The Apostles rule for the re and passive obedience? Undoubtedly not. of our religion gave us an example and a sistance of a Christian. They resisted not the powers of the world by bodily force; but by persuasion, by patient endurance, and by heroic self-devotion: and the moral and civil revolutions, which they and their followers effected, were incomparably the most astonishing that are recorded in the history of man. Should it, however, be said, that ordinary men, not having the powers given to the inspired Apostles, must, on that account, adopt less exalted maxims as their rules of life; we may state in general terms (without loading this discussion with extreme cases which lead to no practical good in moral speculation), that where the Christian religion prevails in its purity, it is impossible there should ever exist an unmitigated despotism; and where the power of the executive is limited (in however small a degree) there will always be found within the constitution some place where the encroachments of bad and despotic men may be met by a moral and legal resistance. Rebellion is pro scribed by human law, and is forbidden by the law of God. But a moral opposition to the executive, conducted on constitutional grounds, is proscribed by no law, either of God or man and if it be wisely and virtuously carried on, it has in its own nature the elements of increasing strength, and must at length be irresistible. If, however, during the progress of a state, the constituted authorities be in open warfare with each other, a good man may at length be compelled to take a side, and reluctantly to draw his sword. in defence of the best inheritance of his country. Such an appeal, to be just, must be made on principle, and after all other honest means have been tried in vain. Unfortunately, the opposition to the encroachments of arbitrary power has too often been commenced by selfish men for base purposes. Instead of taking their stand in a moral and constitutional resistance-instead of trying, by every human means, to concentrate all the might of virtue and high principle on their side, they have broken the laws of their country, dipped their hands in blood, and needlessly brought ruin on themselves and their party. The vices of the subject are not only the despot's plea, but the despot's strength. Where the virtuous elements of social order are wanting in the state, whether men be willing slaves or not, they are unfit for freedom. (4). In the Chapter On the British Constitution we may, I think, find some examples of mere utilitarian reasoning, where the author ought (in part at least) to have taken the higher ground of a moral philosopher. It is impossible to deny that there is in this chapter much good sense and sound reasoning. Reviewing the popular part of our constitution, he points out the vast advantages we have derived from it, and the contingent evils of any material change in the system of popular representation. But, the corruption-the perjury-the baseness connected with the system-the mean shifts to which great men were compelled by it to stoop-the chance that the very fountains of law and honour might become polluted by itthe never-failing topics of offence it held out to discontented and designing men-these things are all passed over, though in the eyes of some they seemed to form a deadly canker in the state. Had he considered these flagrant evils, and then shewn that, while men continue what they are-little better than the slaves of their bad passionsany other system might bring along with it, as great, or perhaps greater, moral evils, he had done well. His conclusions might have been right or wrong; but his argument would have been not only more complete, but placed on higher and truer grounds.-I am offering no opinion on any subject discussed in this chapter; the attempt would * Moral and Political Philosophy, Book v1. Chap. vii. be entirely out of place in this note: my object is, not to examine the weight of Paley's arguments, but his tone of arguing. (5). Near the end of the Chapter On Crimes and Punishments, is the following sentence*: Another maxim which deserves examination, is this ::-" That it is better that ten guilly persons escape, than that one innocent man should suffer." If by saying it is better, be meant that it is more for the public advantage, the proposition, I think, cannot be maintained. It would, I believe, be an easy task to prove that this conclusion is wrong on Paley's own principles. We are, at least, certain that it contradicts the moral feelings of mankind, and this is quite enough to condemn it. No man perhaps ever used the disjunctive form of reasoning with more advantage than Paley. It sometimes however led him into error. The worst example of this kind has been considered in a former page of this Discourse another occurs in the chapter just quoted. There are (he observes) two methods of administering penal justice-The first method assigns capital punishments to few offences, and inflicts it invariably-The second method assigns capital punishments to many kinds of offences, but inflicts it only upon a few examples of each kind. All this is true; but when he argues as if there never had been, or could be, any other methods besides these two; his conclusions (whether true or false) are not derived from any rules of sound logic, and are open to a charge of sophistry. This last remark is not however of much importance, and bears not directly on my present object. From all that has been stated above, we may conclude, that Paley was wrong in overlooking the innate moral capacities of our nature-that the principle of utility is derived from false reasoning-that it places man in a false * Moral and Political Philosophy, Book v1. Chap. ix. + See above, p. 60. position-lowers his standard of right and wrong—and inevitably leads him, whether in speculation or practice, into false and unhallowed consequences. In accepting these conclusions, we merely assume, that man has a moral nature; and that, in almost every act of his life, his perception of right and wrong is incomparably clearer than his knowledge of the general consequences that may follow from the act itself. SUPPLEMENT TO THE APPENDIX, CONTAINING A SERIES OF NOTES TO THE PREFACE. AN unhappy fatality seems to hang over the publication of this Volume. Not many days after the concluding note to the Preface of this Edition was printed the Author went out of College; but he returned about a week afterwards, for the express purpose of passing the following Supplement to the Appendix through the Press, during the Christmas vacation; for he was anxious that the Volume should be out by the beginning of the Lent Term. But very soon after his return he met with painful and dangerous accident, which for five months made him unfit for any continued intellectual labour: and he now resumes his task, though still crippled in his right arm, and anxious on many accounts to make the following supplementary Notes as short as he can without obscuring their meaning. TRINITY COLlege, May 20, 1850. No. I. Additional Remarks on the Nebular Hypothesis. It may have appeared strange to the reader of note D, that no allusion is made in it to The Telescopic Survey of the whole surface of the visible Heavens, by Sir John Herschel. The note was, however, printed several months before the first appearance of that great work. Supra, p. cccxxxiii., and note to p. ccccxli. On reconsidering note D, I find that I have expressed myself inaccurately in referring to the ecliptic as if it were La Place's invariable plane of the Solar System. The ecliptic is, in fact, inclined to that plane at an angle of S. D. M |