois, the Domestic Impulse. We might be tempted to call it the Domestic Instinct; but then, we should have to recollect, that precisely one of the peculiarities which we have here to take into account, is, that man is not governed by Instinct, but by Reason; that in virtue of his human nature, the impulses which belong to him, analogous to the instincts of animals, become conscious and intelligent purposes: and thus personal security, property, contracts and the like, the necessary conditions of a tranquil and reasonable community of life, are necessary results of man's nature. And thus human nature is the source of Rights, as Grotius says, (Proleg. 16).

That man forms a judgment of actions, and tendencies to act, as being right or wrong; and that the adjective right has a wider range than the substantive Rights; are doctrines belonging to man's moral nature; and these doctrines lead us to a scheme of morality which has its foundations, as a sound scheme of morality must have, at once in the external conditions of man's being, and in the internal nature of his soul. The Rights which his outward circumstances necessarily establish, are recognized and made the cardinal points of Rightness, by his inward con

victions. Among the convictions which belong to man, as a moral creature, is this; that not only his outward actions, but his inward purposes, volitions, affections, desires and habits, ought to be right. This consideration, however, leads us into a region of morality with which Grotius is not much concerned in the present work.

Many of the questions of International Law which are discussed by Grotius, have been the subject of much subsequent discussion; and in several cases, the opinions now generally accepted are different from those which he asserts. To have attempted to notice such cases, would have been, not to edit Grotius, but to compile a Treatise on the present state and past history of International Law. The student of such subjects will necessarily have to read many books; of which, however, this of Grotius is certainly one of the most indispensable. What is requisite in order to correct him, must be obtained by studying the best of his successors.

The

I hope that the deep and earnest love of Peace which inspired the design of this book, and which breathes so ardently through so many of its pages, will obtain a favourable reception for the work, in these days when the same sentiment is so strongly felt and so widely spread, and has shewn itself in so many remarkable ways. progress of the study of International Law, on such principles as those of Grotius, and the increase of a regard for the authority of such Law, are among the most hopeful avenues to that noble Ideal of the lovers of mankind, a Perpetual Peace: the most hopeful, because along this avenue, we can already see a long historical progress, as well as a great moral aim. Grotius himself, as was natural with his views, indulged the hope of such a consummation; as appears for instance, Book 11. chap. xxiii. Sect. x. Art. 4, where he says: "It would be useful, and indeed it is almost

necessary, that certain Congresses of Christian Powers should be held, in which controversies which arise among some of them may be decided by others who are not interested; and in which measures may be taken to compel the parties to accept peace on equitable terms." I trust that all Students and Professors of International Law will consider themselves as labouring upon a Problem which is still unsolved, while War exists; and in which all the approximate solutions must make wars more rare and more brief, as well as more orderly and more humane.

Notwithstanding the love of peace and the spirit of humanity which thus runs through the work of Grotius, it has been blamed by some, as sanctioning, by its doctrines, many of the most savage usages of war. But this objection can be made, I think, only by those who have not read the book with due attention. It is true, that in certain parts of the Third Book, he states the customary Rules, according to which wars have always been carried on; which Rules allow killing men, taking prisoners, capturing property, laying waste a country, and the like. And these he calls the Rights of War; and gives interpretations of the rules which may seem very severe. But this, he himself notes: and when he has performed this part of his task, he forthwith (in Chap. x.) proceeds to say, "I am now going to take from belligerents what I have seemed to grant to them, but have not really granted:" and then he goes on with a series of Chapters, which he calls Temperamenta, Restraints as to the exercise of these Rights of War, derived from considerations of humanity, justice, expedience and piety: and by these "temperaments," he divests war of all the cruelty and hardship which are separable from it. Still, some persons appear to be offended at violent and oppressive practices being called Rights in any sense. Upon this, I would